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Two little mice fell in a bucket of cream. The first mouse quickly gave up and 
drowned. The second mouse wouldn't quit. He struggles so hard that eventually he 
churned that cream into butter and crawled out. Gentleman, as of this moment, I am 
that second mouse.  
 
(Christopher Walken in Catch me if you can (2002)) 
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Summary 
Researchers, policy makers, investors and managers have long tried to understand 
why some firms survive and even prosper in the face of environmental changes, 
while others wither. To build a competitive advantage and to cope with 
environmental changes, firms need to renew themselves. Inability to do so may have 
severe consequences for firms, the people they employ, and the communities in 
which they operate (Danneels, 2010). Especially, in the early stages, new ventures 
are confronted with environmental changes, resource constraints and cognitive 
limitations which almost always prevent founders from executing their plans as 
initially intended (Baker, Miner, & Eesley, 2003; Hmieleski & Corbett, 2008). 
Consequently, new ventures will need to build dynamic capabilities which can be 
defined as the capacity to sense and seize opportunities and change the firm’s 
resource base, its substantive capabilities or its environment (Teece, 2007; Helfat 
and Winter, 2011).  
 
Despite the development of the concept, the numerous publications in leading top 
journals and the argued importance of capabilities to competitive advantage and 
firm performance, many theoretical and empirical issues remain a source of debate 
(Hoopes, Madsen, and Walker, 2003; Armstrong and Shimizu, 2007; Newbert, 2007, 
2008). After more than two decades of mainly theoretical research, elaborating on 
the question how established firms can create a competitive sustainable advantage, 
I conduct three empirical studies and apply the dynamic capability perspective to 
the context of new technology-based ventures. We can divide the extant dynamic 
capability literature into two research streams (Zahra et al., 2006).   
 
A first stream of research in dynamic capability literature focuses on the capability 
formation. To trace the emergence of capability formation, one needs to track the 
early stages of a firm, because it is during this phase that capabilities are developed.  
A central argument of capabilities-based work is that routines or capabilities are the 
fundamental units of analysis, and that the organization should be conceptualized as 
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the central repository of routines and capabilities (e.g., Nelson and Winter 1982). 
However, despite over two decades of largely theoretical (and some empirical) 
work, as well as recent efforts to clarify the meanings of organizational routines and 
capabilities (Winter, 2003), fundamental questions about their origins and micro-
foundations still persist. In this thesis, I argue that many of the problems associated 
with capabilities-based work are a result of the focus on collective level constructs 
(e.g. routines) at the expense of individual-level considerations.  
 
In paper 1 of this dissertation, I investigate the capability development process from 
a micro-foundation perspective and analyze how a dynamic capability is developed 
over time in a case study of a new venture which was initially one of the highest 
successes but eventually failed to address a significant change in the environment. 
In line with recent studies, we argue that hierarchies matter in explaining dynamic 
capabilities and consider different decision makers at different layers in the process 
of developing dynamic capabilities. Paper 2 focusses on the role of the founders and 
the entrepreneurial team to bundle resources in either substantive or dynamic 
capabilities. Here, we use the upper echelon and the micro-foundation perspective, 
to investigate which early top managers’ (founders) characteristics will influence 
either the development of substantive or dynamic capabilities. Substantive 
capabilities represents the firm capacity to perform a particular activity in a reliable 
and at least minimally satisfactory way (Helfat and Winter, 2011:1244) while 
dynamic capabilities can be defined as the capacity to change the firm’s resource 
base, its substantive capabilities or its environment (Teece, 2007; Helfat et al., 2007; 
Helfat and Winter, 2011). 
 
A second stream of research analyses the impact of dynamic capabilities on firm 
performance. Early proposals in this field clearly assumed a direct relationship 
between firms’ dynamic capabilities and their performance (Teece et al., 1997). 
These authors stated that this framework is intended to explain firm-level success 
and failure, competitive advantage, and private wealth creation (Teece et al., 1997; 
Makadok, 2001; Zollo and Winter, 2002). More recently, Teece (2007) stated that “
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the ambition of the dynamic capabilities framework is nothing less than to explain 
the sources of enterprise-level competitive advantage over time” and that “dynamic 
capabilities lies at the core of enterprise success (and failure).” However, other 
researchers took a more cautious approach towards the relation between dynamic 
capabilities and performance. In their view, long-term competitive advantage does 
not only rely on dynamic capabilities themselves but on the resource configurations 
or substantive capabilities created by the dynamic capabilities (Zahra et al., 2006) 
and on “using dynamic capabilities sooner, more astutely, more fortuitously than 
the competition” (Eisenhardt & Martin 2000). Very recently, researchers build 
further on this logic and clarified the conditions under which dynamic capabilities 
can be valuable (Drnevich and Kriauciunas, 2012).  Helfat and Winter (2011) and 
Drnevich and Kriauciunas (2012) showed that although dynamic capabilities might 
be more useful in dynamic environments, they also lead to competitive advantage in 
less dynamic ones. Beyond the environment, the literature remains silent when it 
comes to boundary conditions at company level. Paper 3 analyses the boundary 
conditions under which dynamic capabilities can be beneficial in the challenging 
early stages of a new venture. 
 
To examine the research questions of the first paper, I used an inductive case study 
design, collecting data through participant observation over a two year period, 
content analysis of email conversation and analysis of board documents, meeting 
minutes and different versions of the business plan. The case study was not only 
useful to answers the research questions of paper 1, it also appeared very valuable 
as a basis for the development of a measurement instrument for substantive and 
dynamic capabilities which we used in paper 2 (appendix B and C) and 3 (appendix 
D). In the second paper, we obtain a mixed methodology and combine two years of 
exploratory qualitative research with a quantitative research design based upon a 
survey of 144 founders of 78 new technology-based ventures followed in a period of 
three years. Finally, in paper 3 we obtain a quantitative research design to test the 
relationship between dynamic capabilities and firm survival. Therefore, we started 
from the same database of new technology based firms and added more recently 
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founded new technology based firms. In the end, we managed to collect data from 
230 founders of 124 new technology-based firms. 
 
In paper 1, I focused on the micro-foundations of capability development and used a 
micro perspective to investigate the development process of dynamic capabilities. 
Using the phases of perception, willingness and ability which typically are considered 
the building blocks of dynamic capabilities, we found several important barriers to 
the development of dynamic capabilities. First, we show that a firm should be able 
to manage attention which is distributed across different levels of the hierarchy as 
part of the awareness creation process. Understanding the management of 
distributed attention is key to advancing the theory of dynamic capabilities and 
more specifically to improve the “awareness/perception” part.  Secondly, firms 
should manage different levels of cognitive dissonance to create willingness. 
Although different layers in the organization were recognizing the change in the 
environment and were willing to develop an answer to address the environmental 
need, this did not mean that they were willing to change the business model at 
company level nor to change the associated resources. Finally, implementing change 
means that not only awareness and willingness is created, the individual decision 
makers must also be able to do so. We show in our case study that instead of moving 
from one configuration to another, the new business model and resource 
configuration is added upon the existing one. Only after that the second resource 
configuration has proven to be successful, we can assume that the first one loses in 
importance and will be gradually divested. As such, the organization will need to 
cope with competing objectives as a way to finalize the implementation of dynamic 
capabilities. On the one hand they need to create evidence for the new business 
model, while on the other hand they need to match the milestones of the old one. We 
suggest that these competing objectives can be managed by viewing flexibility and 
efficiency as a duality both at individual and systems level. This implies that a 
context is created to stimulate individual ambidexterity, that redundancy and 
cognitive variation are built into the system and that management practices such as 
flexibility inducing mechanisms are adopted to implement the change effectively. 
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Building on the upper echelons theory, which state that the firm reflects the 
preferences of its top management team (Hambrick and Mason, 1984),  I found in 
the second study of my Ph.D that micro-foundations, measured as personality traits, 
also explain why ventures either develop substantive or dynamic capabilities. First, I 
show that conscientious founders and their teams foster the development of 
substantive capabilities. Conscientious founders are typically described as hard 
working, achievement oriented, forward planning and well structured (Gellatly, 
1996; Bell, 2007; Ciaverella et al., 2004; Barrick and Mount, 1991). This personality 
type impacts the way in which the venture is structured and predicts the extent to 
which the founder emphasizes the development of procedures to increase the 
venture’s efficiency. However, to sense or shape new opportunities and to change 
existing substantive capabilities, new ventures need to develop dynamic 
capabilities. Our findings indicate that conscientious founders lack interest in 
developing these capabilities. Instead, I found that conscientious individuals need 
proactive team members to develop dynamic capabilities. Hence, if conscientious 
founders team up with proactive co-founders, their ventures do develop dynamic 
capabilities. Our results also show that proactive personalities have a strong 
positive impact on the development of dynamic capabilities, while they ignore the 
development of substantive capabilities. We further find that firms with proactive 
entrepreneurs without conscientious co-founders tend not to develop substantive 
capabilities. This means that proactive individuals will also benefit from working 
with conscientious co-founders.  
In the third paper, we clarify the conditions under which dynamic capabilities play 
an important role in the early stages of a new venture. This study theoretically 
extends the literature on dynamic capabilities towards organization theory where 
scholars tend to focus on stability as an important element of organizational 
performance. First, we show that formalization improves the impact of dynamic 
capabilities on the performance of new ventures. More specifically, we show that 
dynamic capabilities benefit from clear internal role specialization and 
formalization of the founding team. Second, we show that redundancy on the work 
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floor has a similar impact on the relation between dynamic capabilities and 
performance.  Third, we show that boards, which are considered a third source of 
stability, do not have the same impact on the relation between dynamic capabilities 
and new venture performance. On the contrary, boards limit the impact of dynamic 
capabilities. Boards typically monitor the new venture performance based upon an 
agreed business plan which is difficult to change. External directors in boards might 
be too distant from the new venture’s operations to be assistive in implementing 
changes. 
This dissertation makes several contributions to the strategic management 
literature, more specifically to the literature on dynamic capabilities, but also to the 
entrepreneurship literature, upper echelon theory and research on personality and 
cognition. This Ph.D defines dynamic capabilities in a new venture context, provides 
insights in how dynamic capabilities are formed and explains under which 
conditions dynamic capabilities can be beneficial for new venture survival. It 
addresses different gaps in the dynamic capabilities literature by taking a process 
and micro-foundation perspective on capability formation and by defining the 
boundary conditions under which dynamic capabilities can be beneficial for firm 
survival. Finally, this research offers several practical implications for 
entrepreneurs, (public) investors and policy makers. Entrepreneurs can find useful 
insights in this study regarding the development of dynamic capabilities and team 
composition in the early stages of a new venture’s life. This study can also help 
policy makers in developing support programs for new technology-based firms and 
for new ventures in nascent markets. These start-ups circulate new knowledge in 
our economy and can be considered as important drivers in transforming our 
economy and replacing sectors that are fading away because of economic crises and 
other environmental shocks. 
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1 Introduction 
 
In fast-paced, globally competitive environments, consumer needs, technological 
opportunities, and competitor activity are constantly in a state of flux. Opportunities 
open up for both newcomers and incumbents, putting the profit streams of 
enterprises at risk (Teece, 2007). This situation implies that firms should be 
managed in such a way that they can build successive temporary competitive 
advantages by effectively responding to successive environmental shocks (D’Aveni, 
1994; Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000) and/or by creating environmental change (Teece, 
2007).  Organizations need to continuously renew themselves if they are to survive 
and prosper in dynamic environments. This renewal challenge is even more 
pronounced in the current business environment characterized by fast changes in 
customers, technologies, and competition (Danneels, 2002). How can firms 
successfully address such a challenging task? The “dynamic capabilities” approach 
provides one important response to this crucial question and has become dominant 
in explaining how companies can create a competitive advantage. 
1.1 Dynamic capabilities: origins, definition and current state of 
the literature 
 
The dynamic capabilities concept is rooted in the resource based theory which 
intends to explain the conditions under which firms may achieve a competitive 
advantage based on their bundles of resources and capabilities (Barney, 1991; 
Barney et al., 2011). Capabilities refer to a firm’s capacity to purposefully deploy a 
combination of resources and processes to achieve a desired goal (Amit & 
Schoemaker, 1993; Autio et al. 2011). However, in the current business 
environment characterized by fast changes in customers, technologies, and 
competition, organizational capabilities can become quickly ineffective. The seminal 
article of Teece (1997) extended the resource based theory to a more dynamic 
context (Teece et al., 1997) and considered dynamic capabilities, which can be 
defined as the capacity to change a firm’s resource configuration, as the source of 
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sustained competitive advantage (Teece et al., 2007). Whereas Teece et al. (1997) 
refer to dynamic environments as a primary reason for dynamic capabilities to 
emerge, Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) show that dynamic capabilities also have 
advantages in moderately dynamic environments, and Helfat and Winter (2011) 
even provide anecdotal evidence that dynamic capabilities can lead to competitive 
advantage even in relatively stable environments. Dynamic capabilities has been 
recognized, not only to withstand the 'gales of creative destruction,' but also to 
create them (Danneels, 2002). 
Since Teece et al.’s (1997) landmark article, the dynamic capabilities view has 
generated an impressive flow of research. According to the ABI/INFORM database, 
at least 1,534 articles used the dynamic capabilities concept from 1997 to 2007, 
encompassing not only its original field, strategic management, but also most of the 
main areas in business administration (Barreto, 2010).  From 1997 to 2012, I found 
a total of 51 articles published in leading management journals (Academy of 
Management Journal, Academy of Management Review, Administrative Science 
Quarterly, Journal of Management, Journal of Management Studies, Management 
Science, Organization Science, and Strategic Management Journal) that have 
mentioned “dynamic capabilities” in their title and/or their abstract. 
However, despite the development of the concept and the argued importance of 
capabilities to competitive advantage and firm performance in past research, many 
theoretical and empirical issues remain a source of debate (Armstrong and Shimizu, 
2007; Newbert, 2007). After more than two decades of mainly theoretical research, 
elaborating on the question how established firms can create a sustainable 
competitive advantage, I conduct three empirical studies and apply the dynamic 
capability perspective to the context of new technology-based ventures. The 
emergent literature on capabilities in new ventures argues that new ventures are 
not simply new and small versions of established firms for several reasons (Zahra et 
al., 2006; Autio et al., 2011). First, new ventures often have no layers of middle 
managers to separate top management from operations, whereas established firms 
exist out of multiple bureaucratic layers (Mintzberg, 1978; Sine et al., 2006). Second, 
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new ventures are often operating in uncertain and fast moving environments which 
means that these ventures are rapidly changing and that strategic objectives are still 
in flux (Zahra et al., 2006). Third, new ventures seldom start with well-formed 
capabilities, which emphasizes the creation of de novo capabilities over the 
modification of existing ones (Autio et al., 2011). As these main differences between 
new and established ventures seem to insinuate, the years of capability research in 
strategic management literature cannot be simply copied to the context of new 
ventures. As such, they should be studied separately based on organizational type 
(Zahra et al., 2006). 
We can divide the extant dynamic capability literature into two research streams 
(Zahra et al., 2006).  A first stream of research focuses on the impact of capabilities 
on firm performance. Early proposals in this field clearly assumed a direct 
relationship between firms’ dynamic capabilities and their performance (Teece et 
al., 1997). These authors stated that this framework is intended to explain firm-level 
success and failure, competitive advantage, and private wealth creation (Teece et al., 
1997; Makadok, 2001; Zollo and Winter, 2002). More recently, Teece (2007) stated 
that “the ambition of the dynamic capabilities framework is nothing less than to 
explain the sources of enterprise-level competitive advantage over time” and that “
dynamic capabilities lies at the core of enterprise success (and failure).” However, 
other researchers took a more cautious approach towards the relation between 
performance and dynamic capabilities. In their view, long-term competitive 
advantage does not only rely on dynamic capabilities themselves but on the 
resource configurations or substantive capabilities created by the dynamic 
capabilities (Zahra et al., 2006) and on “using dynamic capabilities sooner, more 
astutely, more fortuitously than the competition” (Eisenhardt & Martin 2000). Very 
recently, researchers build further on this logic and clarified the conditions under 
which dynamic capabilities can be valuable (Drnevich and Kriauciunas, 2012). 
However, the impact of dynamic capabilities on the performance of new ventures 
and the conditions under which dynamic capabilities can be beneficial in these early 
stages remains a black box (Zahra et al., 2006). 
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A second stream of research in dynamic capability literature focuses on the 
capability formation. To trace the emergence of capability formation, one needs to 
track the early stages of a firm, because it is during this phase that capabilities are 
developed.  As Autio et al. (2011) highlighted, in a firm’s early stages no routines 
have been accumulated over time, and more focus is needed on de novo capability 
development. In order to analyze which capabilities managers are likely to develop 
from scratch in firms, Teece (2007) already highlighted that the micro-foundation 
view on capabilities is an interesting avenue for research because most research on 
capability development is on a firm level. The micro-foundations include the distinct 
individual characteristics which influence the decision making behavior of 
managers (Felin and Foss, 2005). Moreover, the dynamic capabilities literature has 
mainly adopted a routine-centered view, while overlooking the roles which 
managers play in developing these resource configurations and initiating the 
processes that lead to capabilities (Sirmon, Hitt, Ireland and Gilbert, 2011).  
1.2 Research questions 
 
Despite the numerous publications on dynamic capabilities in top management 
journals, empirical work on dynamic capabilities is still in its infancy (Newbert, 
2007). The aim of this Ph.D is to address empirically some crucial remaining gaps in 
the capability literature. Paper 1 and 2 concentrate on the micro-foundations and 
micro-processes of capabilities and explores the role of individual decision makers 
in developing capabilities. Paper 3 looks at the capability – performance relation 
and investigates the boundary conditions under which dynamic capabilities can be 
beneficial for new ventures (see Figure1). 
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FIGURE 1: Ph.D framework 
 
 
A process view on the development of dynamic capabilities. In the first study, I 
investigate the development process of dynamic capabilities. The dynamic capability 
literature in general has been criticized as lacking fundamental theoretic logics 
which explain the origins of dynamic capabilities and the micro-processes behind 
the development of dynamic capabilities. In line with this a few studies have argued 
that hierarchies matter in explaining dynamic capabilities. Building on these studies, 
we analyze how a dynamic capability is developed over time in a new venture which 
was initially one of the highest successes but eventually failed to address a 
significant change in the environment. We used an inductive case study design, 
collecting data through participant observation over a two year period, content 
analysis of email conversation and analysis of board documents, meeting minutes 
and different versions of the business plan. Using the phases of perception, 
willingness and ability which typically are considered the building blocks of 
dynamic capabilities, we made sense of this richness of data.  
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The influence of founder personality on the development of substantive and 
dynamic capabilities. Consistent with the upper echelons literature and using a 
micro-foundation approach, the second study provides compelling evidence that 
personal characteristics of the early top managers (firm founders) predict capability 
development. The literature agrees that substantive capabilities and dynamic 
capabilities are crucial for firm performance. Substantive capabilities represents the 
firm capacity to perform a particular activity in a reliable and at least minimally 
satisfactory way (Helfat and Winter, 2011:1244) while dynamic capabilities can be 
defined as the capacity to change the firm’s resource base, its substantive 
capabilities or its environment (Teece, 2007; Helfat and Winter, 2011). Using a 
methodology combining two years of exploratory qualitative research and a survey 
of 144 founders, we argue that founder personality predict the development of 
either substantive or dynamic capabilities. Our study is also one of the first to 
develop scales to measure substantive and dynamic capabilities.  
 
Dynamic capabilities and new venture success: the boundary conditions As 
substantive capabilities have an important impact on firm performance, dynamic 
capabilities can under certain circumstances also contribute to firm performance by 
changing these existing substantive capabilities in the direction of new 
opportunities (Drnevich and Kriauciunas, 2012). However, less is known about the 
boundary conditions under which dynamic capabilities can indeed have an impact 
on the firm performance. Especially in nascent markets, dynamic capabilities will be 
the key capabilities that are needed to survive the difficult early stages of new 
ventures. However, the impact of these capabilities on firm survival and the 
conditions under which dynamic capabilities can be beneficial remains largely 
unknown. While dynamic capabilities can be viewed as important mechanisms to 
guide new ventures through the difficult early stages, Farjoun (2010) does alert that 
in order to survive, organizations must reconcile stability with change. In the third 
paper, we investigate the moderating effects of formal structure and firm stability 
on the relationship between dynamic capabilities and new venture survival. 
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2 Understanding the Micro-Foundations of Dynamic 
Capabilities: Managing Attention, Cognitive Dissonance 
and Competing Objectives at Different Hierarchical 
Levels 
 
ABSTRACT 
The dynamic capability view remains silent when it comes to the origins of and the 
micro-processes behind the development of these capabilities. We analyze how 
dynamic capabilities are developed over time in a new venture which was 
confronted with a significant change in its environment. We used an inductive case-
study design, collecting data through participant observation over a four-year 
period. We complemented this data with content analysis of email correspondence 
and analysis of board documents, meeting minutes and different versions of the 
business plan. We show that the building blocks of dynamic capabilities exist of the 
(a) company’s capacity to manage attention across different levels of the hierarchy 
to create perception of the changes in the environment through a process of issue 
selling, (b) the level to which it succeeds to overcome different levels of cognitive 
dissonance among its individual decisions makers to create willingness through 
collective sense making and (c) the company’s capacity to manage competing 
objectives to enable the change implementation process by integrating efficiency 
and flexibility as a duality. We thus extend the dynamic capability perspective by 
describing the micro-processes behind it and embedding them within the attention-
based view, cognitive dissonance theory and the literature on competing objectives.  
 
KEY WORDS: dynamic capabilities; attention; cognition; competing objectives; 
micro-foundations 
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2.1  Introduction 
 
For more than a decade, dynamic capabilities have attracted considerable attention 
within the strategic management literature to explain how firms can create a 
competitive advantage in dynamic, moderately dynamic and even static 
environments (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Helfat and Peteraf, 2003, Zahra, 
Sapienza, and Davidsson, 2006; Teece, 2007; Barreto, 2010; Helfat and Winter, 
2011). Dynamic capabilities give a firm the ability to change its resource 
configuration, with  respect to both tangible and intangible resources (Zollo and 
Winter, 2002;  Teece, 2007; Helfat and Winter, 2011). Initially the extant literature 
considered dynamic capabilities to be routines that develop over time (Eisenhardt 
and Martin, 2000; Zollo and Winter, 2002). However, more recently scholars have 
defined dynamic capabilities as a managerial process (Teece, Pisano and Schuen, 
1997; Zahra et al., 2006; Teece, 2007) which enables a firm to become aware of or 
sense opportunities/threats, seize or act upon these opportunities/threats and 
restructure the firm’s resource configuration. While the management view on 
dynamic capabilities helps in explaining what the different stages of dynamic 
capability development are in a managerial process, it remains silent on the 
question of how these dynamic capabilities are developed. In line with this 
observation, Danneels (2010) calls for a process view to open the black box of 
dynamic capability theory, allowing us to examine the origins and the paths of 
dynamic capability development. This is exactly the research gap we aim to address 
in this paper.  
To provide more theoretically grounded insights into the development of these 
dynamic capabilities, we use the extended case method (Burawoy, 1991; Tripsas 
and Gavetti, 2000; Danneels, 2010). We start with the existing literature on the 
micro-foundations of dynamic capabilities, which alludes to the role of cognition and 
the way in which cognition might differ across the hierarchy of decision makers. 
Managerial cognition is relevant in the early stages of capability formation (Helfat 
and Peteraf, 2003; Adner and Helfat, 2003; Autio, George and Alexi, 2011) and plays 
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a role across the hierarchical levels of the firm (Gavetti, 2005; Danneels, 2010). The 
rich literature on managerial cognition emphasizes the role of cognitive processes 
and sense making of perceived environmental opportunities/threats as a key 
regulator of actions which lead to capability development (Barr, Stimpert and Huff, 
1992). However, whereas managerial cognition has usually been studied as a guide 
for change processes induced by top management teams (e.g. Tripsas and Gavetti, 
2000), Gavetti (2005) introduces the concept of situational attention in the 
capability literature. He argues that the higher the decision maker is situated in the 
hierarchy the more distant he/she is from the firm’s actions,  and thus the more 
difficult it is for him/her to interpret organizational experiences which create biases 
in the actions taken. Danneels (2010) further extends this view by showing that 
resource cognition, i.e. the identification of key resources in a firm and the 
understanding of their fungibility, differs across the various hierarchical levels of a 
company. Building on these insights, we analyze the managerial process of dynamic 
capability development across the different hierarchical layers in a company to 
address our research question on how dynamic capabilities are developed in firm. 
We use the empirical context of a new, venture capital (VC)-backed firm in the 
mobile internet industry (WeMobile) and follow the company from its inception 
in February 2006 to its liquidation in December 2010. The relevant period of 
observation to study the genesis of dynamic capabilities and their formation over 
time starts with the underwriting of a specific business plan and the term sheet 
agreement between the founders and the A-round investors in November 2008. 
From then on more routines and procedures are developed to increase the 
company’s efficiency and effectiveness in pursuing the milestones associated with 
the business model which all stakeholders did agree upon. Hence, dynamic 
capabilities needed to be developed to make changes to the business model. The 
importance of developing dynamic capabilities to change the original business 
model has been documented in business books describing the success of young 
ventures. For instance, Symantec started as an artificial intelligence company before 
changing into a linguistics platform and later into the anti-virus software firm, 
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which we all know today (Dorf and Byers, 2008), while Google began as a library 
reference search tool before changing its business model into an OEM internet 
search product and eventually developing AdSense as a new revenue tool (Vise and 
Malseed, 2006).  The choice of a venture rather than an established company is 
based upon the fact that this venture has no established routines yet, so it is easy to 
disentangle managerial processes from learning-based outcomes. The 
entrepreneurial start-up phase of the company was extremely successful and 
attracted the attention of venture capitalists, resulting in an A-round of venture 
capital of 4 Million Euros for which the term sheet was signed in November 2008. 
From then on, the firm’s resource configuration was shaped around a high-end, 
powerful technological solution to transform websites into mobile sites. Critical to 
this configuration was the development of a key account management model to 
approach customers. Shortly after the venture capital investment, the launch of the 
App Store by Apple changed the environment radically, and forced the company to 
focus on a different customer segment by offering a user-centric web development 
tool. The introduction of the App Store is the kind of environmental jolt that 
typically places firms in jeopardy because it is difficult to foresee and its impact on 
other firms is disruptive and inimical (Meyer, 1982). In our case study, WeMobile 
failed to change its resources and associated business model accordingly in 
response to this jolt. The initial success and ultimate failure of the company make it 
an excellent study object: as Williamson (1999: 1093) stated ”more informative, 
often, than success stories are stories about failure—especially the failures of once 
successful enterprises to adapt to new circumstances” (see also Priem and Butler, 
2001; Danneels, 2010).  
We put forward three main findings. First, dynamic capabilities will only be 
developed at firm level if at each hierarchical level in the organization the need for 
change is “perceived” as an opportunity. Since not every decision maker in the 
organization has the same focus of attention, this opportunity perception process 
needs to be managed. This can be realized by managing the attention of the different 
decision makers using elements of issue selling such as “objectivation of data”, 
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“direct modes of communication” and “communication persistence”. Second, 
individual cognitive dissonances at each of these levels create rigidities which limits 
the willingness of individual decision makers to change. Decision makers will tend 
to minimize the needed changes, look for solutions they are familiar with or simply 
ignore the need for change. Elements from the literature on prospective collective 
sense making can be used to overcome these barriers. Material artifacts can be used 
to stimulate collective sense making together with more general KPIs and the use of 
reference cases or best practices. Third, to implement changes, the organization will 
need to cope with competing objectives as a way to finalize the implementation of 
dynamic capabilities. On the one hand they need to create evidence for the new 
business model, while on the other hand they need to match the milestones of the 
old one. We suggest that these competing objectives can be managed by viewing 
flexibility and efficiency as a duality both at individual and system level. This implies 
that a context is created to stimulate individual ambidexterity, that redundancy and 
cognitive variation are built into the system and that management practices such as 
flexibility inducing mechanisms are adopted to implement the change effectively. 
This paper extends the literature on dynamic capabilities by introducing three 
theoretical perspectives and explains what the barriers are to introduce dynamic 
capabilities as a management process and what the solutions might be to overcome 
these barriers. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. First, we outline our 
methodological approach which includes the data collection and data analysis 
procedures. We then describe how WeMobile tried to change from one resource 
configuration and associated business model to another one, focusing on how, at 
different levels of the organization—namely the operational, the management, the 
board and the investment committee level—the new environment was sensed, the 
willingness to change was created and decisions were made or not made to 
implement the new configuration and business model. Third, we present the 
findings of our study. Finally, we conclude with a discussion of our key findings.   
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2.2 Method 
This research is based on an in-depth, longitudinal case study of a new venture in 
the emerging mobile internet industry. Given the lack of theory on how dynamic 
capabilities are developed in a company (Sirmon, Hitt, Ireland and Gilbert, 2011), 
we argue that this approach is most useful (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). In 
addition, by taking a longitudinal process perspective we gain insight into which 
decisions have to be made at different hierarchical levels and which actions need to 
be taken to bridge cognitive gaps and evolve from one resource configuration and 
associated business model to another one. Finally, our case study design allows us to 
use a combination of different data sources, including (1) participant observation, 
(2) company archives and (3) publicly available data (Yin, 1994). We take care of 
potential problems of construct validity by using multiple sources of evidence or 
multiple measures of the same facts (Yin, 1994).  WeMobile is a particularly 
attractive case study because the company was extremely successful in its first two 
years after founding and succeeded in one of the largest A-round VC deals in 
Belgium, but then subsequently had to change its resource configuration as a 
response to environmental conditions, which had abruptly changed. It eventually 
failed because one of its investors did not support the new business model. The 
success and subsequent failure of the case did make it an unusually rich source of 
data (Priem and Butler, 2001). The richness of the data allowed us to map 
WeMobile’s change process in detail and gain insights into the relationships 
between key decision makers, which are necessary to investigate the micro-
foundations of the resource-structuring process in the start-up phase of a 
company’s life (Sirmon et al., 2011). Triangulation of various types of data, collected 
through different methods, can overcome the limitations of a single method by 
counter-balancing the weaknesses of one method with the strengths of another 
(Jick, 1979). 
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2.2.1 Data sources 
An important data collection method was participant observation. One of the 
authors (principle investigator) of this study was able to attend the weekly 
management meetings of this venture, monthly board of directors (BOD) and 
biweekly communication forums to the employees. We employed an insider-
outsider approach, which means that two outside authors were involved in the 
actual analysis so that the credibility of the findings would not rely solely on the 
interpretations of a single analyst (Gioia, Price, Hamilton and Thomas, 2010).  
Instead of analyzing key people’s responses in interviews, the participant 
observation method captures managers in their corporeal reality, time, and space 
(Burawoy, 1991). The actual time of participant observation ranged from February 
2006 (start-up) to June 2010 (liquidation), time spent averaged about 1 day per 
week. The time frame covered in this paper ranges from November 2008 (term 
sheet closure) to June 2010 (liquidation). We attended the weekly management 
meeting led by the CEO and participated in different informal events with the 
employees of WeMobile. In January 2009, WeMobile recruited a COO who 
decided to introduce a biweekly communication forum to the employees which we 
also attended. Finally, after finishing a successful venture capital series A round in 
March 2009, a formal board of directors was installed and we participated in the 
monthly board meeting. Altogether, we attended 108 meetings which accounted for 
approximately 275 hours of observation. Regular written field notes provided a key 
resource to articulate the story and understand the linkages between facts during 
the period studied. The observation activities during the company’s meetings were 
crucial to provide us with a clear insight into what was perceived as relevant by the 
team, and gave us a better understanding of the relationships between the key 
decision makers.  
The company archives include extensive documentation covering nearly every 
important document circulated during the company’s existence. First, we had access 
to the official reports of every board and management meeting. Secondly, we could 
review all the documents stored on the intranet server (dropbox) of the company. 
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The “dropbox” was used by the management team, business developers, software 
engineers and other employees to “drop” important documents so that everyone can 
see or use these documents. Finally, the largest and most unique source of 
information is the e-mail account of one of the founders which enabled us to follow 
the complete e-mail communication between the sales and marketing director, CEO, 
COO, account managers, the chairman of the board, investors, key software 
engineers, (potential) clients and partners. Not only was the content of the e-mails 
taken into account, e-mail attachments were also analyzed. These attachments 
included different versions of the business plan, shareholder negotiations, 
marketing, product and technology roadmaps, and staffing plans. Finally, we 
collected publicly available data such as business press articles, press releases, 
elevator pitches and presentations at mobile internet conferences. This gave us a 
better view of how the firm presented itself towards important actors in its 
environment. An overview of the documentation in this case study is provided in 
table 1. 
2.2.2 Data analysis 
We used the extended case method to analyze empirical data gathered through the 
case in order to extend the existing dynamic capability theory (Burawoy, 1991; 
Danneels, 2002). Since the dynamic capability perspective already offers a rich 
variety of insights, and there have already been a number of scholars who have 
emphasized the importance of cognitions and hierarchy to understand the micro-
foundations of dynamic capabilities (Barney et al., 2011), we did not want to start 
from scratch and develop a new theory but preferred instead to use the extended 
case method to stretch and consolidate the existing work on dynamic capabilities. 
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TABLE 1: Data Inventory 
 
Data Type Quantity Original data source Original (intended) data 
audience 
E-mails  4.266 emails, approximately 5.500 
pages 
Founder’s e-mail account Emails to employees, top management 
team, partners, board members, 
(potential) investors,… 
E-mail attachments  1.992 email attachments, 
approximately 12.000 pages 
Founder’s e-mail account Emails to employees, top management 
team, partners, board members, 
(potential) investors,… 
Company’s archive  5.442 documents, approximately 
22.000 pages   
Dropbox, intranet WEMOBILE Employees and top management team  
Observational data Approximately 275 hours, 
Approximately 600 pages of 
observation notes 
Principal investigator’s notes from 
attending formal and informal meetings 
Analysis for this study 
Board meeting reports 15 reports, 249 pages Founders Top management team and board 
members  
Sales & Marketing meeting reports 23 reports, 69 pages Sales and marketing director Sales and marketing team  
Management meeting reports 44 reports, 131 pages Founders Top management team  
Communication forum employees 26 reports, 78 pages  Reports on intranet WEMOBILE Employees and top management team 
Shareholder documents  
 
8 documents, 304 pages  Founders Shareholders and founders  
Versions of the Business Plan 5 business plans, 260 pages Presented at formal occasions such as 
board and investment committees 
Board of directors and investment 
committees  
Business press articles (press 
coverage) 
10 articles, 12 pages Belgian newspapers and business 
magazines 
Readers of Belgian newspapers and 
business magazines 
Press releases  30 press releases, 33 pages Website WEMOBILE Visitors WEMOBILE website 
Interview key actors 6 interviews, 1.5 hours/interview Founders Analysis for this study 
Conference video 52 minutes Taped by professional videographer Conference attendees 
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Following the extended case method approach, we started with a profound 
review of the capability literature. Next, we analyzed the field notes of the 
participant observation and the documents collected during this observation 
period, which directed us to the micro-foundations view on dynamic capabilities. 
Content analyses of the e-mail account of the founders and secondary public data 
revealed new patterns on a micro level which directed us towards attention 
based theory (Ocasio, 1997), cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957) and 
theories on competing objectives (Eisenhardt, Furr and Bingham, 2010). 
Secondly, we collated additional data based on initial analyses of field notes, 
company archives and e-mails. These two “running exchanges,” between 
literature review and data analysis and between data analysis and data collation, 
(Burawoy 1991: 10–11) are further described below.   
The first phase of the extended case study method involves the interplay of 
existing concepts/theories and analysis of empirical data. While this study 
started with an extensive review of the capability literature, data analyses point 
to other relevant concepts and theories in the literature. These concepts and 
theories in turn provide conceptual frameworks which aid the interpretation of 
the data (Danneels, 2010). The participant observation notes and the documents 
collected during the observation period formed the basis for our first data 
analyses. Based on the board and management meeting reports and on field 
notes from the participant observation activities, we were able to reconstruct 
WeMobile’s story by mapping the most important resource-structuring events 
on various timelines (changes in recruitment, rounds of finance and 
technological choices). These initial analyses of archives and field notes revealed 
that the company was confronted with a radical change in its environment, soon 
after its VC-round. Because the VCs had invested in a particular business model 
and had put milestones on that business model, they managed the development 
of capabilities through the board of directors. However, at the same time, the 
company needed to develop capabilities to guide a change in business model in 
order to address the changes in the environment. We defined and described the 
business model and resource configuration based on the business plan that the 
venture capitalist originally signed up for and the various board reports in which 
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the business model, recruitment and investment policy were discussed. The 
targeted business model and associated resource configuration were based upon 
the presentation made by the candidate-CEO in January 2010 and the business 
model / resource configuration of the company he referred to as the direct 
competitor and benchmark (Mobi). The need for a new model and changes in 
resource configuration directed us to the dynamic capabilities literature and 
more specifically the managerial view suggested by Teece (2007) and Zahra, 
Sapienza and Davidsson (2006) and provided us a framework to map these 
events on a timeline and categorize them into phases of perception, willingness 
to react and ability to act.  
Since we wanted to gain insight into the micro-foundations of these dynamic 
capabilities, which we define as the underlying individual-level and group-level 
actions which lead to dynamic capabilities, defined as the capacity to change the 
company’s business model and resource configuration, we had to investigate the 
relationships between the key decision makers. The e-mail account of the 
founders revealed conversations between account managers, software 
engineers, COO, CEO, the chairman of the board, investors and partners (4622 e-
mails spread over a period of 3 years). Two researchers who did not participate 
in the meetings analyzed this e-mail correspondence and, after various iteration 
rounds, reduced the list to the 235 most important e-mails that referred to the 
change in the environment and the subsequent triggering of business model 
adaptation and associated resource configuration. We mapped these e-mails on a 
timeline and used the QSR NVivo 2.0 software package to code and analyze the 
content of these e-mails. The software program aided us in entering codes, 
examining passages of text in which the codes appeared, and counting code 
frequency. Analysis of the data collected via participant observation and the e-
mail correspondence helped us to formulate an insider view of decision 
processes and an inductive understanding of actors’ perceptions and cognitive 
maps. These analyses revealed new issues and pointed to relevant concepts and 
theories. Our study started with the capability literature which, after comparison 
with the WeMobile case, led us to other literature about distinct areas such as 
micro-foundations view on dynamic capabilities (Gavetti, 2005; Felin and Foss, 
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2005; Teece, 2007; Felin and Foss, 2011), attention-based view (Ocasio, 1997), 
cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957), and the literature on competing 
objectives (Eisenhardt, Furr and Bingham, 2010). 
The second phase of research required us to continuously move back and forth 
between data collection and data analysis. The initial analyses through field 
notes and company archives, on the one hand, and the content analyses of the e-
mail correspondence on the other hand, not only led us to other literature 
streams but also forced us to use already existing but unexplored data sources of 
our huge data file. For example, in the course of this study, we were directed to 
the cognitive dissonance literature based on analysis of email discussions 
between the founders, senior managers, and account managers. After an 
extensive review of the cognitive dissonance literature, we found explanations 
for these behaviors at a micro level, which in turn had, according to other 
company archives, an impact on the events at the macro level. Finally, after the 
first data analyses, we started to discuss the results in interviews with key 
people. These were in-depth, semi-structured interviews taking average 1.5 
hours each.  
In order to organize and analyze our data, we used the QSR NVivo 2.0 software 
package on the one hand, to centralize and store our various data sources, and 
developed figures and tables on the other hand. For example, figure 2 gives a 
brief history of WeMobile. Furthermore, we developed table 2 to give an 
overview of the characteristics of the two business models and the resource 
configurations ideally associated with these business models. We explain the 
main features of the business models along the lines of Teece (2007) and their 
associated resource configurations divided into tangible, intangible and human 
resources (Helfat et al., 2007). In what follows, we give a brief history of 
WeMobile in a descriptive narrative, so that readers can experience these 
events vicariously and draw their own conclusions (Stake, 2005: 450). After that 
we present our findings and move on to the discussion and conclusion section. 
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2.3 History of WEMOBILE 
2.3.1 February 2006 – November 2008: Entrepreneurial phase 
Figure 2 shows the history of WEMOBILE. The company agreed upon a term 
sheet with A-round investors on November 9th, 2008. Before that, the company 
was very much in an entrepreneurial phase during which it did not develop 
capabilities but did explore the opportunity space (Zahra et al., 2006). The 
company experimented with open source technology components and had 
subsequently Business to Business, Business to Consumer and Business to 
Business to Consumer market approaches. As no clear underlying business 
model was available, no resources were bundled to optimize the pursuit of the 
business model and no capabilities were developed. This period is therefore not 
interesting for the purposes of this paper. In December 2007, the company 
officially started and began to build a business model, which was the result of the 
entrepreneurial phase. This business model was further developed through the 
negotiations with the investors.  
2.3.2 November 2008-March 2009 (Term sheet-Deal Closure: Business Model 1) 
By the time the company was about to sign its terms sheet, it had developed a 
software platform which enables the user to make existing desktop websites 
mobile, add dynamic content such as Flash, and interactive transactions like 
payments and reservation systems. This platform had three key advantages over 
existing platforms: 1) the ability to deal with device diversity, 2) five to ten times 
faster content access time, and 3) user-friendly, interactive mobile sites. At the 
time, competitors had to adjust websites according to the specific type of mobile 
device. For example, if a customer wanted its website to be optimally viewable 
on five types of mobile devices, competitors had to develop five different 
versions of that website. In contrast, WEMOBILE’s technology could transform 
desktop websites into mobile sites for any type of mobile device. In order to 
retain the maximum user-friendliness, the site automatically adapted to the 
specific features of the mobile device, whatever brand or model being used. 
Rather than a simple shrinking of a website, this technology performed a real 
transformation of the website to make it compatible with any type of mobile 
device. The level of technological complexity of this approach was much higher 
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compared with competing technologies, since it allowed thousands of users to 
view websites with any type of mobile device. Web developers needed training 
to be able to use the technology platform. WEMOBILE’s technology reduced 
the total development time for mobile sites significantly as well as lowering the 
maintenance costs since it no longer involved multiple websites.    
The company’s target customers were large web agencies which needed to make 
mobile solutions for their early adopter clients, in segments such as the media 
and airline industries. The CEO mentioned in a memo to potential investors:  
“We focus on partnership deals with web agencies… we will aim for the 
bigger partners. They seem to get the most value from our toolset which 
allows them to offer high-quality mobile websites to their existing customer 
base without spending too much money on upfront licenses and 
development time – we seem to be better/faster/cheaper than the 
competition.” (CEO, e-mail January 2009) 
In line with this target customer selection, a classic key account management 
model was installed in order to screen the market and build partnerships with 
large web agencies. As expressed by an e-mail conversation between the account 
manager (AM1) and the sales and marketing director  (January/February, 2009)  
“We want to hook up with Digital Agencies (our partners) and we want 
THEM to use our platform and make it scalable. They will create and 
develop mobile websites using the platform.”  (AM1, e-mail January 2009) 
“we are going for the direct sales approach. This means that we expect you to 
contact UK web agencies and the CEO will accompany you to the first sales talks, 
starting from the 2nd week of March as all the sales support tools will only be 
ready by mid-March. You [AM1] have to be picky about who we want to meet 
because setting up meetings all-over Europe is expensive” (sales and marketing 
director, e-mail February 2009)  
One account manager could manage a maximum of up to ten web agencies 
because of the complexity of the sales process. Each time a web agency tried to 
sell a mobile project to one of its clients, the account manager and a software 
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engineer of WEMOBILE had to join the discussions. Next to the revenues from 
these projects, the company also generated recurring revenues via a license 
model. The license model was a subscription license based on the type of usage 
of the platform. The recurring fees from the licenses made WEMOBILE 
attractive to potential investors. The company raised venture capital in April 
2009 which would be used to expand the account management model 
internationally. Soon after the capital investment, the company established an 
office in the UK and employed account managers in Dubai, India, and the US.    
FIGURE 2: WEMOBILE timeline 
 
 
 
2.3.3 April 2009 –  October 2009: Radical change in the environment and the 
impact on WEMOBILE’s business model 
On July 10, 2008, Apple launched a digital application distribution platform, the 
“App Store”, for its mobile operating system via an update of iTunes. 
Applications could be downloaded directly from the App Store to a target device 
Company milestones
February 2006 Company starts
Entrepreneurial phase 
December 2007 Building and executing Business model 1
business model 1
June 2008 Negotiation VC
November 2008 Term sheet agreement VC Environmental change
Introduction of the App storeApp store
April 2009 Closure VC finance Business model 2
May 2010 Company liquidation
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either for free or at a cost. The iPhone 3G, pre-loaded with App Store support 
software, was launched the following day. Rather than developing applications 
in-house, Apple provided a software development kit to 3rd party developers 
who could create applications to run on Apple devices. In the first 6 months, the 
App Store offered more than 15,000 applications and reached 500 million 
downloads. By April 2009, those figures had doubled to 30.000 and 1 billion and 
dominated the 2009 Annual Mobile Summit in Barcelona (West & Mace, 2010). 
This impact of the Annual Mobile Summit should not be underestimated as it 
attracted huge press conference, far beyond the technical community. Soon, 
other platforms for web applications such as Android Market (March 2009) and 
Nokia Ovi (May 2009) were launched. The spectacular growth of the applications 
and downloads and the press coverage of the Mobile Summit did bring about a 
radical change for companies operating in the mobile internet industry. The 
following quote from a press article sent by an account manager to the 
management team illustrates this shock:  
“Only a few years ago… mobile browsers were poor at the time. For most 
companies, pre-loading applications onto devices was not an option, and 
downloading and installing applications was a pain for end users. As mobile 
browsers improved in capability and mobile networks improved in speed 
and reliability, the industry (and users) started to favor mobile websites 
over apps. Then Apple came along with the iPhone and the App Store. 
Suddenly it was easy to download and install mobile apps. Most serious 
players are following Apple’s lead…” (Press article April 23th, 2009 sent by 
AM1 on May 28th, 2009) 
The industry became hungry for applications which provided the possibility of 
interactive engagement with users, a feature which is much more complicated to 
create with mobile sites. In addition, an important advantage of applications over 
mobile websites was a more advanced functionality which made full use of a 
smartphone’s intelligence. WEMOBILE felt this change in the market, as 
illustrated by the following e-mail conversation in April 2009 between the CEO 
and AM1:  
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CEO: “sell our fully managed solution to web agencies. No more, no less. We 
have to hit the street with our proposition, meet them, listen to them, 
convince them… whatever it takes.” 
AM1: “[CEO], all the guys are working very hard – trust me – to do this 
through 1) e-mails, 2) telephone calls, 3) contacts to LinkedIn Groups… Not 
a single one [web agency] has shown any interest (or even answered). But, 
hey, I am trying to keep the morale and keep on trying. I am desperate for 
some help on this.”   
The impact of this industry transition from mobile sites to applications had a 
devastating impact on the company:  
“The overwhelming majority of web agencies started to support iPhone and 
other smartphones.  They dropped everything else. They no longer wanted 
to pay for our service (which transformed websites). Their customers 
wanted trendy applications for iPhone… The demand for our solution 
vaporized. Revenues dried up.” (Interview with COO, press article 2010).  
“Instead of a couple of competitors, WEMOBILE suddenly has hundreds of 
competitors who are all developing apps. One of our biggest threats is the 
iPhone SDK (Apple’s development kit for apps).” (AM1, email May 2009).   
This change in the market undermined WEMOBILE’s business model, which 
was based on a high-end, powerful solution aimed at large agencies. It took the 
company several months to become “aware” of this threat in the market, which 
forced it to revisit its business model. We will further analyze in the next section 
why this process of perception creation took so long. As the company became 
more aware of the changes in the environment, it did develop a new business 
model from the bottom up. Using “Mobi” as a benchmark, it spotted the market 
segment of low end customers (e.g. cities, churches,…) as an interesting segment 
for their technology. In contrast to the technology platform used for high-end 
customers, this product needed to be design in a user friendly way, which 
wouldn’t require training and intense support. The market approach had to 
change from channel management using key account managers towards online 
marketing.  These changes in technology and sales approach had significant 
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implications for the number and profile of the employees needed in the ideal 
resource configuration to support this business model. As the technology 
required was less sophisticated, the number of software developers could drop 
from eight to three, and only one employee would be needed for the server 
maintenance and hosting. A designer would have to be hired to assist the 
development of the GUI (user interface). The new sales approach implied that 
the two account managers were no longer needed, and had to be replaced with 
one online marketing manager. The profile of the CEO in the new resource 
configuration would also change. Whereas the existing CEO had a very technical 
profile, a new CEO with extensive experience in the global mobile internet 
market should be recruited. The key differences between the business model and 
resource configuration needed to serve large web agencies and the one needed 
to serve small web agencies is summarized in table 2.  
TABLE 2: Characteristics of resource configuration 1 vs. resource configuration 2 
 
 Resource configuration 1 Resource configuration 2  
Resources Financial resources 
Pre-seed and Seed : 1 mil EUR 
VC round series A  >  4 mil EUR 
 
Human resources 
Top management:  
CEO/founder (Professor in ICT) 
Director Sales and Marketing/founder 
(Professor in Management) 
COO (Ing., 24 years’ experience in managing 
projects)                                                                                                                    
Operational management:  
1 Program manager,  
1 Product manager,  
8 Software developers,  
2 Maintenance hosting  servers,  
3 Account/sales managers,  
1 Marketing consultant 
 
Technology 
- Proprietary software platform offering semi-
automated tools to deliver content on any type 
of mobile device  
Financial resources 
500K EUR 
 
Human resources 
Top management:  
CEO/VP marketing (MBA, 29 years IE, 5 
years EE),  
COO/ VP engineering (Ing., 24 years IE, 0 
years EE)                                                                                                                                                                           
Operational management:  
1 User experience designer
1 Online marketing 
3 Software developers 
 
Technology 
- Simple, user centric web development tool, 
with a friendly interface to mobilize existing 
websites 
Business 
Model 
MSP (Managed Service Provider) Partner 
model 
Value Proposition 
- Proprietary technology platform that 
decreases the amount of work of the web 
developer with 50-80% when mobilizing 
existing content and reduces maintenance 
costs with 50% for the end user 
Customer Segment 
- High-end, larger web agencies as partners, 
big ticket corporates (such as banks, 
SAAS (Software as a Service) Online 
marketing model  
Value Proposition 
- User friendly, mobile web development 
tool to transform Open Source powered 
websites in no time and maintain them 
at low cost  
 
Customer Segment 
- Low-end, smaller web developers who 
develop websites for cities, public 
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airlines, media companies…) as end 
customers 
Channel 
- Account managers screen the market and 
establish partnerships with large web 
agencies and system integrators (accounts).  
Customer Relationships 
- Dedicated personal assistance and different 
forms of SLAs. Co-selling with the 
partners, system integrators and web 
agencies 
Revenue Streams 
- Revenues come from selling licenses to 
web agents 
- Commercial license= 7000 EUR/account, 
average of 10 accounts/web agent 
agencies, social enterprises, micro-
enterprises… 
Channel 
- Online marketing using SEO, SEA, ….  
- Customers are reached online via the 
product and company website 
Customer Relationships 
- From self-service to automated services 
(= semi-automated Q&As to solve 
problems)  
Revenue Streams 
- Freemium model (free, personal 
premium and commerce version) 
- Price ranges from free to 50/month 
 
 
 
2.4 Findings 
The above history shows that WEMOBILE faced a sudden and abrupt 
environmental change, to which it would have to respond if the company wanted 
to stay successful. Despite its success in building up a sound resource 
configuration and associated business model during the pre-App Store period, 
WEMOBILE failed to adapt its business model and resource base to the 
changed environmental conditions. To organize our findings as to why 
WEMOBILE didn’t succeed in developing a dynamic capability, we adopt the 
managerial process view on dynamic capabilities of Zahra et al (2006). These 
authors distinguish between three managerial processes of dynamic capability 
development: 1) the founder/management’s perception of opportunities to 
productively change existing resource configurations, 2) their willingness to 
undertake such change, which entails a dedication of the management to 
strategize around change decisions and 3) their ability to implement these 
changes, which requires commitment from them to execute changes. Figure 3 
illustrates the structure and ordering of the data and starts from these stages of 
dynamic capability development to show the challenges and possible responses 
for each stage. Table 3 presents representative quotations and events that 
substantiate these identified challenges en responses. 
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FIGURE 3: Data structure 
  
DYNAMIC CAPABILITIES                                                  CHALLENGES                                                                            RESPONSES  
                                           
                                                                                              
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
   
PERCEPTION 
FOCUS ON 
ATTENTION 
Hierarchy 
Job content 
Data objectivity 
Presenting objective data 
Mode of communication 
Developing cross hierarchical 
communication channels 
Communication persistence 
Repeating core messages in 
communication 
ISSUE 
SELLING 
Use of material artifacts 
Visualizing progress to stimulate 
collective sense making 
Use of generalizable KPIs 
Collecting KPIs to stimulate 
collective sense making 
Use of benchmarks 
Identifying good practices from 
other companies  
WILLINGNESS Consonant response 
Remove dissonance 
Reduce dissonance 
COGNITIVE 
DISSONANCE 
COLLECTIVE 
SENSE 
MAKING 
ABILITY 
Short vs medium term 
Strategic stability vs. 
change 
Flexibility vs. 
Efficiency 
MANAGE 
FLEXIBILITY 
AND 
EFFICIENCY 
AS A DUALITY 
Individual ambidexterity 
Pursuing original and new 
individual goals 
System redundancy and 
cognitive variety 
Building system redundancy  
Management mechanisms 
Developing mechanisms to manage 
the original and new BM  
COMPETING 
OBJECTIVES 
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TABLE 3: Representative Quotes, Events and Archival Entries underlying challenges and 
responses 
 
Stage 1: Perception 
 
FOCUS OF   
ATTENTION 
Hierarchy CEO: “sell our fully managed solution to web agencies. 
No more, no less. We have to hit the street with our 
proposition, meet them, listen to them, convince them… 
whatever it takes.” (email March, 2009) 
 
Response AM1: “[CEO], all the guys are working very 
hard – trust me… Not a single one [web agency] has 
shown any interest (or even answered). But, hey, I am 
trying to keep the morale and keep on trying. 
 
Job content May 11, 2009 COO presents the technology roadmap at 
the board meeting and explains that the technology can 
improve by including rich content (video content) and a 
higher level of interactivity (Clarysse and Kiefer, 2011: 
222) 
 
AM1 focuses on a simple, user centric web 
development tool, with a friendly interface: “…Look at 
their revenue strategy: you pay a small fee and then you 
can use the tools to develop mobile apps. The 
technology is very simple and it is easy to use! The 
more I think about it, the more I like the idea! (E-mail 
May 4, 2009)” 
 
ISSUE 
SELLING 
  
Objective information  - Collect customer testimonials 
March 22, 2010 The CEO presents an OSMOBI 
marketing report. The freemium version of OSMOBI 
was downloaded 1500 times in 3 months. 
 
- Use of external experts 
February 26, 2010 JC, a London-based expert in online 
marketing and the prospective new CEO (pending 
continuing funding) presents a new version of the 
business plan to convince the investors in the board of 
directors 
 
Mode of communication Analyses of the attendees of and presentations in 
management meetings, board meetings and investment 
committees show that account managers only present in 
management meetings and very occasionally in board 
meetings. CEO/COO/Sales and marketing director 
present in management meetings and board meetings 
but never for investment committees. 
 
Communication persistence The official board reports and the informal notes of our 
principle investors (September 2009, October 2009, 
November 2009) show that similar slides are used each 
time to convince the board member of the changing 
environment 
 
Stage 2: Willingness 
COGNITIVE 
DISSONANCE 
Consonant response AM2: “The trade fair in Amsterdam was a big success. 
I have at least 10 new leads for partnerships to follow 
up on. I am very sure that by the end of the year I will 
meet my targets. I only need sufficient support from the 
back office” (E-mail from AM2 to Sales and marketing 
director, October 21, 2009) 
 
Remove dissonance CEO: “[COO] brought up the project business, again! 
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I made it clear that we’re not going to invest in this 
anymore and that all efforts are focused on the 
development of OSMOBI… I have the impression (and 
am convinced) that he [COO] doesn’t really believe in 
OSMOBI and he just wants to do projects. He says 
“yes” during meetings but actually thinks “no”, which 
is reflected in e-mails sent two hours  after the 
meeting.” (email December 13, 2009) 
 
Reduce dissonance Board reports (September 2009, October 2009, 
November 2009 and December 2009) describe the 
discussion on OSMOBI but still include a section where 
they evaluate the number of signed partnerships. 
 
COLLECTIVE 
SENSE MAKING 
Use material artifacts September 27, 2009: CEO presents new functional 
prototype at board meeting 
 
October 22, 2009: COO and technology team develop 
launch OSMOBI at online marketing conference 
Use generalizable KPIs Product manager: “In attach the overview of usage of 
OSMOBI. Main conclusions: everything is catching 
back up with figures of Friday. Only the number of 
launched projects is low. Don’t quite know what could 
be the reason, I will follow up… (email October 20, 
2009)” 
 
Response AM1 send to management team: “Thanks to 
[product manager], we have now a clear snapshot of 
where OSMOBI stands today, just after the official 
launch…”(email 28 October2009) 
Use benchmarks March 6, 2009: AM1 e-mail to the management team 
which illustrates the Canadian company Mobi as a 
benchmark (see appendix A): “…This is a clear 
example of how a proper GUI (graphical user 
interface) can make your product look better…” 
Stage 3: Ability 
COMPETING 
OBJECTIVES 
Strategic stability vs change Board meetings (September 27, 2009; October 2009, 
November 2009, December 2009) show that the 
investment managers in the board focus on the agreed 
milestones focus on the engineering roadmap, the 
technology roadmap and a sales pipeline that support 
these milestones. 80% - 90% of the various board 
meeting reports cover these reports. 
 
10%-20% of the board meeting reports discuss strategic 
changes needed to avoid milestone underperformance. 
Different forms of change such as technological choices 
are considered to be a necessity. 
 
 
Job Flexibility vs Efficiency CEO asked his engineers to collect market feedback on 
the new product OSMOBI while at same time focus on 
their work on the account management model and 
follow the technology roadmap in order to meet the  
milestones of the investors. 
 
“…. I expect all engineers to be active on the various 
blogging forums. We use Netvibes and Google Alerts to 
be alerted when web developers blog about our service 
or the one of our competitors so we can follow this up 
very closely. In addition, I expect that everyone to send 
at least one twitter message a day to promote the 
product. Of course this does not mean that you have to 
neglect your day-to-day work…..” (CEO 
WEMOBILE e-mail 8 December 2009)  
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Short vs medium term Internal documents (May 2009) dropped on the intranet 
and observation notes of biweekly communication 
forum to the employees (May 15, 2009) show that 
engineers were asked to follow the technology roadmap 
on the short term. The technology roadmap presented 
by the COO at board meeting of May 11, 2009 explains 
that the technology can improve by including rich 
content (video content) and a higher level of 
interactivity (Clarysse and Kiefer, 2011: 222) 
 
MANAGE 
FLEXIBILITY AND 
EFFICIENCY AS A 
DUALITY 
Individual Ambidexterity A context to stimulate individual ambidexterity was 
created. Priorities were set to facilitate focus. AM1 
could increasingly focus on the change process while 
receiving assistant support to pursue original goals. He 
received a budget to experiment, while additional 
budget was allocated to pursue the traditional 
milestones. 
March 20, 2009: S&M manager sent email to AM1: 
“…you can spend some more time exploring our 
business case with me. I asked Engineer 3 to take over 
the London account X. They are more technical 
oriented anyhow. He is happy to do so, it gives him a 
way to visit London 
System redundancy and 
cognitive variety 
Email analysis indicate that redundancy was built into 
the system as AM1 could set up a Tiger group for 
OSMOBI, while the traditional BM still continued to be 
the dominant focus. So, if AM1 spent some days on the 
prototype, the other projects could still be delivered on 
time.  
October 17, 2009: AM1 e-mail to the S&M manager: 
“…I am pretty confident that we go online beginning of 
December. COO gave me Engineer 1 and Engineer 2 
for the next two weeks to build the GUI back-end. He 
could reschedule their work so they can focus on 
OSMOBI…” 
Second, cognitive variety was built into the system by 
recruiting very diverse people. For instance AM1 had 
no industry nor job specific experience, but a vast 
amount of generic experience (he did an MBA and 
worked for five years as a systems engineer in an 
aviation company) while AM2 had lots of industry and 
job specific experience but no generic experience across 
industries and functions (she worked 10 years as 
account manager in different ICT start-ups (Source: 
CVs). 
Management mechanisms E-mail analyses indicate that the AM1 and Sales and 
marketing director set up a tiger team to develop an 
alternative more simple and easy to use technology 
which is called the Drupalgoesmobile project (which 
eventually resulted in OSMOBI) 
 
 
 
2.4.1 Perception: Managing Attention  
Zahra et al. (2006:918) state that the first stage of dynamic capability 
development refers to the individual entrepreneur’s “perception” of 
opportunities to productively change existing resource configurations. They use 
an upper echelon perspective by assuming that the key management or founding 
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team behavior does predict the company’s behavior. This perspective has been 
criticized by Gavetti (2005) and Danneels (2010), who show that the 
development of capabilities might depend on perceptions that differ across the 
various hierarchical layers of the organization. In our analysis of how 
WEMOBILE as a company becomes aware of changes in the environment, we 
go beyond the founding team and also consider the role of individuals at other 
hierarchal levels, both below (account management level) and above the 
founding team (director level and investment committee). The first signals of 
change were perceived at the level of the account managers. The London-based 
account manager (AM1) – encountered significant problems when he 
approached key accounts in the UK market. Despite the interest in the 
WEMOBILE technology platform among the major London-based web 
developers, many of them increasingly hesitated to set up a partnership. In his 
weekly sales and marketing meeting with the sales and marketing director, AM1 
stated: 
“The WEMOBILE technology is based on the wrong assumptions. Large 
customers ask web developers for an iPhone app. Why would the web 
developers use our technology if they can get £ 50,000 to build an app? They 
do not care that their customers only reach a small percentage of users with 
that app. Customer is king” (Sales & Marketing Meeting, 14 April 2009) 
AM1 convinced the sales and marketing director about this change in the 
environment by referring to his key account testimonials. Although the sales and 
marketing director not immediately disagreed with AM1’s perception of the 
environment, he also had to alert the other two members of the management 
committee. It would be much easier to do so if he could already present the other 
members of the management committee with “hard data” and a potential 
response to the changed environment, in order to make a strong case that AM1 
was not trying to hide underperformance in his own sales and marketing efforts. 
To further develop this, he joined AM1 to collect information from London-based 
web developers. Two months after the April sales and marketing meeting, the 
sales and marketing director gave a presentation about the changed 
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environment to the other members of the management team, using testimonials 
and quotes from former accounts and AM1’s efforts to find a response. 
Although the management committee did buy into the idea of the need for a new 
approach, its members were quite resistant to change anything in the old 
business model which had been agreed upon with the investors. So, a strategy 
was developed to draw the attention of the investment managers on the board of 
directors to the changed environment. AM1 received a new function, releasing 
him part-time from his account manager role. The new function of AM1 was to 
get a better understanding of the new iPhone apps trend in the UK market and 
explore how the company could develop a response to this change in customer 
preference. The CEO asked for some convincing material to present so he could 
alert the directors already at the next board meeting on July 27, 2009. He knew 
that just issuing an alert signal about the environmental changes would not be 
sufficient to focus the board members’ attention, as they were less embedded in 
the market nor did they understand the technology in depth. His strategy was to 
put the changes in the environment and the development of a potential solution 
always at the agenda of the board meetings. Every board meeting after 27 July 
deals with this topic. In addition, he requested a visual prototype which could 
become part of the eventual solution, and which would help the board members 
understand the difference between the “mobilizer” used as a technology 
platform for large accounts and the “instant mobilizer” that could be launched as 
a specific, easy-to-use, plug-and-play product for smaller accounts. The board 
members did appreciate the efforts of the company to segment the market, but 
did not immediately consider this to be a change in the market, which would 
force the company to change its business plan. 
Two months later, the CEO presented the new “functional prototype,” now called 
OSMOBI (Open Source Mobilizer) at the board meeting on September 28, 2009.  
Although the board members liked the OSMOBI product and its revenue 
potential, this was not tantamount to a clear perception that the business model 
and associated resource configuration needed to change. The minutes of the 
board meeting on September 28, 2009 mentioned: 
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“The different OSMOBI revenue streams constitute a speeding-up of the 
initial business plan, not a change. We always had the intention to develop a 
product for the low end market. Now this investment will be made sooner. 
The forecast on partnership revenues stays as in the business plan” (BOD 
meeting, September 28, 2009) 
FIGURE 4: Budgeted, Realised and Forecasted Revenues from Licenses 
Source : BOD, 27 October 2009 
 
 
It was only at the next board of directors meeting (on October 27, 2009) that the 
investment managers started to perceive how much the environment had 
changed and did feel the need for the firm to change its focus from partnerships 
to the new OSMOBI product. Figure 4 shows that revenues from partnerships not 
only lagged behind the figures budgeted in the initial financial plan, but also 
leveled off. At this point, the CEO started to realize that more effort needed to go 
into OSMOBI product development for the new market segment, and his 
willingness to further invest in OSMOBI increased. We will further explore this in 
the next session where we cover the “willingness” to develop change rather than 
the “perception” element. 
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It was only at the management meeting on December 14, 2009, in preparation 
for the board scheduled later that month, that the CEO articulated the need for a 
radical change in strategy, with OSMOBI as the lead product. He then proceeded 
to draw the attention of the other board members in this direction. The board 
was still not convinced that the environment had changed that much and upon 
suggestion of the president of the board, a London-based expert in Mobile 
Technology was contacted to act as a consultant for the company and maybe a 
potential CEO if a new direction needed to be taken.  The board on February 22, 
2010 was fully devoted to the new challenges that were offered by the 
environment and OSMOBI as a potential answer to these challenges. The 
London-based expert made a convincing presentation about how the Apple App 
Store had changed the environment, which at the same time had created 
opportunities for the booming business of m-commerce and defended OSMOBI 
as a reasonable attempt to formulate a response to this changing environment. 
At this board meeting, the investment managers decided this should be 
presented to their investment committees, since the next tranche of investment 
would be needed in a couple of months. They did not yet feel comfortable 
presenting the new business model themselves to their limited partners, but 
thought that the London-based expert would be credible, upon the condition that 
he also would commit himself as a potential CEO if they did buy the idea. In 
March 2010, a meeting was therefore planned with two of the three investors, 
where the new management team (new potential CEO, CEO, and COO, and the 
sales and marketing director who would now take a role as a non-executive 
director) would have to present the new business plan. The third investor, a 
public fund, did not have an investment committee of limited partners which met 
on a regular basis. At the BOD on March 26, 2010, the investment managers 
confirmed to the company management: 
“The roadshow you did at our investment committees was successful, our 
investors liked the idea of a turnaround…  I [the public fund investment 
manager] discussed the new plan with my colleagues and we see no 
problems for obtaining the next round of financing of 1.5 million Euros” 
(BOD meeting, March 26, 2010) 
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 However, the investment team of the public fund ultimately decided in its 
meeting on April 8, 2010 that it would not release the next 500 thousand Euros, 
as the milestones in the new business model had changed from those in the 
original business plan. The official communication from the public investor to 
WEMOBILE read as follows:  
“Our investment team has decided not to further invest in the company, as 
the industry expert in the team has expressed his disbelief in m-commerce 
and mobile transactions as a potential source of revenues. The fact that the 
milestones in the business plan have not been met supports this concern” (e-
mail from investment manager to CEO, 8 April 2010) 
What is clear from the flow of communication and the above story line is that the 
different layers in the organization do not get aware of the environmental 
changes at the same moment in time and, related, it does take them longer to get 
aware, the more distant they are from the company’s core activities (see Figure 
5). We see that AM1 perceived the change in March 2009, soon after he started 
working for the company, whereas the investment managers on the board of 
directors only perceived this six months later. Higher-level decision makers, such 
as investment managers at board level, are more distant from the action, thus 
diminishing their ability to interpret “novel experiences”. For example, the board 
acknowledged that something was changing in the market, but the attention they 
paid to this change was limited, as they kept focusing on activities related to the 
existing business model.   
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FIGURE 5: Attention of decision makers
Hierarchical layers
Investment company
Investment committee 1 NO PERCEPTION
 (Investment committee April 2010)
Investment committee 2 NO PERCEPTION
 (Investment committee April 2010)
Investment committee 3
(Investment committee 8 April 2010)
Board of directors
Investment manager 1 PERCEPTION
(Board meeting October 2009)
Investment manager 2 PERCEPTION 
(Board meeting October 2009)
Investment manager 3 PERCEPTION 
(Board meeting October 2009)
Management committee
Chief operations officer PERCEPTION
(Management meeting June 2009)
Chief executive officer PERCEPTION
 (Management meeting June 2009)
Marketing & Sales director PERCEPTION 
(Sales & Marketing meeting 14 April, 2009)
Employees
Account manager 1 PERCEPTION  
(e-mail 18 March, 2009)
dec/07 … mar/09 apr/09 may/09 jun/09 jul/09 aug/09 sep/09 okt/09 nov/09 dec/09 jan/10 feb/10 mar/09 apr/10 may/10 Time
NO PERCEPTION 
…       Jul/10
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The importance of organizational hierarchy in decision-making has been 
theorized in the attention-based view of the Firm (Ocasio, 1997), which 
stipulates that what decision makers do depends on their focus of attention 
rather than processing information. The focus of attention is determined by the 
situation in which they find themselves, which again is influenced by the 
processes the organization has put in place. This view argues that firm behavior 
is the result of how firms channel and distribute attention across various 
hierarchical layers in the organization. In other words, the organization is 
presented as a system of distributed attentional processing (Ocasio, 1997; 
Ocasio, 2011).  
Attention is defined by Ocasio (1997:189) as the noticing, encoding, interpreting 
and focusing of time and effort by organizational decision makers on both (a) 
issues, the available repertoire of categories for making sense of the 
environment; problems, opportunities and threats and (b) answers, the available 
repertoire of action alternatives, such as proposals, routines, projects, programs 
and procedures. Managers across the organizational hierarchy focus attention on 
different activities and aspects of the firm’s agenda. The case above shows, in 
great detail, that the attention which decision makers at various levels pay to the 
issue differs greatly according to the situation they are in (i.e. account manager, 
exec manager, investment manager, limited partner). Developing a dynamic 
capability at company level implies that a system of distributed attention is 
installed which directs the attention of all different levels in the hierarchy 
towards the environmental challenge (the issue) and towards finding an answer 
to that issue. The case shows that the more distant the decision maker was from 
the action, the more information and communication tools were needed to draw 
his/her attention. For instance, the sales and marketing director accompanied 
AM1 to collect quotes from the different customers in order to convince the 
other members of the management team. Later, a visual prototype of the 
potential solution was developed to communicate with the board members and 
an external expert was brought into the board to present his expert opinion on 
how the environment did change and what the opportunities were that resulted 
from that change. Directing attention includes (a) actions such as exploring the 
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landscape by doing preferred witness research (Clarysse and Kiefer, 2011); (b) 
using communication tools and channels such as prototypes, testimonials and 
even invited experts at board level; and (c) developing procedures which then 
channel this attention, such as inviting management teams to investment 
committee meetings (Joseph and Ocasio, 2012). These actions, communications 
and procedures are moves used by employees to affect and direct the attention 
of others to and understanding of changes that have implications for firm 
performance (Dutton and Ashford, 1993). This process is referred to in the 
Attention Based literature as “issue selling” (see figure 3)  and constitutes the 
initial step in the change process of which success depends on how effectively 
change agents get the right people involved (Dutton, Ashford, O’Neill, and 
Lawrence, 2001). This leads us to the following proposition: 
Proposition 1: The extent to which the firm is able the sense opportunities 
and threats in the environment, as a first step in developing dynamic 
capabilities, will depend upon the extent to which the firm is able to manage 
attention across the different hierarchical layers of the organization through 
a process of issue selling. 
 
2.4.2 Willingness: Managing Cognitive Dissonance 
In the previous section, we have shown that it is key to get attention aligned 
across different hierarchal layers in the organization to optimize the sensing of 
change in the environment. Next, dynamic capabilities imply that the 
organization develops a “willingness” to change the business model and move 
from one resource configuration to the next.  
Our case data shows that despite the fact that “perception” was created, this did 
not mean that everybody was “willing” to change the business model and the 
company’s resource configuration. WEMOBILE employed two account 
managers (AM1 and AM2), but each reacted very differently to the fact that they 
did not meet their targets. London-based AM1 analyzed the problem, observed 
the environment and looked for a potential solution, which eventually became 
OSMOBI.  
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In contrast, AM2 tried instead to meet the targets set for the partnership 
business model by working harder within her role as an account manager. On 
Wednesday, October 21st  – more than 6 months after AM1’s e-mail from the 
London branch – she e-mailed the following to the sales and marketing director: 
“The trade fair in Amsterdam was a big success. I have at least 10 new leads 
for partnerships to follow up on. I am very sure that by the end of the year I 
will meet my targets. I only need sufficient support from the back office” 
(Mail from AM2 to sales and marketing director, 21 October, 2009) 
Her belief in the partnership model was strengthened by her signing the first 
contract with a partner one week after the Amsterdam visit. Figure 6 and 7 show 
the results of the content analysis of the email conversation they had with the 
management of the company. Whereas AM1 increasingly talks about OSMOBI 
and the new solution to the changed environment, AM2 continues to put her 
attention towards exploiting the account management model she started in. 
The key difference between  AM1 and AM2 as business developers was their 
previous work experience. AM2 had over ten years of experience as an account 
manager in ICT-related environments and made use of a whole battery of 
routines and contacts from the past. In contrast, AM1 was an engineer who 
wanted to get out of engineering and had therefore pursued an MBA. Straight 
after the MBA, he started to work for WEMOBILE. He used his newly 
developed management skills to analyze the situation and concluded that the 
environment had changed. 
This difference in how people react towards challenges in the environment is 
also observable between different levels of the organization. The sales and 
marketing director had experience in managing new ventures (he had been CEO 
of a new venture before) whereas the CEO of the company had considerable 
experience as a CTO of a relatively young technology based company in the US. 
He had joined that company three years after its founding, so he was proficient at 
developing stable routines in a growing environment, with a focus on technology 
development. Again, both reacted in a very different way towards the changes 
they sensed in the environment.  
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FIGURE 6: Email Count AM1 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 7: Email Count AM2 
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The sales and marketing director sent the CEO an e-mail in December 2009 in which he 
challenged the assumptions underlying the existing business plan, in light of the new 
developments in the market. He realized that the current sales approach via account 
managers could never work in a changed market where customers were no longer 
interested in complex, high-end technology but had a strong appetite for apps. Therefore he 
suggested departing from the old business model and convincing the board to focus mainly 
on OSMOBI and the new business model. Despite the fact that he recognized the changes in 
the environment, the CEO’s reaction was rather surprising: 
“I read your [sales and marketing director’s] email with great astonishment. Unless I 
didn’t get it, basically you’re raising doubts about our approach and overall strategy!” 
(CEO e-mail, December 2009)   
At no point in time does the CEO seem to have realized that, as a response to changes in the 
environment, OSMOBI would also require redevelopment of the firm’s the resource 
configuration. Even in the company’s final months, he presented the following story to the 
board of directors:  
“…..CEO starts the meeting with the good news that WEMOBILE has managed to be 
elected for an EC project…. CEO gives an overview of the take up rate on OSMOBI (free 
version). He presents the funnel of over 8000 visitors leading to 1200 mobile websites 
in the air at the moment of presentation and 7 paying premium sites…. JC is presented 
as the new senior VP in sales and marketing and future CEO…. He covers the main 
issues that have to be tackled in the business case, including the product development 
map which is needed to go from OSMOBI towards OSMOBI m-commerce. Investor 1 
asks CEO whether the technology needed for the m-commerce version is totally 
different from the one embodied in OSMOBI. COO answers that indeed quite some extra 
development work needs to be done….CEO argues that 1.5 million Euros extra is needed 
to finance the further development of OSMOBI and to continue the technology 
roadmap….” (Excerpt from BOD minutes February 26, 2009) 
The excerpt above shows that even at the moment when the different hierarchical layers 
(except for the investment committees) were convinced that a new business model was 
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needed, and after presenting JC, the London-based expert, to the board as the prospective 
new CEO (pending continuing funding), the current CEO opened the board meeting by 
announcing that the company had won R&D funding from the EC (which meant only 50% 
financing) to further develop the roadmap associated with the old business model and 
reflected the routines he was familiar with from his previous job as a CTO (i.e. building 
technology roadmaps and bidding for funding to finance these). The COO, who had over 20 
years as a project manager in an ICT company, also reacted in a similar way to the 
environmental change. His job had always been to manage complex engineering projects 
and deliver excellent quality. At the BOD on February 26, he quantified the amount of work 
needed to turn OSMOBI from a functional prototype into a commercial product (see quote 
above, where 1.5 million Euros was requested from the board). Note the difference with 
respect to the e-mail sent by AM1 to the sales and marketing director nine months earlier 
(see appendix A) where he refers to Mobi as the role model for WEMOBILE. Mobi became 
successful with a product which was technically inferior to OSMOBI at that time.  
Also at board level, we observed that the investment managers responded to the change in 
the environment by developing responses which suited their comfort zone. The two 
investment managers from the lead investor had considerable experience in industry (over 
20 years) as VP sales and marketing of a company active in digital projectors and digital 
displays. That company’s business model was focused on account management. Throughout 
the different board meetings, a significant amount of time was spent fine-tuning the KPIs 
for the account managers and the numbers which needed to be reported. The investment 
managers also liked to regularly attend technical events to meet the different accounts. 
However, none of the two investment managers had any experience in online marketing, 
which was an essential element of the new business model. Nor did they have experience 
with start-ups (it was their first A-round investment and the rest of their portfolio was in B- 
and C- rounds). They used their existing routines and procedures to optimize account 
management and general management in the new venture. Although they bought into the 
idea of OSMOBI as a new product in the environment, they did not think about the change in 
business model and associated resource configuration.  
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These examples indicate that individuals in the company were aware of the need for a 
change in business model, yet they did not want to give up the old business model. The 
reason behind this seems to be that the old business model in which they had invested 
either money and/or effort (as a founder, investor, manager, employee, etc.) fit neatly 
within the cognitive maps or heuristics they had constructed through their past 
experiences. Previous research has put forward the importance of cognitive maps in 
explaining dynamic capabilities. Gavetti (2005) for instance referred to them as important 
foci of attention. Managers typically rely on their long-held, institutionalized beliefs when 
confronted with new, ambiguous information. Fundamental changes in the market, such as 
the introduction of Apple’s App Store in relation to WEMOBILE, require a new strategic 
logic which was not aligned with cognitive maps of the key decision makers. Kaplan (2008) 
has further developed these cognitive arguments within the attention-based view of the 
organization, and shows how the cognitive map of CEOs determines the way they shape 
responses to technical change. Cognitive maps can be seen as heuristics and routines which 
people use to make sense of signals from their environment. For instance, AM2, the second 
account manager at WEMOBILE, interprets the bad sales results as an indication that 
more effort must be invested in account  management, and uses routines developed in her 
previous job as a response. However, OSMOBI needs online marketing in order to be 
promoted effectively, and is thus very distinct from her cognitive map. Similarly, the CEO 
had previously worked in a high-tech company where he developed routines to build and 
execute technology roadmaps and manage his engineers to develop cutting-edge 
technology. But OSMOBI needs a simple solution with a user-centric design, something very 
distant from his cognitive map. We find a similar cognitive tension at the level of the 
investment managers. In the following press release, the investor announces that 
WEMOBILE will now focus on a different market segment, yet the old partnership model 
will not be abandoned: 
“[Company] supplies advanced, tailor-made mobile projects and its strategy is mainly 
based on Partners offering end-to-end mobile development. [Company] also decided to 
make its source code available to the development community, although the company 
retains its traditional, commercial solutions”. (Press release May 26, 2009)  
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In sum, although the different decision makers at WEMOBILE acknowledged the need for 
a reaction to the changed environment, they did not leave their comfort zones, i.e. the old 
business model which neatly fit their cognitive maps. Instead, they see the new product, 
OSMOBI, as an add-on to the old business model. The persistence of cognitive maps is 
illustrated in the following e-mail from the CEO to the sales and marketing director 
regarding the COO’s reluctance to embrace the new strategy:  
“[COO] brought up the project business, again! I told him over the past couple of weeks 
that the project business doesn’t work because our technology is too complex, and web 
agencies don’t have deep pockets… I made it clear that we’re not going to invest in this 
anymore – do we need to keep our account managers – and that all efforts are focused 
on the development of OSMOBI… I have the impression (and am convinced) that he 
[COO] doesn’t really believe in OSMOBI and he just wants to do projects. He says “yes” 
during meetings but actually thinks “no”, which is reflected in e-mails sent two hours 
after the meeting.” (email December 13, 2009)  
We can explain this behavior using the theory of “cognitive dissonance” (Festinger, 1957; 
Cooper, 2007). Cognitive dissonance theory states that if a person holds two cognitions that 
are inconsistent, he/she will experience dissonance and will try to reduce in one of three 
ways: (1) remove dissonant cognitions; (2) add new consonant cognitions to it; or (3) 
reduce the importance of dissonant cognitions (see figure 3). The theory’s main context lies 
in individual and social psychology, but it has been widely used in marketing and, to a lesser 
extent, in management, where scholars used it in the early nineties to explain resistance to 
change (Telci, Maden & Kantur, 2011). The reaction of decision makers in the firm who 
possessed strong cognitive maps was to reduce the importance of the new, dissonant 
cognition by keeping the old cognitive map. Individuals who are confronted with new 
information (i.e. the changed strategic logic from account management to online marketing) 
feel unease with the mismatch between their cognition (based on account management) 
and the new cognition (based on online marketing), and thus tend to neglect it 
(Hodgkinson, 2011). Although dissonance between cognitions should signal a need to re-
evaluate the interpretation of disruptive events, managers often feel unwilling to abandon 
their embedded beliefs and instead avoid the cognitive inconsistency (Zimbardo and 
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Leippe, 1991). New ventures which go through a process of transition from one strategic 
focus to another require leaders to make a significant cognitive shift from the old 
interpretive scheme to the emerging reality (Ambos and Birkinshaw, 2010). Such a 
transition takes a significant period of time, as it requires discussions and internal 
negotiations between decision makers to build a shared understanding of the new market 
circumstances. To create this shared understanding, WEMOBILE developed first a visual 
prototype presented at its September board meeting, then a functional prototype, 
presented at its December board meeting and eventually collected data such as number of 
downloads, from having its functional prototype in the market place to back up the new 
business model. In appendix A is the mail sent by AM1 to the sales and marketing director 
which illustrates the Canadian company Mobi as a benchmark to develop the prototype and 
change to a new business model (see table 2). The prototyping and market testing was an 
extremely important factor in creating “willingness” to change. As the individual decision 
makers could not fall back on their own cognitive maps, they had the tendency to minimize 
the change in the market and stay within their comfort zone. Coming up with 
understandable “data” based upon market tests of the functional prototype showed them 
the potential of this.  
The use of material artifacts such as prototypes has been shown to support the transition 
from individual to collective sense making in an organization (see table 3; Stigliani and 
Ravasi, 2012). Collective sense making reduces the cognitive distance between individuals 
and allows companies to seize opportunities in the environment (Cornelissen and Clark, 
2010). Especially future oriented or prospective sense making which focuses on the 
circumstances when a group of people or an organization engages in forward-looking 
thinking to “structure the future” is an important way to overcome cognitive dissonances. 
The extant literature in prospective sense making has highlighted the use of material 
artifacts in addition to linguistic forms of communication as engines which fuel the cycle of 
sense making and sense giving and allow the transition from the individual to the group or 
company level (Stigliani and Ravasi, 2012). This leads us to the following proposition: 
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Proposition 2: The extent to which a firm is able to develop willingness to change, as a 
second step in the development of dynamic capabilities, will depend upon the extent to 
which the firm is able to overcome cognitive dissonance at different layers in the 
organization through prospective forms of collective sense making 
 
2.4.3 Ability to Implement: Managing Competing Objectives 
The previous paragraphs indicate that the change process of an organization does not 
represent a smooth transition from the existing resource configuration to the desired 
resource configuration due to cognitive dissonance. Rather, the new resource configuration 
tends to be built on top of the older one until its underlying business model can prove its 
validity. Once the new business model is validated in the market, the higher levels in the 
hierarchy can use the generic KPIs (such as cash flow, revenues, margins) they are familiar 
with to evaluate the new business model.  
The implications of this process for the management of resources in the transition from one 
business model to an alternative business model are important. In the case of WEMOBILE 
this meant that the company had to develop an entirely new concept based on online 
marketing, in parallel to the account management business model. Since the existing 
business model remained unchanged, the objectives in that model had to be reported at 
every board meeting, and the lower levels in the company had to accomplish these 
objectives in addition to thinking about the new business model. In other words, at each 
level in the hierarchy, the original objectives for the employees stayed the same. For 
instance, the technology roadmap and the engineering roadmap which had been agreed 
upon with the investors staid largely unaffected, and were reported at every board meeting. 
The partnership model continued to play a significant part in the board meetings, and 
OSMOBI was seen as an addition to that model. 
The management of the OSMOBI process as a parallel path involved a combination of 
stretching existing resources to work for the OSMOBI project on top of the original tasks, 
and the acquisition of new resources.  For instance, an internal communication document 
was sent in December (just after the OSMOBI website went on-line) with the following 
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guidelines for the WEMOBILE employees: social media are an important marketing 
instrument for OSMOBI. 
“…. I expect all engineers to be active on the various blogging forums. We use Netvibes 
and Google Alerts to be alerted when web developers blog about our service or the one 
of our competitors so we can follow this up very closely. In addition, I expect that 
everyone to send at least one twitter message a day to promote the product. Of course 
this does not mean that you have to neglect your day-to-day work…..” (CEO 
WEMOBILE e-mail 8 December 2009)  
A new VP sales and marketing was attracted in January 2010, as well as a dedicated user-
centric designer to build the graphical user interface for OSMOBI. The company also looked 
for an expert in online marketing to promote the product.  
In the end, the company did not succeed in its goal because one of the VCs withdrew 
support, which caused a snowball effect on the two other investors. The company did not 
succeed in securing the funds needed to support the two business models (as new 
resources were acquired without divesting existing ones). The extra cost of the new 
business model is illustrated in Figure 8, which shows the numbers compiled by us from the 
business plan submitted to the venture capital syndicate, also used as a financial 
management tool in the BOD meetings of 2009, and the new business plan submitted to the 
investors in November 2009. The new business plan also includes OSMOBI. It shows that 
the development of OSMOBI would increase the burn rate significantly in 2010, peaking at 
500 thousand dollars per month. This increase in burn rate resulted from the decision not 
to divest any of the existing resources. Instead, the management forecast that the 
development of OSMOBI and associated products would need an extra investment of 2 
million Euros (BOD Report, February 22, 2010). 
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FIGURE 8: Forecast Cash Flow, 2009-2010 
 
                                                                        Source : Business plan November 2008, business plan November 2009 
 
 
This change process deviates substantially from processes which have been described in 
the resource-constrained literature as “bricolage” (Baker and Nelson, 2005) or 
“effectuation” (Sarasvathy, 2001). This literature suggests that entrepreneurs change their 
business model very easily when new opportunities emerge. They address these 
opportunities by using existing resources, even if doing so requires some form of bricolage. 
However, this resource constraint literature has almost exclusively focused on very small 
ventures (Baker and Nelson included 29 ventures with a median number of employees of 4 
in their investigation), without any form of venture capital (which means there was not 
necessarily an agreed upon business model) and predominantly in low-tech (i.e. less 
dynamic) environments. In contrast to the ventures described by Sarasvathy (2001) or the 
ones included in the Baker and Nelson (2005) study on bricolage, WEMOBILE had raised 
a substantial amount of A-round venture capital based upon a clear business plan upon 
which the milestones in the shareholders’ agreement were based. These milestones are not 
always generic in the sense that they can be transferred from one business model to 
another (e.g. revenues). Instead, a part of them are quite business model specific (e.g. 
number of licenses sold, number of partnership agreements).  
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The process described above shows that the development of a new business model and 
resource configuration occurs in parallel to the ongoing implementation of the existing 
ones, and therefore requires the company to be able to manage conflicting objectives. The 
management of conflicting objectives has traditionally been covered by the literature on 
organizational ambidexterity (O’Reilly and Tushman, 2008). One solution proposed by that 
literature is the creation of dual structures to deal with different objectives in an 
organization, so-called “structural ambidexterity”. Although WEMOBILE did attract some 
new resources to develop OSMOBI, no separate structure was created to champion the new 
business model. This solution would have been very difficult in such a resource constraint 
environment. A dual structure would have been considered as consuming too many 
resources and divert attention away from the core focus of the company.  
Instead, competing objectives were managed at an individual level. The same people had to 
both implement the old business model and take actions to support the new one, although it 
is true that some remained to have a core focus on the old one (eg. AM2) while others had a 
core focus on the new one (eg. AM1). Gibson and Birkinshaw (2004) have introduced the 
concept of “contextual ambidexterity” to separate this way of managing ambidexterity from 
the structural ambidexterity mentioned above. When organizations manage contextual 
ambidexterity, it means that their organizational members are expected to cope with the 
contradicting requirements of the existing and new business models by smoothly switching 
between them in the course of their daily activities. Gibson and Birkinshaw (2004) assume 
that contextual ambidexterity is rooted in the individual’s ability to both exploit the existing 
business model and to explore the new one, and advocate that a “context” needs to be 
created which enables this (Raisch, Birkinshaw, Probat and Tushman, 2009). Schreyög and 
Sydow (2010) have criticized this approach by challenging the assumption that individuals 
are cognitively able to switch in this way. They advocate a systems view which encourages 
both stabilization and renewal as two interrelated processes. Hence, a more important role 
is attributed to organizational processes and semi-structures to realize these competing 
objectives.  
Eisenhardt, Furr and Bingham (2010) integrate these two views and propose management 
mechanisms to deal with conflicting objectives such as the use of heuristics to shape 
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strategic decision making and the use of flexibility-injecting structures to underscore 
decisions. In line with this, Farjoun (2010) suggests that flexibility and efficiency should not 
be seen as dualisms or competing objectives but are dualities that are interrelated to each 
other and should be managed accordingly. He suggests that companies should build in 
redundancy in their systems to allow experimentation with new business models, while 
avoiding that the old one collapses in the meanwhile. We observed that WEMOBILE has 
indeed used a mixed approach of both relying on and creating a context which stimulated 
ambidexterity of the individuals and developing a system which both encouraged 
stabilization and renewal. For instance, WEMOBILE relied on and stimulated the 
individual ambidexterity of the engineers to both develop further the old platform, but also 
engage themselves in online marketing activities such as blogging, twitting and tweeting 
about the new one. However, at the same time, it built in some redundancy and cognitive 
variety in the system to avoid that company completely collapses. As an example of system 
redundancy, AM2 took over some accounts of AM1 so that he could spend more time on the 
development of OSMOBI. Cognitive variety was built into the system for instance by 
recruiting two account managers, one of them had a lot of industry and job specific 
experience, while the other one had an extensive amount of general experience. Eventually, 
AM1, who had extensive general experience, played a crucial role in developing the OSMOBI 
product. In addition management mechanisms such as the creation of a virtual OSMOBI 
tiger team (which was an example of a flexibility injecting mechanism because it cuts across 
the structures and simplified much of the decision making as the CEO and CTO were 
immediately informed) and the use of heuristics from a different industry such as number 
of downloads and users. 
Taken together, the literature on competing objectives proposes both contextual, system 
level and managerial practices to induce the simultaneous pursuit of such competing 
objectives (for an overview see table 3). The point of departure of these solutions is that 
flexibility and efficiency should be seen as dualities rather than dualisms (Farjoun, 2010).  
This means that the company should attract individuals who are able to cope with 
individual ambidexterity and create a context to promote this form of individual level 
ambidexterity. However, this is not sufficient. The organizational system should also have 
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built in mechanisms to deal with stability and change. This can be realized by bringing 
redundancy and cognitive variety into the system. In addition, managerial practices such as 
flexibility inducing mechanisms and the use of simplifying heuristics can further increase 
the effectivity of managing efficiency and flexibility as a duality. This leads us to the 
following proposition: 
Proposition 3: The extent to which a firm is able to implement change, as a third step in 
the development of dynamic capabilities, will depend upon the extent to which the firm 
is able to manage competing objectives at different layers in the organization through 
managing efficiency and flexibility as a duality 
 
2.5 Discussion and conclusion 
The purpose of this study was to gain a better understanding of the micro-foundations of 
dynamic capabilities. We performed a case study of a new venture, WEMOBILE, which 
was confronted with a radical environmental shift which forced the firm to change its 
business model and associated resource configuration. To do so, it had to build dynamic 
capabilities at firm level.  
Our study puts forward three important contributions to the dynamic capability literature. 
First, we introduce the attention-based view of the firm as an underlying theoretical 
perspective to position the different hierarchical layers and their focus of attention in the 
firm in the perception stage of dynamic capability development. This study provides a rich 
understanding of how attention differs across hierarchical layers in the organization and 
how the organization needs to develop procedures and communication channels to manage 
this distributed attention. Focusing on top-level decision makers is not enough when 
organizations have to change because of external pressure. Addressing the challenges 
suggested by the attention-based view (see table 3) is a crucial element in the successful 
inception of dynamic capabilities. We refer to the insights offered by the theory on issue 
selling to address these. Second, this study introduces cognitive dissonance as a main 
theoretical explanation for the reluctance of individuals to introduce change even if they are 
convinced that change is necessary. Cognitive dissonance at the different levels of the 
organization’s hierarchy explains why firms might be less “willing” to change than 
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originally expected. We show in detail how cognitive dissonance causes resistance to new 
environmental demands and how elements of collective sense making can be used to 
overcome this resistance. Third, we show how the literature on competing objectives 
provides guidance in how firms can manage efficiency and flexibility as a duality. We 
hypothesize that shaping a context for individual ambidexterity and developing a system to 
manage this duality are necessary components on which additional management practices 
such as flexibility inducing mechanisms can be added. In sum, the development of dynamic 
capabilities implies (a) the management of distributed attention through a process of issue 
selling, (b) the management of cognitive dissonance through a process of prospective 
collective sense making, and (c) the management of competing objectives through a process 
of duality. The next paragraphs elaborate on the implications of each of the three 
contributions.  
Understanding the management of distributed attention in the “perception” stage of 
dynamic capability development is a key ingredient for advancing the theory of dynamic 
capabilities. Attention is distributed across hierarchical levels in the organization (Ocasio, 
1997) and both the level and the focus of attention differs at these various hierarchical 
levels. Hence, the level at which the environmental change is detected and where most 
likely the answer to that change will be formulated, will have to communicate clearly with 
the other levels in the organization. To facilitate that distribution of attention, 
organizational procedures such as regularly organized meetings between different levels of 
the organization, activities such as presentations for stakeholder organizations, and 
communication in the form of public press coverage to alert more distant stakeholders is 
needed. A crucial characteristic of the distribution channels is that efficient vertical 
interactions complement horizontal interactions to convey new information and focus 
attention (Joseph and Ocasio, 2011). If attention is not carefully managed, the weakest link 
in this distribution channel will eventually determine whether or not a dynamic capability 
will be developed. In the WEMOBILE case, it was ultimately the third (public) investor’s 
investment team, with which no form of interaction was possible through a vertical 
distribution channel, which pulled the plug. This means that managing attention implies 
that the same focus of attention has to be spread throughout all levels. Our study shows that 
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tightening vertical interactions is necessary to shift the cognition of decision makers who 
face cognitive inertia when being confronted with an environmental shock. Their greater 
distance from the firm’s action hinders the interpretation of new information and action-
outcome relationships (Gavetti, 2005).  
The attention-based view of the firm does clearly highlight the sources of why the same 
opportunities or threats are not considered to be equally important in different parts of the 
organization. The solution to this however is to be found in a different part of the literature 
which addresses attention, namely the literature on issue selling. We show that the 
“objectivisation” of data through the use of testimonials and external exports, the “change in 
modes of communication” by increasing direct involvement of the actors in different 
committees and the “communication persistency” by continuously putting important issues 
on the agenda,  helps to create awareness among decision makers.  
We have shown in the WEMOBILE case that, although different hierarchical layers in the 
organization were recognizing the change in the environment and were willing to develop 
an answer (OSMOBI) to address it, this did not mean that they were willing to change the 
business model at company level nor to change the associated resource configuration. In 
fact, we found that those decision makers who had strong cognitive maps related to the 
existing business model and resource configuration were the least willing to change. They 
faced significant challenges to interpret the environmental change and its implications for 
the organization. Instead, they used their cognitive maps to fine-tune the existing business 
model, with which they felt comfortable. Thus, the impact was a further enhancement of 
current capabilities instead of the development of dynamic capabilities, which would allow 
the organization to make the transition to the new business model and resource 
configuration. We explained this process theoretically by employing the theory of cognitive 
dissonance. This theory, developed by Festinger (1957) is widely adopted in the individual 
and social psychology and the marketing literature. It explains why people resist change 
and how they do so. Since organizations which have to reconfigure their resources require 
dynamic capabilities (Zahra et al., 2006), developing such capabilities implies that cognitive 
dissonance must be managed. One mechanism to manage cognitive dissonance is to recruit 
people with less experience. For instance, we show that the account manager without 
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experience recognized the change in the environment and was willing to develop a novel 
response, while the experienced account manager kept using and re-using his/her cognitive 
maps to improve sales. This finding suggests that prior experience with a specific type of 
business model is an important boundary condition to the fungibility of human resources in 
highly dynamic markets, where business models may change dramatically in a short period 
of time.   
Managing cognitive dissonance implies that mechanisms of collective sense making are 
needed to overcome individual dissonances. Material artifacts are one such form of 
mechanism. The literature on prospective collective decision making has shown that the 
use of prototypes and other visual artifacts facilitates both sense giving from one individual 
to another and a generic collective form of sense making along which a group of individuals 
draws the same conclusions based upon a more collective form of discussion. In addition to 
material artifacts, the development of generic KPIs (key performance indicators) for the 
new business model can be seen as an additional way to stimulate collective sense making 
at the higher levels of the organization. Finally, the use of a benchmark company which had 
already developed a similar business idea did increase the willingness to further explore 
this avenue among the key decision makers. 
This brings us to our third theoretical contribution to the dynamic capability perspective. 
Realizing change implies that not only perception and willingness are created, but also that 
the individual decision makers must be able to implement the change deemed appropriate. 
We show that instead of moving from one configuration to another, the new business model 
and resource configuration are developed in parallel to the existing one, due to cognitive 
dissonance. Individuals will try to marginalize the dissonant cognition and leave the 
development of the new business model to individuals with less dissonant cognitions. 
However, this form of experimentation with a new business model implies that a significant 
number of employees at WEMOBILE had to be able to pursue competing objectives due to 
limited resources. The degree to which they were able to do so also determined the ability 
with which WEMOBILE was able to go through the final stage of the dynamic capability 
process, namely its implementation. 
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In line with recent thinking in this theory, we argue that the management of competing 
objectives is an important element of this implementation process. Competing objectives 
can be both managed at individual and at system level. We show that at WEMOBILE 
managers did create a context, which encouraged individual ambidexterity. Of course, in 
line with the theory, this required a lot from the individuals in terms of cognitive ability. 
However, in addition to creating the context to deal with such ambidexterity, the company 
also developed a system which allowed to pursue both flexibility and efficiency at the same 
time. For instance, cognitive variation was built into the system so that new ideas could be 
developed. The case study shows that AM1 used the heuristics he had learned during his 
MBA classes and at his previous job to make sense of the changed environment and to 
develop a solution. Also redundancy was built into the system so that the organization did 
not immediately collapse when more time was allocated to explore the new business model. 
Finally, the organization also introduced management mechanisms, which are known to 
increase flexibility. For instance, prototyping rather than planning was used as a way to 
communicate the new business model and gradually convince different layers in the 
decision-making structure. Also, the new business model was directly communicated to the 
investment committees, which is a form of simplifying the decision-making structure. In 
fact, WEMOBILE’s inability to simplify this line of communication with one of its 
investors also led to its ultimate failure. 
In sum, we conclude that we have extended the dynamic capability view by considering 
different decision makers working in different hierarchical layers, as their attention is 
situational and needs to be managed. In addition, their willingness to develop changes will 
depend on how individual cognitive dissonances are overcome and, finally, eventual success 
in implementing these changes will depend on the extent to which the organization can 
manage competing objectives. We present each of these underlying theories as “challenges” 
for which responses can be found in derivative streams of the literature such as issue 
selling, collective sense making and the management of dualities. 
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APPENDIX A: Email AM1 to CEO/CSO 
 
From: AM1 
To: CEO 
       Sales & Marketing Director (CSO) 
Date: 6/03/2009 17:37:11 
Subject: The clone of WEMOBILE - www.mobi.me 
 
 
GUI, GUI, GUI!!!!! 
 
 Yet, this is a clear example of how a proper GUI can make your product look better. 
 
Not sure where mine and Jan's GUI specs ended ... but it looks like Mobi got it in their hands and 
implement (some) of our ideas!... From a commercial viewpoint, 100% their GUI gives them a 
more 'sellable' product. Try it yourself. It takes NO training or user manual. It is simply logical. 
1) enter the desktop website where the content is (what a pity you can select only one website and 
not many....  
 2) by just clicking pictures/texts on it, select the web content you want to mobilize 
 3) look how it looks on a mobile device. Add, move it, insert something by just clicking some 
buttons. DONE!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 
 No need to know about filter/mapping... no need to read manuals. No training. 
 ENGINE 
Like ours, based on Xpath expression concept. Their 'composer' is web-based, like ours. But 
sometimes it crashes (like ours?:-)), not very stable. 
 MARKETING 
It makes you think how cool the name 'Mobi’ is. Maybe 'composer' is not so appealing for    
marketers? 
 I personally don't like their website but I like the fact that it is simple and stupid. 
 Business Development 
 Business Model is based on licenses and the service is fully hosted. 
 Target groups: web developers. 
 Nice to see that their 'license page' on their website does exactly what we want to do in our new 
one (including Terms & Conditions). The new website 
 developers in WEMOBILE should copy it!. 
Pricing: VERY LOW. But also the allowed traffic is low.... as far as I can understand. “CEO”, can 
you help here? 
 
 Best 
 AM1 
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3 Understanding the Micro-Foundations of Substantive and 
Dynamic Capabilities in New Ventures: The Role of Founder 
Personality 
 
ABSTRACT 
Many studies have documented outcomes of capabilities but the fundamental question of 
the origins of capabilities remains largely unknown. Consistent with the upper echelons 
literature and using a micro-foundation approach, our study provides compelling evidence 
that personal characteristics of the early top managers (firm founders) predict capability 
development. Using a methodology combining two years of exploratory qualitative research 
and a survey of 144 founders, we found that founder personality predicted development of 
dynamic and substantive capabilities. Extending research on top management team 
diversity, which tends to study either the average or diversity levels of team characteristics, 
we showed that the configuration of these personality characteristics predicts capability 
formation. Our study is also one of the first to develop scales to measure substantive and 
dynamic capabilities.  
KEY WORDS: dynamic capabilities; new ventures;  personality; micro-foundations  
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Understanding the Micro-Foundations of Substantive and 
Dynamic Capabilities in New Ventures: The Role of Founder 
Personality 
 
3.1 Introduction 
During the past decade, the extant capability literature has mainly focused on 
understanding how a firm can sustain competitive advantage by responding to and even 
proactively pursuing environmental change. This capacity of a firm to change has been 
defined as its “dynamic capability” (Teece, 2007; Helfat and Peteraf, 2009; Helfat and 
Winter, 2011). However, even after a decade, the literature still falls short of disentangling 
dynamic from substantive (or ordinary) firm capabilities (Helfat and Peteraf, 2003; 
Danneels, 2008; Barreto, 2010; Helfat and Winter, 2011). Most dynamic capability research 
has tried to refine the definition of dynamic capabilities and has focused on the question of 
the environmental circumstances in which dynamic capabilities lead to competitive 
advantage (Helfat and Peteraf, 2003; Teece, 2007; Zott, 2003; Barreto, 2010; Helfat and 
Winter, 2011).   
Not only does the extant literature fail to disentangle dynamic from substantive capabilities, 
the literature also remains largely silent when it comes to explaining how these capabilities 
emerge (Autio, George, and Alexy, 2011). More research is thus needed to understand the 
antecedents of capability formation. According to the upper echelons literature, the firm 
reflects the preferences of its top management team (Hambrick and Mason, 1984). Firm 
actions, strategy, decisions, and structures do not emerge “from a disembodied decision 
making process—managers make these decisions.” Yet, this upper echelons perspective is 
notably missing from the literature on capability formation. Echoing this omission, Felin 
and Foss (2011) call for a micro-foundation perspective on capability formation, i.e. a focus 
at the individual level to understand the origins of capability formation (Felin and Foss, 
2005). This call is further endorsed by several researchers including Eisenhardt and Martin 
(2000) and Helfat and Peteraf (2003) who argue that individual-level attributes are 
important in the early stages of capability development. Gavetti (2005) further extends this 
view by showing that the situational attention of individuals based upon their position in 
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the organizational hierarchy impacts the development of capabilities. Of all individual 
attributes, personality is most fundamental as it shapes behavioral tendencies and decision 
making (Zhao and Seibert, 2006). Individuals are confronted with so many stimuli, laden 
with so much ambiguity, complexity, and contradiction, that their personalities greatly 
enter into how they distill and process this information (Nadkarni & Herremann, 2010). 
This filtering process influences their strategic choices and is considered to be central to 
developing strategic flexibility (Johnson et al., 2003; Shimizu & Hitt, 2004). 
In this paper, we address two research gaps by testing (a) how individual level attributes, 
specifically personality traits of members of the founding team, influence (b) the 
development of either substantive or dynamic capabilities (separately) in new ventures. 
Since the micro-foundations of capability formation are an emerging area of research, we 
added a qualitative investigation to complement our deductive study. We complement our 
theorizing with interview evidence which informs us about different personality types and 
the decisions early stage entrepreneurs make. In line with Kim and Miner (2007), we use 
insights from these interviews to formulate our hypotheses. However, it is important to 
note that this is not an inductive study. The qualitative evidence is not used to build 
theories but to enrich our empirical model.  
As substantive and dynamic capabilities are developed early in the firm’s existence (Zahra 
et al., 2006), we studied firm founders. Our findings support that individual attributes 
measured by the personality differences between founders play a role in explaining the 
origins of capabilities and therefore develops a rationalist foundation of capability 
development beyond the endogeneity problem as raised by Foss and Felin (2011). More 
specifically, we show that conscientious founders, who are hardworking, achievement-
oriented, like to plan and are well-organized (Gellatly, 1996; Bell, 2007; Ciavarella et al., 
2004; Barrick and Mount, 1991), prioritize the development of substantive capabilities. In 
comparison, proactive founders, who like to take initiative to improve current 
circumstances or create new ones (Crant, 2000; Grant and Ashford, 2008), contribute to the 
development of dynamic capabilities. We further show that if one founder is highly 
proactive, but lacks conscientiousness, this can be compensated by a higher degree of 
conscientiousness by another founder within the founding team. This study contributes to 
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the theory of capability development by showing how personality traits of individuals 
contribute to our insights about the origins of de novo capability development and how 
different personalities at the individual and team level prioritize development of different 
capabilities, even in the same environment. 
3.2 Capabilities and personality traits 
The extant capability literature describes two types of capabilities. Winter (2003) defines 
zero-level or ordinary capabilities as those that earn income now, while dynamic 
capabilities are those that create, modify and extend ordinary capabilities. This two-level 
dichotomy is broadly based and also known as operating routines vs. dynamic capabilities 
(Zollo and Winter, 2002), operational vs. dynamic capabilities (Helfat and Peteraf, 2003), 
zero-level or ordinary capabilities vs. dynamic capabilities (Winter, 2003), substantive vs. 
dynamic capabilities (Zahra et al., 2006; Helfat and Winter, 2011) and lower- vs. higher-
order competences (Danneels, 2002; Danneels, 2008). Although most papers use slightly 
different definitions of both substantive and dynamic capabilities, more recent work 
suggests that capabilities are ‘capacities’ (rather than routines), with substantive 
capabilities referring to the capacity to perform a particular activity in a reliable and at least 
minimally satisfactory way (Helfat and Winter, 2011:1244) and dynamic capabilities as the 
capacity to change the firm’s resource base, its operational capabilities or its environment 
(Teece, 2007; Helfat et al., 2007; Helfat and Winter, 2011). 
Whereas Teece, Pisano and Shuen (1997) refer to dynamic environments as a primary 
reason for dynamic capabilities to emerge, Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) show that 
dynamic capabilities also have advantages in moderately dynamic environments, and Helfat 
and Winter (2011) even provide anecdotal evidence that dynamic capabilities can lead to 
competitive advantage even in relatively stable environments. Zahra et al. (2006) argue that 
substantive and dynamic capabilities interact with each other and even reinforce their 
impact in a given environment. Despite these findings, much of the debate has been about 
trying to distinguish dynamic capabilities from substantive ones (Helfat and Peteraf, 2009; 
Di Stefano, Peteraf, and Verona, 2010; Helfat and Winter, 2011). 
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The extant literature on capabilities uses empiricism and behavioral theory to explain how 
capabilities develop (Felin and Foss, 2011). Empiricism suggests that the development of 
capabilities is determined by the perception of needs in the environment. Behavioral theory 
assumes that firms develop routines based upon previous experiences. Experience and the 
perception of the external environment are thus key determinants in explaining how 
capabilities develop. For example, Zahra et al. (2006), Zollo and Winter (2002), Eisenhardt 
and Martin (2000) and Gavetti and Levinthal (2000) each refer to organizational experience 
based on different forms of learning models to explain the development of capabilities in 
companies.  
Whereas experience is instrumental for explaining the level of capability development, 
without making a distinction between dynamic and substantive capabilities, environmental 
factors such as ‘dynamism’, ‘volatility’ or ‘change’ are used as explanatory factors to 
distinguish between the need for dynamic versus operational capabilities (Teece et al., 
1997). As aforementioned, Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) already show that in volatile 
environments, dynamic capabilities can be important, while Helfat and Winter (2011) even 
argue their importance in stable environments. Zahra et al. (2006) then argue that even in 
dynamic environments, substantive capabilities are important. One of the reasons the 
environment is not a good predictor of different forms of capability formation is that the 
perception of the opportunities or threats in this environment will be determined by the 
individual traits of the managers who make sense of this environment, i.e. the micro 
foundations of the firm (Teece, 2007). 
Foss and Felin (2011) further question the use of empiricism and behavioral theory by 
arguing that the above explanations of capability formation tend to be endogenous. 
Presenting capabilities as routines developed over time through accumulated experience 
implies that there will be feedback loops between the dependent variable (capabilities) and 
the independent ones (e.g. cumulated experience), which result from an inherently 
endogenous situation. In other words, the literature falls short of explaining how 
capabilities emerge and what determines their difference. To trace the emergence of 
capability formation, one needs to track the early stages of a firm, because it is during this 
phase that capabilities are developed.  As Autio et al. (2011) highlighted, in a firm’s early 
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stages no routines have been accumulated over time, and more focus is needed on de novo 
capability development. In order to analyze which capabilities managers are likely to 
develop from scratch in firms, Teece (2007) already highlighted that the micro-foundation 
view on capabilities is an interesting avenue for research. 
The micro-foundations include the distinct individual characteristics which influence the 
decision making behavior of managers (Felin and Foss, 2005). This perspective echoes the 
upper echelons stream of research where the firm reflects preferences of the top 
management team (Hambrick and Mason, 1984). The early members of the top 
management team (firm founders in this study) bring in human capital  in the form of firm-
specific, industry-specific, related industry, and generic skills which influence firm 
outcomes (Castanias and Helfat, 1991, 2001). This micro-foundation of dynamic capabilities 
reflects the broader perspective that in order to understand firm strategy, structures, and 
goals, the characteristics of key managers should be studied. As Adner and Helfat (2003) 
asserted an inquiry into corporate strategy extends to the individuals responsible for 
strategic decision making. An answer to the question of ‘what makes firms different’ 
requires an answer to the question of ‘what makes managers different.’ Among upper 
echelons characteristics, personality and cognitions are two main human capital factors 
which determine the decision making behavior of managers. Scholars in the cognition 
perspective assume that entrepreneurs make decisions either based upon heuristics they 
have learned in the past or upon simplifications of the environment (Baron, 2004; Gavetti, 
2005). Gavetti (2005) shows that managerial cognition helps predict how capabilities 
develop. Autio et al. (2011) show in a qualitative study how entrepreneurs’ cognition 
impacts the way they perceive environmental opportunities to internationalize and 
modifies their approach to internationalization. Despite the contributions of the cognitive 
approach, Hodgkinson and Healy (2011) call for a less cognitive approach to the micro-
foundations view. Personality traits offer an alternative as they impact the focus of 
attention of managers (Ocasio, 1997). Ocasio (1997) shows that what decision makers do 
will depend on where they focus their attention, which is in turn determined by their 
personality characteristics. Focused attention explains the mechanism through which 
personality traits might lead to decisions which impact the development of capabilities. 
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Generic human capital factors, such as personality, should predict firm outcomes across a 
wide range of industries (cf. Adner and Helfat, 2003).  
For years, entrepreneurship research has explored the implications of the personality of 
founders and early top managers. The majority of work has focused on either what 
personality traits affect an individual’s likelihood of becoming an entrepreneur, or the 
differences between entrepreneurs and managers. Far fewer studies have explored which 
personality types of founders are prone to successfully guide their ventures to long-term 
survival (Ciavarella et al., 2004). When reviewing these studies, proactiveness and 
conscientiousness are the personality constructs most strongly and consistently associated 
with successful entrepreneurs (Zhao, Seibert, and Lumpkin, 2009). Whereas proactiveness 
tends to be positively associated with opportunity detection (Ardichvili, Cardozo, and Ray, 
2003; Baron, 2007), conscientiousness is shown to have a positive impact on the outcome 
of the entrepreneurial process (Zhao and Seibert, 2006; Zhao et al., 2009) and seems to 
influence the founder’s likelihood of taking the venture from the startup stage to the 
maturity stage (Ciavarella et al., 2004). Conscientious individuals are described as 
hardworking, achievement-oriented, forward-planning and well-organized individuals 
(Gellatly, 1996; Bell, 2007; Barrick and Mount, 1991). Most personality scholars distinguish 
two dimensions within the conscientiousness trait (Collins, Hanges, and Locke, 2004): need 
for achievement and dependability. The need for achievement facet of conscientiousness 
reflects the preference for situations in which performance is directly related to one’s own 
efforts rather than to other factors. The dependability facet of conscientiousness refers to 
the extent to which one is organized, deliberate and methodical and can be relied on to 
fulfill one’s duties and responsibilities. Although, both facets are distinct characteristics of 
conscientious individuals, the conscientiousness construct is seldom analyzed in its 
subcomponents. There seems to be consensus that both elements are important, but 
interrelated and not exhaustive to cover conscientiousness, which also includes 
perseverance as a characteristic (Zhao and Seibert, 2006; Zhao et al., 2009).  
Proactiveness is a personality trait which describes someone who is intellectually curious, 
imaginative, and creative; someone who seeks out new ideas (Griffin, Neal, and Parker, 
2007). Bateman and Crant (1993: 105) defined a proactive person as someone with a 
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relatively stable behavioral tendency to initiate change in the environment. Proactive 
individuals identify opportunities, act on them, show initiative and persevere until they 
bring about meaningful change (Crant, 1996; Crant, 2000). A proactive person anticipates, 
plans for, and attempts to create a future outcome that has an impact on the self or 
environment (Grant and Ashford, 2008). Proactivity which is a facet of openness to 
experience has been used to explain differences in entrepreneurial opportunity recognition 
(Ardichvili, Cardozo, and Ray, 2003), ability to find new solutions (Unsworth, 2001), 
entrepreneurial intent (Crant, 1996) and venture success (Ciavarella et al., 2004).  
To conclude, founders of new ventures have a particularly high impact on the way in which 
the venture will be structured. Above, we suggested that the personalities of these founders 
might lead to different forms of decision making behavior. More specifically, we suggested 
that two different personality traits have been found to be specifically relevant among 
founders and managers: conscientiousness and proactiveness. Below, we develop the 
hypotheses of how these factors predict different forms of capability development. 
3.3 Personalities as micro-foundations of capability formation 
The personality trait of conscientiousness is defined by characteristics such as orderliness, 
persistence, achievement goal orientation, hard work, and reliability (Costa and McCrae, 
1992; Gellatly, 1996). As aforementioned, the extant literature on personality has put 
conscientiousness forward as a good indicator of managerial success. Managers scoring 
high on this characteristic tend to structure and organize their environments better. 
Conforming to these characteristics, Sine, Mitsuhashi, and Kirsch (2006) show that 
imposing structure and effectively managing time are critical to successfully commercialize 
a business idea. Conscientious managers, who are structured, well-organized and possess 
planning skills (Mount, Barrick, and Strauss, 1999), should be better at developing an 
efficient business model. Substantive capabilities do not arise automatically. Instead, they 
involve intense, effortful, prolonged and highly-focused efforts (Baron and Henry, 2010). 
Because persistent efforts are needed to develop substantive capabilities, conscientious 
founders are likely to build these capabilities because conscientious individuals pay 
attention to and are better at creating structures for the company (Mount et al., 1999). One 
 94 
 
of the highly conscientious founders whom we interviewed in our study (average of 6.53 on 
7-point scales; above the 90th percentile) provided supporting evidence for this. He stated:  
“I joined my two co-founders when they were about 12 months into the project. My first 
job was cleaning the mess they had created in 12 months’ time. There was nothing 
here: no meeting reports, no HR policy, no product roadmap, no sales plan… It was a 
real mess. It was only after I had joined that we really started the company and that we 
could convince investors…” 
In line with the quote above, we expect that the level of conscientiousness will explain the 
development of substantive capabilities. Founders who are highly conscientious are likely 
to be effective in setting up structures within the venture and are motivated to achieve their 
objectives, even if this means they have to fight against resistance. In other words, we 
assume that conscientious founders will implement routines in their ventures to reflect 
their personal preferences.  
In contrast, the inclusion of conscientious founders should be associated with a greater 
tendency to stay committed to task accomplishment and avoid digressions and other 
impulses to stray off task (Barry and Stewart, 1997). These focused and structured 
individuals can  have difficulties thinking out of the box and considering information which 
is not directly relevant to execute existing tasks. As such, conscientiousness can curtail 
creative problem-solving (Waldman, Atwater, and Davidson, 2004; Hough, 2003) and 
subsequently impede development of the firm’s capacity to identify new opportunities and 
address changing environments. Moreover, individuals high on conscientiousness tend to 
have a high need for order and avoid doing things without careful consideration (LePine, 
2003). In fast moving environments, conscientious founders can have difficulties making 
changes in a timely manner. Following this logic highly conscientious managers are less 
likely to foster development of dynamic capabilities. One of our interviewees, a highly 
conscientious founder (average 6.84 on 7-point scales; above the 90th percentile) provides 
anecdotal evidence for this view when he commented that: 
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“I prefer to execute our business plan stepwise. After two years, we still have our initial 
business plan with only a few corrections. This systematic approach caused us some 
delays, but I’m convinced that this approach will be beneficial for our company in the 
long run. For the moment, we have developed our product in the greatest details and 
are looking forward to bringing the product to the market in the near future. We hope 
that the market will respond well.” 
Therefore: 
H1a The higher the level of conscientiousness of the individual founder or the collective 
founding team, the more likely the venture will develop substantive capabilities. 
H1b The level of conscientiousness of the founder(s) will not impact development of dynamic 
capabilities 
Proactive behavior is defined as taking initiative to improve current circumstances or to 
create new ones (Crant, 2000). Proactive personalities actively seek information and 
opportunities to improve things. They don’t passively wait for information or opportunities 
to come to them, and they are creative in finding alternative solutions (Crant, 2000). 
Unsworth (2001) defines proactive behavior as a form of creativity, a way to generate more 
ideas and an active search to solve problems. In a review of the concept, Parker, Williams, 
and Turner (2006: 636) suggested that ‘despite different labels and theoretical 
underpinnings, concepts that relate to individual-level proactive behavior typically focus on 
self-initiated and future-oriented action that aims to change and improve the situation or 
oneself.’ Proactive people, who develop proactive behavior in an organization, scan and 
identify opportunities and act on them, show initiative, and persevere until meaningful 
change occurs. However, people low on proactive personality should exhibit opposite 
patterns: they can fail to identify, let alone seize, opportunities to change things.  
Dynamic capability is an organization’s capacity to change its substantive capabilities. 
Dynamic capabilities imply an organizational capacity to sense and shape new 
opportunities and divert existing resources bundles and routines toward new directions. 
Zahra et al. (2006) summarize that in order to implement dynamic capabilities, an 
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organization must have the ability to perceive external opportunities, have  the willingness 
to change its existing resource configuration and eventually implement these changes. This 
three-step cycle is also supported by other scholars in the dynamic capability perspective 
(Teece, 2007; Helfat and Winter, 2011). At the individual level, this implies that the key 
decision makers should have the skills to identify and/or co-create opportunities and take 
the initiative to convince others in the organization to implement them.  
This is exactly what proactive behavior is supposed to be, and proactive personalities are 
hence more likely to establish that behavior in their ventures. Proactive individuals are 
path-finders who constantly look around and scan the company’s environment (Bateman 
and Crant, 1993). They possess creative minds which allow them to think out of the box and 
find solutions or new directions (Unsworth, 2001). Along the same line as our reasoning, 
one of the proactive founders (average 6.50 on 7-point scales; above the 90th percentile) in 
our sample commented that:  
“I’m a creative thinker and help to bring new opportunities into our company. I’m not 
interested in spending 99% of my time on HR issues or other day-to-day problems. I 
have the ideas and the vision of where the company needs to be within 5 years, but I do 
not have the patience to build up and manage the structures needed to pursue these 
new paths. I have set the goal for this company and convince others to follow.” 
Another characteristic of a proactive personality is the ability to take initiative. Proactive 
persons do not hesitate to take action and persevere until they reach closure by bringing 
about change (Parker et al., 2010; Crant, 2000). One of the main components of this 
proactive behavior is therefore taking personal initiative since proactive individuals tend to 
take action to achieve their goals even in the face of barriers and setbacks (Griffin et al., 
2007).  
Finally, they should be more aware of the need for their ventures to change and update the 
business idea, not stick rigidly with the initial business plan. Grant and Ashford (2008) 
suggested that proactivity involves a process of anticipating, planning and striving to have 
an impact. Parker et al. (2010) further elaborated this by identifying proactivity as a goal-
driven process involving both generating and implementing forward looking goals which 
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might involve a departure from the current situation. Based on these characteristics, 
proactive individuals are likely to question the routines which are used in day to day 
practice. By doing so, it is likely that they will also enforce this attitude in the venture they 
have created and develop a culture reflecting this attitude at an organizational rather than 
at the individual level. One of the more proactive founders (average 6.70 on 7-point scales); 
above the 90th percentile) of the companies we interviewed shared the following: 
“The success of our company has been the fact that we were flexible enough to 
continuously change our business plan when we got more insights from the market. I 
always strived to deliver this message throughout the company by using metaphors. 
The employees, the financers and the other members of the management team always 
followed this and now it has become part of our culture…” 
In summary, proactive individuals tend to be opportunity focused, take personal initiatives 
to achieve their goals, and are change-oriented. Therefore:   
H2a: The more proactive the individual founder or the collective founding team of a new 
venture, the more likely this venture will develop dynamic capabilities. 
H2b: The level of proactivity of the founder(s) will not impact the development of its 
substantive capabilities 
Hypotheses 1a and 2a predict a positive relation between the degree to which the 
personality trait is present in the founding team and the development of capabilities at 
organizational level. However, an average personality trait at team level does not reveal 
within team composition. In other words, a relatively high level of average proactivity at 
team level can either reflect a homogenous high degree of proactivity or an extreme 
proactive founder, complemented by less proactive persons in the founding team. The 
question which emerges is whether the way in which a team is composed affects the overall 
team performance and hence explain different forms of capability development at company 
level (Zhao and Seibert, 2006;  Bell, 2007; Mathieu et al., 2008). 
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In the case of capability development at organizational level, we already hypothesized that 
specific personality variables lead to the development of specific capabilities, thus implying 
that personality variables contribute directly to the specific tasks under study, namely the 
development of different capabilities. Therefore, we can assume that heterogeneity in the 
personalities of the founding team resembles task-related diversity in the team, which in 
turn suggests a positive impact on task performance. In other words, the founding members 
with different personalities in the team are supposed to complement each other.  
Along these lines, one of the more conscientious founders (average 6.82 on 7-point scales; 
above the 90th percentile) in our sample expressed the following opinion:  
“I consider myself to be quite structured and tend to take a long time before making a 
choice. My co-founder tends to be more opportunity-driven. He is responsible for 
scouting technology opportunities and presenting them to the board to get funding. I 
could not do this, but I have introduced some stop procedures in the company which 
have saved us from losing quite a lot of money. Together we accomplish more than the 
sum of the two of us.” 
From the point of perspective of the conscientious founder, the quote above clearly 
illustrates the importance of team composition. Conscientious founders are not against 
change, nor do they create barriers to it, it is just not on the top of their mind. However, 
they appreciate their co-founder fulfilling that specific role. Also the more proactive 
founders appreciate the conscientious personality type in the founding team. One of the 
more proactive individuals (average 6.50 on 7-point scales; above the 90th percentile) 
shared the following:  
“My co-founder (who scores high on the conscientiousness scale) owns all the credit for 
the strong financial position which our company has. If he was not there, I would have 
taken decisions more intuitively and would have lost focus. I have a tendency to jump 
into new opportunities without being fully aware of the financial risks associated. But 
thanks to me, we are doing what we do today as a company.” 
 
 99 
 
This shows that proactive personalities do not necessarily create barriers to substantive 
capability development, but they do not actively think about them. However, they 
appreciate their co-founder with a conscientious personality filling this gap. This leads us to 
the following hypotheses: 
H3a: Having a proactive founder in a team with a relatively high degree of conscientiousness 
will strengthen the relationship between team conscientiousness and development of dynamic 
capabilities 
H3b: Having a conscientious founder in a team with a relatively high degree of proactivity will 
strengthen the relationship between team proactiveness and development of substantive 
capabilities 
3.4 Research setting 
We analyze a population of new technology-based firms located in Belgium to explore our 
research questions. We define new technology-based firms as start-ups that are established 
to exploit a new technology through developing either services or products based on this 
new technology (Little, 1977; Autio, 1997; Clarysse, Bruneel and Wright, 2011). This 
population is particularly interesting for exploring the development of capabilities, as these 
companies (a) operate in extremely volatile environments characterized by emerging 
market demands and/or emerging technical developments (Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt 
and Schoonhoven, 1990; Clarysse et al., 2011); (b) tend to be growth-oriented and thus 
make rapid transitions from a loosely structured organization towards a more professional 
organizational structure, where capabilities tend to prevail over individual entrepreneurial 
characteristics (Kazanjian, 1988; Almus and Nerlinger, 1999; Brinckmann and Hoegl, 2011), 
and (c) allow us to distinguish between individual-level attributes and organizational 
characteristics, to differentiate founder characteristics from organizational routines which 
are developed (Sine et al., 2006). 
Besides the theoretical advantages, there are also a number of practical advantages in 
choosing this population. First, these companies tend to be easy to identify as they are 
eligible for a variety of innovation grants, for which they tend to bid repeatedly. Secondly, 
they tend to collaborate in longitudinal research, as they see this collaboration as a giving 
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back to the public institutes which administer such grants. Some 144 founders of 78 new 
technology-based firms collaborated with us over a three-year period, from 2009 to 2011. 
More details on how the data were collected are given in the next section.  
3.5 Methods 
3.5.1 Qualitative Study 
Our study combines exploratory qualitative work with quantitative hypothesis testing to 
establish a link between our theories and our statistical models. Our formal hypotheses test 
causal predictions about how individual and team antecedents lead to the development of 
firm capabilities. This qualitative data, grounded in field observation, is not used to build 
theories around a specific situation, but to inform empirical models that reflect our theories 
(Kim and Miner, 2007). Using only quantitative data to support hypotheses on capability 
development leaves us with gaps in the proposed theories because the data do not address 
how capabilities  develop (McKelvie and Davidsson, 2009). Our quantitative study contains 
two important parts. First, we performed in-depth analysis of a new technology-based 
venture, using participant observation as a data collection technique to construct an 
instrument to measure substantive and dynamic capabilities. During the first years after 
start-up (2007-2009), we were able to attend the weekly management meeting of this 
venture, the monthly board meeting and the biweekly communication forum for the 
employees. This in-depth information allowed us to construct an instrument to measure 
substantive and dynamic capabilities. We used this instrument in the quantitative part of 
the research.  
Second, to fill potential gaps between our theories and our empirical models, we informed 
and challenged our theorizing via continuous, iterative, qualitative investigations once the 
quantitative, longitudinal research design (2009 - 2011) had started. In the first interview 
round, we visited 167 founders of 93 new technology-based ventures who had founded 
their venture within the two years preceding data collection in 2009. We did face-to-face 
interviews which were extremely helpful to explain the upcoming longitudinal, quantitative 
research design. Interview duration varied from 30 minutes to two hours. The interviews 
 101 
 
also allowed us to build trust and rapport with the founders to increase cooperation and 
response rate during the quantitative, longitudinal data collection process. 
3.5.2 Sample  
We started with a list of 131 new technology-based companies. After checking the founding 
years from the BELFIRST database, we chose to eliminate companies older than 3 years at 
the time of the first interview round (2009). We made this choice to capture the 
development process of capabilities in the early stages of a new venture, an approach which 
is consistent with the operationalization of new ventures (Zahra, Hitt, and Ireland, 2000). 
We developed a longitudinal quantitative research design supported by a continuous 
qualitative study and secondary data collection. In all, we contacted 116 companies. Of 
these, 6 new ventures had ceased to exist by the time we sought to contact them, because 
they had been acquired or dissolved. Eventually, we collected data about the experience 
and personality styles of 167 founders of 93 new ventures (response rate 80%) in the first 
interview round. This baseline information was collected at an individual level by using a 
structured questionnaire during face-to-face interviews. We added founder and company 
data on each of the ventures, which we collected from IWT1, the innovation granting 
institute which supported this research. Thus, we used several information sources to 
collect data on the founders and their companies. In the end, we followed 144 founders of 
78 new ventures (response rate of 67%) through the first interview round (2009) and the 
two follow-up rounds (2010 and 2011). Eleven companies did not respond in the follow-up 
rounds because they were acquired or dissolved. In these follow-up rounds, we collected 
information about the capabilities the companies had developed after start-up. Here, we 
used a web-based survey supported by telephone follow-ups to collect capability data. We 
collected the independent variables (experience and personality styles) at an individual 
level in the first interview round in 2009, and collected the dependent variables 
(substantive and dynamic capabilities) at an organizational level in the two follow-up 
rounds in 2010 and 2011. The capabilities are measured at different points in time and 
rated by different members of the entrepreneurial team. As the evolution of the dependent 
variables (substantive and dynamic capabilities) over the two interview rounds remained 
                                                          
1 Agency for innovation by science and technology 
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quite stable, and kappa analyses (inter-rater agreement; Fleiss, 1971) showed a moderate 
level of agreement between different raters of capabilities within a team, we took the mean 
of capability scores of different team members over the three interview rounds. Thus, the 
dependent variable is a combination of different respondents at different points in time, 
which mitigates concerns about common method bias and external validation. The 
comparison of revenues, capital raised, industry sector and age between respondents and 
non-respondents revealed no response bias (Autio, Sapienza, and Almeida, 2000).  
3.5.3 Dependent variables 
The capabilities were measured using a scale we developed to capture the extent to which 
new ventures have increased their substantive capabilities (SC) and dynamic capabilities 
(DC). The scale was developed based on insights from the qualitative part of this study and 
is, to our knowledge, the only scale to measure substantive and dynamic capabilities 
(Danneels, 2008). To develop the instrument, we followed Walter, Auer and Ritter (2006)’s 
procedure. We started by developing an initial pool of scale items based on our 
observations in the period during which we followed the new technology-based venture, 
using participant observation as a data collection technique. The initial pool of items was 
then pre-tested in an interview round with four new technology-based ventures. In each 
round, two to three interviewees from each venture were asked to complete the 
questionnaire. While completing the questionnaire, entrepreneurs verbalized any thoughts 
that came to their minds. The items were revised following each interview round. At the 
end of round four, feedback from the respondents indicated that the scale items were clear, 
meaningful, and relevant. All constructs were measured using seven-point scales. A 
complete listing of the scales used in the study is provided in appendix B and C. 
After a purification of items through multiple iterations of exploratory factor analysis (see 
Walter et al., 2006), we conceptualize substantive and dynamic capabilities as two higher-
order constructs, which increase in magnitude as each of their components increases, 
meaning that substantive and dynamic capabilities are composites which require formative 
measures (Diamantopoulos and Winkelhofer, 2001). Financial/HR capabilities (α= 0.80), 
marketing capabilities (α= 0.79) and product/technology capabilities (α= 0.74) are viewed 
as three components or integral parts of substantive capabilities. We created the 
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substantive capabilities index as a linear sum of the substantive capability component 
means. The reliability for this new substantive capability scale is α = 0.80. Also from a 
theoretical point of view, these components are domains in which companies need to 
develop routines to build an efficient business model and to create an outcome and 
generate revenues in the short run (Winter, 2003). Scanning capabilities (α= 0.67) and 
implementation capabilities (α= 0.74) are two components of dynamic capabilities, which 
show similarities with Teece’s (2007) definition of dynamic capabilities.’ Namely, Teece 
(2007) defines dynamic capabilities as the capacity of a firm (1) to sense and shape 
opportunities and threats, and (2) to seize opportunities and reconfigure the existing firm’s 
assets. We created the dynamic capabilities index as a linear sum of the dynamic capability 
component means. Cronbach’s Alpha for this dynamic capability scale is 0.75. Confirmatory 
factor analyses (LISREL 8) showed satisfying results for the first-order constructs and 
revealed that these constructs are indeed separate factors (CFI= 0.97; NFI= 0.92; SRMR= 
0.04; RMSEA= 0.06; GFI= 0.95; AGFI= 0.90)2. 
To test the discriminant validity of the substantive and dynamic capabilities scales, we 
performed a zero-order correlation between these scales. The correlation among these 
scales is low to moderate at 0.27 (p < 0.0000), suggesting discriminant validity (Danneels, 
2008). Since substantive and dynamic capabilities are typically described in the literature 
as strong interwoven constructs (Zahra et al., 2006), low to moderate correlation levels are 
to be expected. We also performed a second test to provide additional empirical support for 
the distinction between substantive and dynamic capabilities. In the capability literature, 
substantive capabilities are typically linked with achieving an outcome (Zahra et al., 2006) 
and making a living in the short term (Winter, 2003), while dynamic capabilities are linked 
with changes in business models, value propositions and resource bases (Zahra et al., 2006; 
                                                          
2The comparative fit index (CFI) examines the portion of total variance accounted for by a model and overcomes 
difficulties associated with sample size; 0.90 is considered an acceptable level. The normed fit index (NFI) is an 
incremental fit index which measures the proportionate improvement in fit by comparing the model with a more 
restricted baseline model; .90 is considered an acceptable level. The root-mean-square residual (SRMR) is a 
standardized summary statistic for residuals; .04 is considered an acceptable level. The root-mean-square error of 
approximation( RMSEA) is a test of the null hypothesis of close fit; .05 indicates a very good fit, .05 to .08 indicates 
a fair to mediocre fit. Goodness of fit (GFI) is a global indication of how well a model fits the data; .90 is considered 
an acceptable level. The adjusted goodness-of-fit index (AGFI) is adjusted for model parsimony;. 90 is considered an 
acceptable level (Busenitz, Gomez,  and Spencer, 2000) 
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Teece, 2007). Thus, we also measured the business model changes and performance of 
these new ventures. The results show that the substantive capabilities scale is associated 
with revenues (r= 0.24, p<0.05) and gross margin (r= 0.24, p<0.05), and also correlates 
significantly with a subjective measure of firm performance (r= 0.21, p< 0.05), while the 
dynamic capabilities scale is linked with changes in the product and/or services offered by 
the company (r= 0.24, p<0.05) and in the way the product or service is offered on the 
market (r= 0.23, p<0.05). Finally, we also performed a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to 
test the discriminant validity between the higher-order constructs substantive and dynamic 
capabilities. The results of the CFA suggest that there is still a slight connection between 
these two types of capabilities (CFI= 0.72; NFI= 0.67; SRMR= 0.11; RMSEA= 0.16; GFI= 0.68; 
AGFI= 0.59) which is in line with previous theoretical arguments that substantive and 
dynamic capabilities are interwoven constructs (Zahra et al., 2006). Taking these three 
discriminant validity tests into account, we can conclude that these higher-order constructs 
are seemingly (un)related, a conclusion which is in line with previous theoretical work 
(Zahra et al., 2006; Helfat and Winter, 2011) and also asks for a seemingly unrelated 
regression analysis to account for any possible correlation between the two dependent 
variables, substantive and dynamic capabilities (Uzzi and Gillespie, 2002).   
3.5.4 Independent variables 
Personality. We used the big five inventory (BFI) measure of John, Donahue and Kentle 
(1991) to measure conscientiousness (CS). The conscientiousness items were administered 
with a seven-point scale, ranging from 1 (disagree strongly) to 5 (agree strongly). Items 
include ‘tends to be disorganized’ (reverse coded) and ‘can be somewhat careless’ (reverse 
coded). Reliability for the personality conscientiousness scale is α =  0.76. Proactive 
personality (PR) was measured using the seven-point scale of Seibert, Crant and Kraimer 
(1999) and has a Cronbach Alpha of 0.83. Sample items include ‘I am constantly on the 
lookout for new ways to improve my life,’ and ‘I love being a champion for my ideas, even 
against others’ opposition.’ In cases where there was more than one founder, we averaged 
the personality scores of the different members of the founding team.  
Team personality. Group composition research requires individual differences to be 
combined to form team-level constructs  (Kozlowski and Klein, 2000). The most frequently 
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used method is to combine  individual characteristics in a linear fashion, such that the mean 
of individual characteristics represents the team-level construct (Stewart, 2003). 
Consequently, we measured the level of conscientiousness of a team (CSteam) as the mean 
of all individual scores on conscientiousness in one founding team. This approach is in line 
with existing research on team personality (Bell, 2007; Stewart, 2006). Team proactiveness 
(PRteam) was measured using the same method.  
3.5.5 Control variables 
We also controlled for other variables that might influence capability development, such as 
industry sector. Here, we obtained five categories: ICT, business services, biotech & 
pharmaceuticals, engineering and manufacturing. Secondly, we controlled for 
environmental uncertainty (ENVIR UNCERT) and munificence (ENVIR MUNIF). Sirmon, 
Hitt, and Ireland (2007) hypothesized that environmental munificence impacts the way 
capabilities are developed, while Zahra et al. (2006) attributed a major role to 
environmental uncertainty as a factor in capability development. Although we limited the 
variation in environmental factors through our research design, founder/managers might 
still have different perceptions about the environment in which they operate. Therefore, we 
used perceptual measures of environmental uncertainty and munificence as additional 
controls (Maestro, 2009). Maestro (2009) adapted a five-item scale of environmental 
uncertainty from Miller and Droge (1986) and Sutcliffe (1994). Items include ‘Products or 
services quickly become obsolete in our industry’ and ‘Actions of competitors in our 
industry are quite easy to predict (reversed code).’ The six-item scale of environmental 
munificence (Maestro, 2009) was based on Sutcliffe (1994) and Zahra (1993). Items include 
‘Resources needed for growth and expansion are in abundance and easily accessible in our 
industry (reverse code)’ and ‘Demand for products and services in our industry is growing 
and will continue to grow.’ We also controlled for the founders’ years of work experience of 
prior to starting the venture (INDUST EXP). The capability literature suggests that pre-
founding experience can have a similar impact to post-founding experience. Finally, we 
included a dummy variable to indicate whether the company had reached the stability 
phase or not (BOARD). We considered that a company had reached this phase if it had 
raised venture capital and if it had installed a board of directors on which external advisors 
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held a seat. Clarysse et al. (2011) suggest that this is a moment at which resource 
structuring evolves into capability formation.  
3.6 Results 
The means, standard deviations and correlations of the variables are presented in Table 4, 
showing that 44% of the founders had previous start-up experience and the average 
founder had 8 years of work experience. These figures are consistent with past research  
(Clarysse et al., 2011; Bhide, 2000; Baum, Bird and Singh, 2011; Ucbasaran, Westhead, and 
Wright, 2006; Wiklund and Shepherd, 2008). In our sample, 71% of the ventures were 
started by a team of entrepreneurs rather than a single founder, which is also in line with 
the entrepreneurship literature focusing on high-tech start-ups (Davidsson and Wiklund, 
2001; Francis and Sandberg, 2000). The average team size is 2.32 and can be considered 
normal (Heirman and Clarysse, 2004; Beckman et al., 2006). In general, the descriptive 
statistics of our sample are consistent with previous entrepreneurship studies.  
TABLE 4: Means, standard deviations, reliabilities, and intercorrelations of study and control variables 
 
Table 5 summarizes the results of the regression analyses. To test our hypotheses, we 
performed seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) with substantive and dynamic 
capabilities as dependent variables. SUR is a generalization of a linear regression model that 
consists of several regression equations, each having its own dependent variable and 
potentially different sets of exogenous explanatory variables (Zellner, 1962). This method is 
Mean Std 
Dev
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1. SC        4.45 0.70 1.00
2. DC          4.95 0.64 0.27** 1.00
3. PR 5.29 0.80 0.09 0.27** 1.00
4. CS 5.39 0.79 0.24** 0.02 0.17* 1.00
5. PRteam 5.19 0.63 0.16 0.39** 0.57** 0.11 1.00
6. Csteam 5.47 0.63 0.34** 0.08 0.11 0.54** 0.16 1.00
7. INDUST EXP                                            8.00 6.92 0.12 ─ 0.07 ─ 0.22** 0.06 ─ 0.22** 0.13 1.00
8. BOARD 0.59 0.49 0.31** 0.06 ─ 0.11 0.01 ─ 0.08 0.07 0.03 1.00
9. ENVIR UNCERT                                4.22 1.09 0.24** ─ 0.04 ─ 0.00 0.16 0.07 0.19* ─ 0.05 0.10 1.00
10. ENVIR MUNIF                              4.62 0.75 0.16 0.28** 0.19* 0.05 0.22* 0.02 ─ 0.11 ─ 0.05 0.10 1.00
 * Significant at p < 0. 05 (two-tailed)
** Significant at p < 0. 01 (two-tailed)
n= 144
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often used for simultaneously estimating a system of nonparametric regressions which may 
seem unrelated, but where the errors are correlated between equations (Uzzi and Gillespie, 
2002), as is the case for substantive and dynamic capabilities. The extant literature has 
shown that substantive and dynamic capabilities are closely interrelated (Zahra et al., 2006; 
Helfat and Winter, 2011). By using a SUR, we were able to address these theoretical issues. 
Moreover, previous research has shown that the advantage of estimating such a seemingly 
unrelated system of nonparametric regressions is that fewer observations are required to 
obtain reliable function estimates than if each of the regression equations were estimated 
separately and the correlation ignored (Smith and Kohn, 2000). The highest VIF was below 
2.40 for regression models 1 and 2 and below 4.26 for regression model 3, which means 
that multicollinearity did not pose a problem for the regression models (Neter, 1990; 
Walter et al., 2006). Because we have multiple respondents per company over multiple 
years, we calculated the Kappa (inter-rater agreement, Fleiss 1971) of their subjective 
evaluative perceptions of the extent to which they rated substantive and dynamic 
capabilities in their companies, for each of the companies in the study. The Kappa ranged 
from 0.47 to 0.58, which indicates a moderate agreement. In each of the cases, the Kappa 
was statistically significant. In order to avoid common method bias, we performed CFA 
between all key variables in this study and measured the independent and the dependent 
variables at a different point of time (Podsakoff et al., 2003). As a small number of 
companies in our sample do not have an entrepreneurial team, we performed additional 
robustness checks by testing the regression model with and without companies with one 
founder. However, the results showed no differences. Finally, we also clustered for 
company ID in Models 1 and 2. 
Model 1 includes only the control variables to explain substantive and dynamic capabilities. 
The previous work experience of the founders does not have a significant impact on the 
development of either dynamic or substantive capabilities. In contrast, stage of 
development of the venture, measured by the fact that either the venture had attracted VC 
investment or had installed a board of directors, predicted development of substantive 
capabilities. After introducing the direct effects in Model 2, the explanatory power increases 
significantly from .25 to .32 and from .13 to .25 for substantive and dynamic capabilities 
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respectively. H1 which posits that degree of conscientiousness in the founding team (or of 
the founder for ventures started by a single founder) will positively impact the 
development of substantive capabilities is also supported at the .01 level, while we do not 
find a significant relation between conscientiousness and development of dynamic 
capabilities. This means that H1b also receives support. H2a which states that proactive 
personality positively impacts development of dynamic capabilities is also supported at the 
.01 level. Supporting H2b, we do not find a relationship between proactive personality and 
development of substantive capabilities. In Model 3, we introduce the interaction 
coefficients. Explanatory power of the model increases significantly from 0.32 to 0.34 for 
substantive capabilities and from 0.25 to 0.27 for dynamic capabilities. H3a which states 
that proactive individuals will not develop substantive capabilities unless they have a 
conscientious partner in the team receive support at the 0.01 level, while H3b which 
articulates that conscientious individuals will not develop dynamic capabilities unless they 
have a proactive partner is also supported at the 0.01 level. 
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TABLE 5: Seemingly unrelated regression with substantive capabilities (SC) and dynamic capabilities (DC) as dependent variables 
Variables MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 
 SC          DC SC       DC  SC DC 
Sector dummies       
   ICT -0.50(0.23)* -0.29(0.28)    -0.41(0.22)*     -0.20(0.17)
  
    -0.45(0.16)**    -0.23(0.16)
 †
    
   Business services -0.29(0.26)
 
 -0.10(0.33)    -0.39(0.22)
 †
    -0.21(0.33)    -0.38(0.22)*    -0.21(0.22)     
   Biotech & Pharmaceuticals -0.12(0.29) -0.43(0.26)*   -0.14(0.29)    -0.44(0.27)*    -0.22(0.21)    -0.50(0.20)**    
   Engineering -0.49(0.29)* -0.29(0.28)    -0.48(0.30)
 †
     -0.20(0.29)     -0.46(0.21)*    -0.20(0.21)    
   Manufacturing  0.38(0.23)*  0.03(0.34)     0.39(0.22)*     0.05(0.38)      0.43(0.41)*     0.20(0.37)    
Environmental uncertainty (ENVIR UNCERT)  0.19(0.05)
 †
 -0.06(0.08)     0.14(0.12)    -0.07(0.08)
 
     0.12(0.06)*   -0.10(0.05)*    
Environmental munificence (ENVIR MUNIF)  0.15(0.08)*  0.26(0.09)**     0.13(0.08)*     0.20(0.09)**     0.18(0.08)**    0.21(0.07)**    
Industry experience (INDUST EXP)  0.01(0.01)
 
 -0.00(0.01)
 
  0.01(0.01)
 
   0.00 (0.01)
 
     0.01(0.01)
 †
     0.01(0.01)
 
   
Stability phase (BOARD)  0.44(0.19)**  0.19(0.18)  0.43(0.18)**   0.26(0.17)
 †
     0.54(0.12)**     0.32(0.12)**    
Conscientious team (CSteam)    0.26(0.12)**  -0.00(0.09)    -0.02(0.10)     0.05(0.14) 
Proactive team (PRteam)    0.12(0.11)     0.40(0.10)**     0.06(0.14)  0.02(0.10)    
Conscientious founder (CS)      -0.40(0.15)**      
Proactive founder (PR)     -0.24(0.16)
 †
      
Proactive founder x conscientious team (PR_CSteam)           0.06(0.03)**     
Conscientious founder x proactive team (CS_PRteam)        0.07(0.02)**    
Cons  2.97(0.69)     4.13(0.54)     1.23(0.98)     2.27(0.72)     2.40(0.81)    4.16(0.77)    
R² 
 
 0.25  
(F=1.92) 
 0.13 
(F=1.80) 
 0.32 
 (F=2.47) 
 0.25  
(F=3.37) 
 0.34  
(F=4.86) 
 0.27    
(F=2.73) 
n  144  144 144 144  144  144 
       Significance tests are one-tailed for hypothesized relations and two-tailed for controls. 
         †p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01 
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3.7 Discussion 
We show in this study that personality traits and experience of founders play an important 
role in developing capabilities after company start-up. We make several contributions to 
the capability literature. First, we show that the micro-foundations measured as personality 
types at individual level, aggregated if appropriate to the level of the founding team, explain 
why ventures either develop substantive or dynamic capabilities. We therefore add to the 
theoretical foundation of the capability perspective, which has been criticized for being 
endogenous in explaining the factors which determine the emergence of capabilities. 
Second, we show that these individual-level antecedents influence the development of 
substantive and dynamic capabilities separately. To our knowledge, no study has been able 
to identify antecedents of capability development which might explain why organizations in 
a similar environment might be different in terms of developing dynamic and substantive 
capabilities. Helfat and Winter (2011) argue that even in static environments some 
organizations develop dynamic capabilities, while others do not. However, we show here 
that personality differences of individual decision makers and the average ‘personality’ of 
the dominant coalition in the firm provide a theoretical explanation for the fact that some 
ventures develop only substantive capabilities while other ones succeed in the same 
environment in building dynamic ones. Hence, our research contributes to disentangling 
substantive from dynamic capabilities as two different constructs. Third, we also make an 
empirical contribution. This study is, to our knowledge, the first to develop an instrument 
to measure substantive and dynamic capabilities as two different constructs. We elaborate 
each of these contributions below.  
First, we provide a theoretical explanation for the origins of organizational capabilities, 
rooted in the micro-foundations of the firm. More specifically, building upon the personality 
literature, we show that conscientious founders and their teams foster the development of 
substantive capabilities. While most studies on capability development focus on firm level 
factors, we find that an individual level factor, that of conscientiousness, predicts 
substantive capability development. This personality type impacts the way in which the 
venture is structured and predicts the extent to which the founder emphasizes the 
development of procedures to increase the venture’s efficiency. However, to sense or shape 
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new opportunities and to change existing substantive capabilities, new ventures need to 
develop dynamic capabilities. Our findings indicate that conscientious founders lack 
interest in developing these capabilities. Figure 9 suggests that highly conscientious 
individuals are even negatively oriented towards development of dynamic capabilities. The 
simple slope analysis (figure 9 and 10) also clearly shows that conscientious individuals 
need proactive team members to develop dynamic capabilities. Hence, if conscientious 
founders team up with proactive co-founders, their ventures do develop dynamic 
capabilities. Our results also show that proactive personalities have a strong positive 
impact on the development of dynamic capabilities, while they ignore the development of 
substantive capabilities. We further find that firms with proactive entrepreneurs without 
conscientious co-founders tend not to develop substantive capabilities. This means that 
proactive individuals will also benefit from working with conscientious co-founders. 
Because personality types and the behaviors which result from them are found to impact 
the development of capabilities in different ways, we provide a strong theoretical 
explanation for the foundations of capability development.  
FIGURE 9: Graphical Presentation of Interaction between ‘conscientiousness’ and ‘proactiveness’ on 
substantive capabilities 
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FIGURE 10: Graphical Presentation of Interaction between ‘conscientiousness’ and ‘proactiveness’ on 
dynamic capabilities 
 
 
Secondly, we show that substantive and dynamic capabilities are different constructs that 
find their roots in very different individual-level personalities. Much of the confusion about 
both types of capabilities might be attributed to the fact that both types of capabilities are 
affected by organizational-level antecedents such as experience or learning in the same 
way. In other words, we also show that both capabilities accrue over time, so successful 
ventures will eventually develop both in an interrelated way. This confirms the proposition 
of Felin and Foss (2011) that the origins of organizational capabilities tend to be 
endogenous. Even in a similar environment such as the volatile context of young 
technology-based firms, both substantive and dynamic capabilities are built up and have a 
role to play. However, the personality types of the founders will determine which form of 
capabilities is emphasized.  
Thirdly, we show that substantive and dynamic capabilities are indeed different. Based 
upon an in-depth case study using participant observation to develop insights in a 
theoretically complex domain, we succeeded in identifying routines within a venture that 
could be associated with either increasing the efficiency of operations, i.e. substantive 
capabilities, or changing the business plan and model to reflect new environmental 
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challenges, i.e. dynamic capabilities. Based on our participant observation and several 
rounds of scale refinement, to our knowledge, we developed the first instrument to 
differentiate dynamic and substantive capabilities. Other available instruments (such as 
Danneels, 2008) only measure dynamic capabilities. We show that, although development 
of substantive and dynamic capabilities are related to each other, they are determined by 
different antecedents. In addition, we find that the environment impacts development of 
capabilities. We show that entrepreneurs who start a company in an environment which 
they consider to be uncertain develop more substantive capabilities, whereas 
entrepreneurs who start a business in an environment which they consider to be 
munificent tend to develop dynamic capabilities. Substantive capabilities can bring 
structure in uncertain environments while dynamic capabilities require different resources 
to be added. 
Finally, our study extends existing research on effects of upper-echelons team composition 
on team outcomes. Some studies on team composition focus mostly on diversity effects 
(e.g., Foo, Wong, and Ong, 2006) while other researchers include average team 
characteristic (e.g., Kearney, Gebert, and Voelpel, 2004). Our study shows that a 
configurational approach can also predict firm outcomes when team members’ 
characteristics complement each other. Relatedly, this study reinforces the key role of top 
managers in determining firm-level outcomes, including those of strategy, decisions, 
structure, and profits (c.f. Castanias and Helfat, 1991, 2001). Yet, despite the important role 
of micro-foundations in firm outcomes, the role of individual characteristics on 
development of firm capabilities remains largely unknown.  
In sum, we provide a new theoretical understanding of how capabilities emerge in new 
ventures, rooted in the micro-foundations of the firm, by showing that substantive and 
dynamic capabilities are championed by very different types of entrepreneurs. These 
findings suggest that specific characteristics of founding team members and joint 
characteristics of these founders predict development of substantive and dynamic 
capabilities. 
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3.8 Limitations and further directions 
This study is the first to examine which personality traits lead to the development of 
substantive capabilities and which are more suited to fostering the development of dynamic 
capabilities. While this study already reveals that conscientiousness and proactiveness are 
two personality types which are useful in the beginning of a company’s life, future studies 
could analyze how additions or changes in the team of founders can speed up or slow down 
the development of certain capabilities. Future work could also explain why experience in 
setting up a structure and developing substantive capabilities can be transferred more 
easily to another start-up company as opposed to the experience in sensing or shaping new 
opportunities. Finally, this study found that firms with both conscientious and proactive 
founders have a positive impact on the development of substantive and dynamic 
capabilities which is found by previous research to be beneficial for firm performance 
(Drnevich and Kriauciunas, 2012). However, we did not consider the potential tension 
between these two types of founders which could generate conflict between these team 
members and eventually have a negative impact on firm performance.  
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APPENDIX B: Substantive capabilities scale 
Different companies are good at different things. The following questions ask you to assess your 
company’s skills in various areas, relative to other start-ups. Relative to other start-ups, my 
company has … 
 
 Strongly                                        Strongly  
Disagree                                          Agree 
1.An efficient financial dashboard (i.e. signalling different 
potential problems in cashflow, ….)  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2.A structured product roadmap (i.e. what the different 
milestones are and tasks to build the product/service) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3.A clear marketing and communication plan  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4.Clear distribution channel management  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5.Strong milestone planning which, in time, enables the 
delivery of products/services 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6.An efficient recruitment system 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7.An efficient cost control system 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8.An efficient HR management system, which allows us to 
hire/fire people 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
APPENDIX C: Dynamic capabilities scale 
Different companies are good at different things. The following questions ask you to assess your 
company’s skills in various areas, relative to other start-ups. Relative to other start-ups and based 
on new information, my company is good at … 
 
 Strongly                                        Strongly  
Disagree                                          Agree 
1. Assessing the potential of new markets 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. Researching new competitors and new customers 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. Assessing the feasibility of new technologies 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. Identifying promising new technologies 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. Changing the marketing and communication plan  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. Altering the product roadmap 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. Making changes to the global delivery model / 
distribution channels 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. Revising the technology roadmap 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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4 The Contribution of Dynamic Capabilities to New Venture 
Survival in Nascent Markets: The Boundary Role of Stability  
 
ABSTRACT 
The dynamic capability literature has argued that dynamic capabilities are of most 
importance to companies that face dynamic environments. New ventures in nascent 
markets are in such a situation. They need to develop dynamic capabilities to survive. 
However, the literature remains silent when it comes to the boundary conditions under 
which these dynamic capabilities have most impact on survival. We extend the literature on 
dynamic capabilities by showing that firm stability measured as role formalization in the 
founding team and redundancy at the work floor increases the impact of dynamic 
capabilities. We therefore contribute to the literature on dynamic capabilities by showing 
its duality with company stability. However, the installation of a board with external 
directors decreases the impact of dynamic capabilities. We explain this by the decreased 
resource cognition among the decision makers at board level which undermines the 
positive impact of venture stability.  
KEY WORDS: Dynamic capabilities, nascent markets, firm survival, firm stability 
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The Contribution of Dynamic Capabilities to New Venture 
Survival in Nascent Markets : The Boundary Role of Stability  
 
4.1 Introduction 
The extant literature on dynamic capabilities has focused on how large companies gain a 
competitive advantage if they are able to develop these capabilities in preferably but not 
exclusively dynamic environments (Helfat and Peteraf, 2003; Teece, 2007; Helfat and 
Winter, 2011). Dynamic capabilities are generally considered as the capacity of a firm to 
change its resource base (Helfat and Peteraf, 2009). Zahra, Sapienza and Davidsson (2006) 
extended the dynamic capability perspective to entrepreneurial companies, arguing that 
also these companies benefit from dynamic capabilities as they allow new ventures to be 
able to continuously create, define, discover and exploit entrepreneurial opportunities. 
Dynamic capabilities differ from entrepreneurial capabilities as they encompass the firm’s 
capacity to change its business model and resource base towards new, emerging 
opportunities whereas entrepreneurial capabilities refer to the identification of 
opportunities and the development of a resource base to pursue these opportunities 
(Arthurs and Busenitz, 2006). Overall, the dynamic capability perspective suggest that 
dynamic capabilities are needed to build up a competitive advantage both in large and small 
firms. However, the extant literature falls short in explaining the boundary conditions at 
firm level under which these dynamic capabilities lead to better performance. This is the 
theoretical gap we address in this paper.  
Researchers in the domain originally assumed that dynamic environments triggered the use 
of a firm’s dynamic capabilities (Teece et al., 1997; Teece, 2007). More recently, Helfat and 
Winter (2011) and Drnevich and Kriauciunas (2012) showed that although dynamic 
capabilities might be more useful in dynamic environments, they also lead to competitive 
advantage in less dynamic ones. Beyond the environment, the literature remains silent 
when it comes to boundary conditions at company level. Zahra et al. (2006) hypothesize 
that dynamic capabilities will accrue over time and form a complex set of inter-relations 
with operational or substantive capabilities but do not touch upon the internal 
organizational form which might be needed to optimize the impact of dynamic capabilities. 
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Farjoun (2010) argues that change is most effective when it is embedded within stability. 
This implies that dynamic capabilities might be most effective in an organization which also 
has sufficient stability to embody change. Even in new ventures, stability is needed to avoid 
the chaos which tends to be associated with major changes (D’Aveni, Dagnino and Smith, 
2010). 
The extant entrepreneurship literature has identified a number of factors which lead to 
stability in new ventures. These stability factors are situated in three hierarchical layers, 
which can be found in most new ventures: operational level, founding team or (early) top 
management level and board of directors level. These factors are even more important for 
the stability of new ventures active in nascent markets. Nascent markets are environments 
that are characterized by turbulence and uncertainty and therefore necessitate change and 
flexibility (Sine and David, 2003; Santos and Eisenhardt, 2009). First, Sine, Mitsuhashi and 
Kirsch (2006) show that new ventures in such markets need formal structures in order to 
overcome liabilities of newness (Stinchcombe, 1965). Whereas formal structures tend to 
inhibit change in large, established firms, new ventures typically start-up in dynamic 
environments and need a structured founding or (early) top management team to deal with 
the role ambiguity and uncertainty which accompanies change in the environment (Sine et 
al., 2006). Second, new ventures reach stability through the involvement of external 
stakeholders which act as financers, catalysts and monitors (Garg, 2012). External 
stakeholders tend to participate in the decision making process through the board of 
directors which forms the key governance mechanisms of new ventures (Dowell et al., 
2011). Boards track the significant behaviors of the founders, the outcomes of their actions, 
and the performance of the venture in order to ensure that corrective action is taken as 
needed (Garg, 2012). Monitoring in new ventures increases their stability in markets that 
call for frequent changing of direction because changes are extensively discussed and 
benchmarked before implementation. When the firm decided to restructure their business 
activities, boards use their experience to advise the management team and provide them 
access to the necessary resources to support these changes. Finally, new ventures do 
increase their levels of stability through introducing redundancy (Farjoun, 2010) or slack 
(Greve, 2003; George, 2005) into their operational system. Redundancy allows managers to 
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let their people on the work floor experiment (Jelinek and Schoonhoven, 1990) without the 
risk of underperformance in the core business (Greve, 2003) and avoids that a system 
collapses when part of the attention is redirected towards a new market opportunity 
(Simon, 1996). Redundancy also improves communication between people with 
overlapping bundles of knowledge and avoids that opportunities remain isolated due to a 
lack of shared cognition (Weick and Roberts, 1993). 
In this paper, we empirically test whether dynamic capabilities will decrease the probability 
of failure of new ventures in nascent markets. We theoretically contribute to the dynamic 
capability literature by extending this perspective into the extant literature on 
organizational theory which proposes organizational stability as an important determinant 
of firm success and which has recently shed a new light on the relation between stability 
and change, presenting it as a duality of reinforcing concepts (Farjoun, 2010). We therefore 
hypothesize that organizational stability is a boundary condition for dynamic capabilities to 
enhance the survival potential of a new venture. 
To examine our central questions and to test our hypotheses, we use a panel of 124 new 
ventures founded in the period 2006-2008, which we followed over time in the period 
2009-2012 using several interview rounds to collect data on the development of their 
dynamic capabilities. We used a hazard model to investigate the impact of dynamic 
capabilities on firm survival. Hazard models have been used extensively and in a wide 
variety of contexts in the innovation and strategy literatures (Sinha and Noble, 2008). This 
type of analysis allows for the modeling of failure at each time point, and considers both the 
occurrence and timing of a failure (Cui et al., 2010). The new ventures were selected based 
upon the fact that they did apply for an innovation grant with the Flemish Government to 
finance the development of a business plan with the specific objective to raise venture 
capital. Only new ventures which enter into nascent markets of which the industry 
structure is not clear yet are eligible for this type of financing. We choose this empirical 
context because new ventures are less complex than more established firms, so they 
provide a comparatively clean setting for an empirical exploration of the effect of resources 
and capabilities (Gruber et al, 2010).  
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This study theoretically extends the literature on dynamic capabilities towards organization 
theory where scholars tend to focus on stability as an important element of organizational 
performance. First, we show that formalization improves the impact of dynamic capabilities 
on the performance of new ventures. More specifically, we show that dynamic capabilities 
benefit from clear internal role specialization and formalization of the founding team. 
Second, we show that redundancy on the work floor has a similar impact on the relation 
between dynamic capabilities and performance. Third, we show that boards, which are 
considered a third source of stability, do not have the same impact on the relation between 
dynamic capabilities and new venture performance. On the contrary, boards limit the 
impact of dynamic capabilities. Boards typically monitor the new venture performance 
based upon an agreed business plan which is difficult to change. External directors in 
boards might be too distant from the new venture’s operations to be assistive in 
implementing changes. 
We structure the paper as follows. First, we draw on theoretical insights from both 
organizational design and boards as well as dynamic capabilities to develop our hypotheses. 
Next, we present details on our methodological and sampling approach. Finally, we close 
with a discussion of the results and implications for theory and practice.  
4.2 Theory and hypotheses development 
New ventures in emergent economic sectors or nascent markets start up in environments 
that are characterized by turbulence and uncertainty (Sine and David, 2003; Santos and 
Eisenhardt, 2009). Nascent markets lack a dominant logic to guide actions (Kaplan and 
Tripsas, 2008) and therefore form important challenges to new ventures which operate in 
these markets. Due to a lack of legitimated industry logics, the new ventures have 
difficulties to identify which resources are strategic (Bingham, Eisenhardt and Davis, 2009) 
and to develop associated business models (Ozcan and Eisenhardt, 2009). Survival rather 
than efficiency is the main objective of ventures in these markets (Santos and Eisenhardt, 
2009). New ventures that want to survive in these nascent markets will need to develop 
capabilities which allow them to navigate through the ambiguity which usually is associated 
with these markets. 
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The capability literature has made a distinction between substantive and dynamic 
capabilities (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Helfat and Peteraf, 2003; Zahra et al., 2006; 
Helfat and Winter, 2011). Whereas substantive capabilities represent the firm’s capacity to 
develop routines which make its living and hence directly contribute to the efficiency of the 
company, dynamic capabilities refer to its capacity to change its resource configuration and 
business model. Teece (2007) further describes a firm’s dynamic capabilities as its capacity 
to ‘sense’ opportunities, ‘seize’ these opportunities in terms of developing an appropriate 
business model and eventually ‘implement’ change through applying this business model.  
Early proposals in this field clearly assumed a direct relationship between firms’ dynamic 
capabilities and their performance (Teece et al., 1997). These authors stated that this 
framework is intended to explain firm-level success and failure, competitive advantage, and 
private wealth creation (Teece et al., 1997; Makadok, 2001; Zollo and Winter, 2002). More 
recently, Teece (2007) stated that “the ambition of the dynamic capabilities framework is 
nothing less than to explain the sources of enterprise-level competitive advantage over 
time” and that “dynamic capabilities lies at the core of enterprise success (and failure).”
However, other researchers took a more cautious approach towards the relation between 
performance and dynamic capabilities. In their view, long-term competitive advantage does 
not only rely on dynamic capabilities themselves but on the resource configurations or 
substantive capabilities created by the dynamic capabilities (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; 
Winter, 2003; Helfat and Winter, 2011). However, these theoretical arguments are mostly 
developed in the context of established firms and for the purpose of creating a sustainable 
competitive advantage (Barreto, 2010).  
Since substantive capabilities are efficiency oriented, we might expect that dynamic 
capabilities will be the key capabilities that are needed to survive the difficult early stages 
of new ventures in nascent markets. The development of dynamic capabilities will allow the 
new venture to be alert for new emerging logics in the market and will allow it to adjust its 
business model accordingly, if necessary.  On the contrary, the lack of dynamic capabilities 
might constrain the viability of a new venture in a nascent market. Bingham (2009) shows 
that experimentation is needed in seizing the opportunities in order to be successful in new, 
unfamiliar markets. This means that new ventures need to be able to experiment with 
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different business models and resource configurations that are in line with these business 
models in order to be successful in these markets. Hence, a lack of dynamic capabilities, 
which allow new ventures to detect new logics in the market and eventually adjust their 
business model and resource configuration, will lead to rigidities and eventually lead to 
new venture failure. Autio, George and Alexy (2011) argue that in environments such as 
nascent markets a lack of substantive capabilities might even be an advantage. This implies 
that those ventures which develop substantive capabilities will even have higher failure 
rates if they lack dynamic capabilities which allow them to change these substantive 
capabilities than if they have no capabilities at all. In line with the dynamic capability 
literature, we therefore hypothesize: 
H1 The Development of Dynamic Capabilities will decrease the Probability of Failure of New 
Ventures in Nascent Markets 
 
While dynamic capabilities can be viewed as important mechanisms to guide new ventures 
through the difficult early stages, Farjoun (2010) does alert that in order to survive, 
organizations must reconcile stability with change. Organizing for firm survival and growth 
in nascent markets means that new ventures should be able to sense and seize new 
opportunities and reconfigure existing capabilities (Teece, 2007). However, the level of 
rivalry and innovativeness in these nascent markets could escalate, making dynamic 
capabilities the instrument of ever greater chaos (D’Aveni et al., 2010). Therefore, 
organizational behaviorists suggests that firms need “stable building blocks” in order to 
facilitate change and benefit from these changes (Farjoun, 2010; Schreyögg and Sydow, 
2010; Smith and Lewis, 2011). These studies advocate structure and stability as necessary 
elements to undertake change. 
Along the same lines, Sine et al. (2006) already emphasized that new ventures in nascent 
markets need formal structure to prosper in these markets and overcome what 
Stinchcombe (1965) has referred to as the liability of newness which new ventures face. 
This implies that in new ventures, especially in nascent markets, some form of structure is 
needed in which dynamic capabilities should be embedded. Zahra et al. (2006:918) argue 
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that Teece’s organizational level process of sensing, seizing and shaping opportunities 
corresponds in new ventures to the entrepreneur, the entrepreneurial team or the firm’s 
senior management ‘perception’ of opportunities, their ‘willingness’ to undertake change 
and their ‘ability’ to implement changes. In other words, a central role is allocated to the 
founding team and the key decision makers in the dynamic capability process. However, the 
dynamic capability literature remains largely silent when it comes to describe how these 
founding teams might impact the overall relation between dynamic capabilities and 
performance (Sirmon et al., 2011). 
Sine et al. (2006) formalize structure by identifying role formalization in founding teams. 
Following Dalton et al. (1980),  Sine et al. (2006:122) define formalization of organizational 
tasks as the ‘identification and designation of particular functional roles and their 
assignment to specific individuals’. Role formalization avoids confusion about who is 
supposed to do particular routine tasks. Having formalized roles in the founding team of a 
new venture implies that there is a clear attempt to decrease the ambiguity of the 
environment as each team member will know exactly what to do and coordination costs 
decrease. Coordination costs refer to the costs associated with the efforts needed to resolve 
disputes, disagreements, or conflicts about the nature and the scope of the change needed 
(Zahra and Nielsen, 2002). Zahra et al. (2006) already refer to the need for integration if 
dynamic capabilities need to be developed. Dynamic capabilities assume that opportunities 
are identified and decisions are made about how to address new, emerging opportunities. If 
the roles in the founding team are clearly allocated, it is likely that these decisions will be 
taken easier since every member has a specific domain (e.g. technology, marketing, 
operations,…) for which he/she is responsible and trustworthy. 
A lack of role formalization might on the contrary lead to total chaos in the case of change. 
In the latter case, the different founding members will have an opinion about all the 
functional domains and about what needs to be done in each of these domains in order to 
adjust to the new insights or opportunities which emerge when markets develop. A lack of 
clear role alienation will force new ventures to rely upon decision making by consensus 
(Sine et al., 2006). This decreases the speed of decision making and also increases the costs 
to arrive at any particular decision. In other words, developing dynamic capabilities and 
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getting most out of them will become extremely difficult in these ventures. At any of the 
three stages in the process of these capabilities, a lack of consensus can collapse the impact 
of capabilities. We therefore hypothesize:  
H2 The negative impact of dynamic capabilities on the probability of failure will increase with 
greater role formalization in the founding team 
 
 
Sine et al. (2006) refer to the role formalization among founding team members as an 
indicator of organizational structure and flexibility. However, not only internal structures 
do bring stability to new ventures. Garg (2012) argues that the boards of directors in these 
ventures are of critical importance because they have, as a key governance mechanism in 
new ventures, a monitoring function in addition to their more frequently recognized 
advisory role (Wasserman and Boeker, 2010). Monitoring, which can be defined as the 
director’s activities which involve the tracking of founder behavior to make sure that 
corrective action is taken if needed, is critical to ensure the stability of ventures in markets 
that call for frequent changing of directions such as nascent markets. The monitoring 
function of boards in new ventures is distinct from public firms, where boards almost 
exclusively have been studied, as the separation between ownership and control disappears 
in new ventures. The key management typically consists of the founding team, which tends 
to have similar financial interests with other firm owners such as outside investors that are 
represented in the board (Wasserman, 2006). Because of the financial stake of these 
investors in the new ventures, the latter tend to be more involved in monitoring than 
typical directors in public firms. Hence, one can see the board of directors of a new venture 
as the enlarged management team which monitors the actions of the founder-managers. 
As new ventures in nascent markets do face ambiguity (Santos and Eisenhardt, 2009) and 
shifting industry structures (Ozcan and Eisenhardt, 2009), traditional financial metrics such 
as profit are usually unavailable. Therefore venture board members will monitor both 
strategic and operational activities and will do this on a frequent basis. Typically, venture 
boards are likely to make sure that strategic decisions of the founder-CEOs keep the firm’s 
focus on growth instead of the personal goals of these founder-CEOs such as realizing an 
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original product vision and maintaining a particular organizational culture (Tuggle et al., 
2010; Garg, 2012). Therefore, it is likely that boards will both stimulate and challenge new 
opportunities that emerge and/or new logics that are formed in nascent markets. Moreover,  
besides their monitoring and advisory role, boards can also provide new ventures the 
access to resources to adjust the new venture’s business model in line with these new 
identified opportunities or new formed logics (Dowell et al, 2011). In sum, boards provide a 
formal structure to the new venture which allows the founding team to benchmark its 
ideas, forces the team to carefully reflect upon potential changes and gives them access to 
additional resources. 
A lack of boards does not force the venture team into the same form of rigidity. Hence, 
founding team members do not have to present their ideas to external board members 
before they take actions. They can take these actions as intuitive responses to external 
opportunities which they might or might not consider to be personally important. A lack of 
formal reporting to external board members means that they are not obliged to report to 
these externals nor to reflect upon their strategic choices. In this case, it will be solely up to 
the individual capacity of the founders whether they will be able to make efficient decisions 
to change strategically or not. A lack of external board members also means that the 
founding team loses a financial structure and potential links to new investors (Certo, 2001; 
Dowell et al, 2011) which can be very necessary if the firm wants to change their existing 
resource configuration and capabilities into more profitable directions. Therefore we 
hypothesize : 
H3: The negative impact of dynamic capabilities on the probability of failure will increase with 
the availability of an external board in the new venture 
 
A third source of stability can be found in the amount of “redundancy” which is available in 
the new venture (Farjoun, 2010). In contrast to the dominant thinking in organizational 
design, which assumes that efficiency creates stability, the extant literature on reliability 
has argued that perfected parts can fail and, particularly in tightly coupled systems, can lead 
to a global failure. Instead, some form of redundancy increases flexibility as it allows 
knowledge overlaps and avoids system failure if one of the components drops out. The 
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principle of attaining reliability through redundancy is also illustrated by Weick and 
Roberts (1993). In complex environments such as nascent markets, no individual has all 
relevant information and if he/she would, he/she would immediately constitute an 
“unreliable” element in isolation. Instead, cognitions are distributed around the company 
and need to be managed. Consequently, some knowledge overlap between individuals can 
help them identify potential problems and solutions and address breakdowns in the fault 
lines between interdependent activities. In sum, redundancy at the work floor allows the 
company to explore different directions and allocate individual’s attention towards these 
without fearing that the organization immediately falls apart. 
Albeit from a different perspective, also the behavioral theory of the firm introduces 
redundancy - more generally referred to as organizational slack - as a boundary condition 
for stability and eventually, exploration and even innovation (Cyert & March, 1963; Greve, 
2003). Organizations with spare time and spare resources have greater opportunities for 
experimentation, have less strict performance monitoring and have the resources needed to 
enable change. Jelinek and Schoonhoven (1990) show that managers can formalize slack by 
allocating amounts of time for product developers to work on their own projects and 
applying loose performance standards for new projects. Danneels (2008) shows that firms 
with slack financial and human resources are able to deploy these resources to change the 
existing resource configurations. Slack resources are available to hire new experts, buy new 
equipment or materials, etc. that are not directly related to the firm’s current activities.  
Although most of the slack literature refers to larger organizations, George (2005) shows 
that also resource constraint organizations do have slack and do benefit from slack under 
conditions of uncertainty. Privately held firms and new ventures tend to outperform larger 
ones because resource constraints enable efficiency (Greve, 2003; George, 2005). However, 
slack enables what Greve (2003) has called slack search processes, which in turn lead to 
exploration activities and change in resource configurations (Danneels, 2008). 
Slack and redundancy are two interrelated concepts which are shown to bring stability and 
exploration, especially at the lower levels of the organization. We might expect that 
dynamic capabilities, which by definition include search processes and mechanisms to 
implement the results of these search processes, will benefit from redundancy in a number 
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of ways. First, redundancy will allow employees to improve their scanning activities and 
explore changes in the environment, which is particularly important in nascent markets 
characterized by an absence of dominant designs or industry architectures (Danneels, 
2008; Greve, 2003). In addition, redundancy will facilitate the decision of the management 
team to allow employees to implement part of these changes as the other parts of the 
organization will not necessarily fall apart from having some people who devote time to 
these (Farjoun, 2010). Third, redundancy allows employees to spend time to communicate 
the necessary change processes that are needed to adjust to the opportunities that are 
created by the environment. Therefore we hypothesize: 
H4: The negative impact of dynamic capabilities on the probability of failure will increase with 
amount of redundancy in the new venture 
 
4.3 Methods 
Our objective in this research is to consider the boundary conditions on the central premise 
that dynamic capabilities influence new venture survival. We use a hazard modeling 
framework to investigate the impact of dynamic capabilities on firm survival. Hazard 
models have been used extensively and in a wide variety of contexts in the innovation and 
strategy literatures (Sinha and Noble, 2008). 
4.3.1 Sample and data collection 
This study gathered survey and secondary data on new technology-based firms founded in 
Flanders (northern part of Belgium). We started with a list of 211 new ventures, which was 
provided by the Flemish agency for innovation by science and technology (IWT).  After 
checking the founding years from the BELFIRST database, we chose to eliminate companies 
older than 3 years at the time of the first interview round (2009). This approach is 
consistent with the operationalization of new ventures (Zahra, Hitt, and Ireland, 2000). 
Even though different age ranges have been used in the literature, there is a growing 
consensus that firms 6 years and younger are new ventures (Zahra et al., 2000). In all, we 
contacted 185 companies. Of these, 6 new ventures had ceased to exist by the time we 
sought to contact them, because they had been acquired or dissolved.  Eventually, we 
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collected general data about the founders, management teams, business models and 
founding conditions of 148 new ventures (response rate 80%) in the first interview round. 
This baseline information was collected by using a structured questionnaire during face-to-
face interviews. These face-to-face interviews were extremely helpful to explain the 
upcoming longitudinal, quantitative research design. Interview duration varied from 30 
minutes to two hours. The interviews also allowed us to build trust and rapport with the 
founders to increase cooperation and response rate during the quantitative, longitudinal 
data collection process. Interviews with these companies revealed their business model and 
future plans which confirmed their innovative reputation. All these companies were 
granted by the IWT because they had developed technological innovations which could 
have a significant economic impact. Based on the pre-selection by the IWT, the face-to-face 
interviews and an extensive web search, we concluded that these companies were active in 
nascent markets. ICT companies in our sample focus for example on mobile internet or 
cloud software. Engineering companies are developing solutions for electronic vehicles or 
invented new ways to save and generate energy. Biotech companies in our sample develop 
new generation of drugs that has the potential to treat a broad range of severe diseases. 
In the end, we followed 230 founders of 124 new ventures (response rate of 67%) through 
the first interview round (2009) and the two follow-up rounds (2010 and 2011). In these 
follow-up rounds, we collected information about the entrepreneurial team and the 
capabilities the companies had developed after start-up. Here, we used a web-based survey 
supported by telephone follow-ups to collect capability data. We added company data on 
each of the ventures, which we collected from IWT (the innovation granting institute which 
supported this research), BELFIRST, GRAYDON, VENTUREXPERT and the Belgian Official 
Journal. By doing so, we managed to collect data on environmental dynamism, firm survival, 
types of investors, amount of raised capital, revenues, employees, sector, etc.  In sum, we 
use several information sources to collect data on the entrepreneurial teams and their 
companies. 
4.3.2 Dependent variable 
Our dependent variable is firm failure. Firms were coded 1 if they failed during the time 
period studied and 0 otherwise. Failures included completed bankruptcies, completed 
 137 
 
liquidations, closures based on company request, and merger or acquisition of 
organizations at risk of bankruptcy (Hannan and Freeman, 1989). We first identified 
whether a start-up had failed using the Belgian Official Journal. Secondly, we also used 
financial reports from GRAYDON to identify those companies that are having difficulties to 
fulfill their financial obligations. The founders of these firms were contacted and coded “1” 
if the founder confirmed that the company was bankrupt, liquidated or closed. Finally, we 
also investigated the rather small amount of companies that were acquired (3%) or were 
involved in a merger (0.8%). Based on the same financial reports from GRAYDON and 
reports from VENTUREXPERT, we classified an acquisition as unfavorable using the 
following criteria: (i) for VC-funded start-ups, if the transaction value (the value of the 
acquisition deal) was less than the total capital raised; (ii) if a start-up was not VC funded 
and reported a loss in the year prior to the acquisition; (iii) if the start-up is not VC-funded 
and we lack profitability data, if none of the founders of the focal start-up joined the 
acquiring firm (Arora and Nandkumar, 2011). 
4.3.3 Independent variables 
Dynamic capabilities. The capabilities were measured using a scale we developed to 
capture the extent to which new ventures have the capability to change. The scale was 
developed based on the scale of Danneels (2008) and the theoretical definition of dynamic 
capabilities by Teece (2007). Namely, Teece (2007) defines dynamic capabilities as the 
capacity of a firm (1) to sense and shape opportunities and threats, and (2) to seize 
opportunities and reconfigure the existing firm’s assets. We started by developing an initial 
pool of scale items based on the scale of Danneels (2008) and the theoretical work of Teece 
(2007). The initial pool of items was then pre-tested in an interview round with four new 
technology-based ventures. In each round, two to three interviewees from each venture 
were asked to complete the questionnaire. While completing the questionnaire, 
entrepreneurs verbalized any thoughts that came to their minds. The items were revised 
following each interview round. At the end of round four, feedback from the respondents 
indicated that the scale items were clear, meaningful, and relevant. All constructs were 
measured using seven-point scales. A complete listing of the dynamic capability scale used 
in the study is provided in appendix D. Reliability analysis indicated that the items for these 
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measures have a Cronbach alpha of 0.809. This conforms to the accepted level of at least 
0.70 (Nunnally, 1978). We created the dynamic capabilities index as a linear sum of the 
dynamic capability items means. The main differences with scales of Danneels (2008) and 
Drnevich and Kriauciunas (2012) are that the scale is more applicable for new ventures and 
covers more the different components of a dynamic capability as defined by Teece (2007). 
4.3.4 Moderating variables 
Role formalization (RoleForm). Pugh et al. (1963) identified the formalization of 
organizational tasks and roles as a key attribute of modern organizational structure. Role 
formalization in entrepreneurial teams captures “what one is asked to do” and refers to the 
identification and designation of particular functional roles and their assignment to specific 
individuals (Dalton et al., 1980). The role formalization variable was adopted from Sine et 
al. (2006) and is the number of formalized functions in a new venture divided by the 
potential maximum number of functional roles. The potential functional areas were defined 
based on Sine et al. (2006) and the face-to-face interviews in the first interview round. 
These include chief executive officer, chief financial officer, chief engineering/operations 
officer, human resources, international sales, marketing, research and development, sales, 
legal/IP. Following Sine et al. (2006), we also orthogonalized the variable role formalization 
to avoid problems with multicollinearity. 
External board (Board). Firms were coded “1” if they have installed an external board. 
Firms were coded “0” when they did not have an external board. The board can be seen as 
an external extension of the internal structure and is considered as an important 
governance mechanism for firm survival (Dalton et al, 1999; Dowell et al, 2011). We only 
take outside board members into account which means that boards with solely founders 
and/or members of the management team are not included here.  
Redundancy. The variable which has been used frequently to measure redundancy at the 
work floor is human resource slack (Mishina et al., 2004; Voss et al, 2008). Human resource 
slack refers to specialized and skilled human resources that are rare and absorbed (Mishina 
et al., 2004). We measured human resource slack in line with previous recently published 
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works by dividing the number of employees by the total number founding team members 
(Voss et al., 2008).  
4.3.5 Control variables 
We controlled for company age because this variable could have an important impact on the 
survival of companies (Sapienza et al, 2006) and the development of dynamic capabilities 
(Zahra et al., 2006). Company age is measured in months and collected by using BELFIRST. 
We use the natural log transformation because the variable company age was skewed. 
Secondly, we controlled for the environment in which new ventures operate. We used 
industry-level objective information to derive an index of environmental dynamism. The 
approach used has been adopted in a number of studies (e.g., Dess and Beard, 1984; Simerly 
and Mingfang, 2000, Castrogiovanni, 2002) and is viewed as the appropriate level of 
analysis for studying phenomena related to the environment. The industry-level rate of 
unpredicted change was measured as the standard errors of two regression slopes 
following the work of Dess and Beard (1984) and Castrogiovanni (2002). In each case, the 
independent variable was time. The dependent variables were industry revenues and 
number of industry employees. Industry revenue has been used as a measure of uncertainty 
in prior studies (e.g., Keats and Hitt, 1988), and number of employees is a common measure 
of change in research involving new businesses. 
Specifically we regressed industry revenues and industry employees over 5 years against 
time (2005-2010), and used the standard error of the regression coefficient related to a 
time dummy variable divided by the average value of industry’s revenues and industry 
employees to produce a standardized index of environmental dynamism. The industry-level 
archival-based data captured common environmental characteristics faced by participants 
within a given industry (Boyd, Dess, and Rasheed, 1993). Data on industry revenues and 
industry employment totals were acquired from the OECD STAN database. Time was 
regressed against these variables for the most recent 8-year period. An index of the 
standard errors of the regression slopes divided by their respective means was used as the 
indicator of unpredicted change for each of the two variables. These figures were then 
standardized and summed to create an overall index of environmental dynamism. In 
addition to this objective measure of environmental dynamism, we also collected 
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perceptual measures of environmental uncertainty and munificence (Maestro, 2009). 
Maestro (2009) adapted a five-item scale of environmental uncertainty from Miller and 
Droge (1986) and Sutcliffe (1994). Items include ‘Products or services quickly become 
obsolete in our industry’ and ‘Actions of competitors in our industry are quite easy to 
predict (reversed code).’ The six-item scale of environmental munificence (Maestro, 2009) 
was based on Sutcliffe (1994) and Zahra (1993). Items include ‘Resources needed for 
growth and expansion are in abundance and easily accessible in our industry (reverse 
code)’ and ‘Demand for products and services in our industry is growing and will continue 
to grow.’ 
Beside environmental dynamism and company age, we also controlled for other variables 
that might influence the impact of dynamic capabilities on new venture survival, such as 
industry sector. Here, we obtained five categories: ICT, business services, biotech & 
pharmaceuticals, engineering and manufacturing. As mentioned before, the new ventures in 
our sample are active in nascent markets which can be brought under this traditional sector 
classification. Finally, we also controlled for the size of the firm and the founding team. Firm 
size was the total number of organizational members, including executives and employees. 
We use the natural log transformation because the variable company size was skewed.  
Founding team size was the number of executives in a firm. To avoid problems with 
multicollinearity, founding team size was orthogonalized (Sine et al., 2006). 
4.4 Findings 
The means, standard deviations and correlations of the variables are presented in Table 6. 
We found that 32 new ventures (26%) failed to survive the early stages, which is in line 
with previous studies on new ventures in nascent markets. Roberts (1991) studied 
technology-based firms in the Boston (US) area and found that failures rates were between 
15 and 30%. A Norwegian study showed that survival rate for new technology-based firms 
is around 75% (Aspelund, Berg-Utby, and Skjevdal, 2005). The companies in our sample are 
between 6 months and 6 years old and on average 3 years old. Our environmental 
dynamism measures exhibits similar results as in previous studies (Simerly and Mingfang, 
2000). 
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TABLE 6: Means, standard deviations, reliabilities, and intercorrelations of study and control variables 
 
Table 7 summarizes the results of the regression analyses. Because the dependent variable 
displays the probability of a focal event (firm failure), we employ event history analysis to 
investigate the impact of dynamic capabilities on firm failure. Event history analysis allows 
for the modeling of event probability at each time point, and considers both the occurrence 
and timing of an event, that is, distinguishing between failure one year after company 
foundation and failure two years after foundation, which is not possible in a logistic 
regression (Cui et al., 2010). More specifically, we apply a Cox proportional hazard model. 
Cox models are more suitable than parametric models because it is difficult to make a 
realistic assumption of the baseline hazard function and incorrect parametric specification 
of the baseline hazard function would introduce bias into the analysis.  
All models in Table 7 are highly significant. Column 1 presents the results of the baseline 
model with control variables alone (X²= 1096.54, p< 0.001). We see that company age has a 
positive significant impact on new venture failure, while company size is negatively related 
to failure. Firms founded in biotech & pharmaceutical emerging markets or firm established 
around innovative business services are more likely to survive the early stages. Instead, 
firm active in emerging markets related to the engineering industry are more likely to cease 
their activities. Environmental dynamism has a negative impact on new venture survival. 
We also run the same model with perceived environmental uncertainty and found a similar 
M ean Std Dev 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1. Failure 0.21 0.41 1.00
3. Csizeb 4.85 5.22 ─ 0.18* 1.00
3. Age 34.85 16.12 0.09 0.19* 1.00
4. Envir 0.01 0.00 ─ 0.17* 0.13 ─ 0.07 1.00
5. TeamSizea 2.62 1.44 ─ 0.18* 0.28** 0.06 0.18* 1.00
6. DC          5.29 0.69 ─ 0.11 ─ 0.14 ─ 0.15* ─ 0.02 0.10 1.00
7. RoleForma 0.29 0.16 ─ 0.33** 0.42** 0.19* 0.14 0.45** 0.04 1.00
8. Board 0.56 0.50 ─ 0.21** 0.25** ─ 0.04 0.12 0.37** 0.12 0.44** 1.00
9. Redundancyb 2.61 2.67 ─ 0.01 0.44** 0.19* 0.03 ─ 0.06 ─ 0.17* 0.08 ─ 0.03 1.00
 * Significant at p < 0. 05 (two-tailed), ** Significant at p < 0.01 (two-tailed), n= 170
ᵃOrthogonalized variable
ᵇLog-transformed variable
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negative relationship with survival. Column 2 shows the results of the regression with the 
direct effects (X²= 25.32, p< 0.001). After introducing the direct effects in Model 2, the 
explanatory power, measured by the generalized R square, increases significantly from 0.20 
to 0.30. H1 which posits that the dynamic capabilities of a new venture will help new 
ventures to survive the early stages and thus negatively impacts failure is supported (p< 
0.01). Further, we noticed that role formalization has a negative significant impact on new 
venture survival which is in line with the findings of Sine et al. (2006). The final model 
includes the interaction effects (X²= 20.98, p< 0.001). The generalized R-square increases 
again significantly from 0.30 to 0.39. H2 which states that role formalization has a 
moderating effect on the relationship between dynamic capabilities and failure is supported 
at the 0.01 level. H3, which stated that the negative impact of dynamic capabilities on the 
probability of failure will increase with the availability of an external board, did not found 
support. Instead, we found that the impact of dynamic capabilities on failure will increase 
because of the availability of an external board (p<0.05). Finally, we found support for H4 
which means that redundancy at the work floor will increase the negative impact of 
dynamic capabilities on failure. The simple slope analyses (illustrated in figure 11, 12 and 
13) confirm our interpretations of the moderating effects in the regression analyses. 
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TABLE 7: Cox proportional hazard regression with failure as dependent variable 
Variables MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 
Sector dummies    
   ICT -0.22 (0.42) -0.11 (0.33) -0.03 (0.31) 
   Business services  -0.14 (0.06)*     -0.62 (0.18)**    -0.29 (0.09)** 
   Biotech & Pharmaceuticals     -0.79 (0.14)**     -0.52 (0.11)**     -0.47 (0.15)** 
   Engineering      0.29 (0.10)**      0.56 (0.18)**      0.62 (0.18)** 
Founding team size (TeamSize) -0.28 (0.27)  0.31 (0.30)     0.46 (0.22)* 
Company size (Csize)   -0.34 (0.14)*  -0.48 (0.24)*     -0.94 (0.32)** 
Company age (Age)     0.01 (0.01)*    0.01 (0.01)†    0.01 (0.01)* 
Environmental dynamism (Envir)                          -0.15 (0.13) -0.19 (0.13)                          -0.18 (0.11)† 
Role formalization (RoleForm)         -0.70 (0.31)*     -0.97 (0.26)** 
External board (Board)    -0.13 (0.30)  0.17 (0.31) 
Redundancy   0.20 (0.22)    0.53 (0.23)* 
H1 Dynamic Capabilities (DC)       -0.56 (0.18)**     -0.85 (0.11)** 
H2 Dynamic Capabilities X Role formalization       -0.85 (0.21)** 
H3 Dynamic Capabilities X External board      0.79 (0.48)* 
H4 Dynamic Capabilities X Redundancy      -0.44 (0.25)* 
Log-likelihood                          -148.95                                        -139.28                                        -135.72                
Generalized R²                            0.20                            0.30                            0.39 
n                            170                            170                         170 
       Significance tests are one-tailed for hypothesized relations and two-tailed for controls.    
       †p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01 
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FIGURE 11: Graphical Presentation of Interaction between ‘dynamic capabilities’ and ‘Role 
formalization’ on new venture failure 
 
 
 
FIGURE 12: Graphical Presentation of Interaction between ‘dynamic capabilities’ and ‘External Board’ 
on new venture failure 
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FIGURE 13: Graphical Presentation of Interaction between ‘dynamic capabilities’ and ‘Redundancy’ on 
new venture failure 
 
 
4.5 Discussion and conclusions 
Our objective in this study was to examine the relationship between the dynamic 
capabilities developed in a new venture, the processes which invoke its stability and its 
survival in nascent markets. Combining arguments based upon organizational theory and 
dynamic capabilities, we show that the internal structure of the venture in terms of the 
adopted role formalization in the founding team and the redundancy at the work floor 
operationalized as the employees per manager form strong boundary conditions for 
dynamic capabilities to enhance the survival potential of the venture. As expected, 
developing dynamic capabilities over time also increases the potential survival of these 
firms significantly. In contrast to our hypotheses, boards do not amplify the impact of 
dynamic capabilities on survival. On the contrary, they moderate this relation.  
This study extends the literature on dynamic capabilities by showing how stability in its 
form of formal structures within the organization and redundancy or slack at the work floor 
form fertile grounds. In line with Farjoun’s (2010) theoretical arguments on duality 
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between change and stability, we find that dynamic capabilities work best when they are 
embedded in a stable and well-structured organization. As such, they do not form a tradeoff 
but have, as hinted at by Zahra et al. (2006), complex interactions among each other. 
Dynamic capabilities without stable underlying structures might lead to chaos and at least 
moderate the positive impact of these capabilities in nascent markets. The counter-intuitive 
hypothesis that dynamic capabilities are strengthened by this form of stability is novel and 
extends the theoretical perspective on dynamic capabilities, which at most considers these 
capabilities to be contingent upon the environment and the development of underlying 
operational capabilities. The fact that organizational stability underpins the impact of 
dynamic capabilities has been largely neglected in the literature. Our study shows that 
companies in nascent markets, of which the environmental conditions force these 
companies to explore business models, need to create stability in order to be able to allow 
for changes. These findings are also in line with Sine et al.’s (2006) findings that formal 
structure enhances performance in new ventures (in nascent markets). However, we show 
that their findings do not exclude flexibility. Ventures which have a degree of formalization 
exceed in addressing changes in the environment by developing specific dynamic 
capabilities, which in turn amplify the impact on performance. 
In addition to the theoretical contribution, this article also provides an empirical 
contribution to the literature on dynamic capabilities (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Teece, 
2007) by developing and testing measures of dynamic capabilities. Moreover, we show the 
often assumed but never tested positive impact of dynamic capabilities on the most 
important performance outcome of new ventures in nascent markets, namely firm survival. 
Despite the increased interest in dynamic capabilities, the concept remains an empirically 
unexplored construct with the exception of a few studies (eg. Danneels, 2008; Drnevich and 
Kriauciunas, 2012), most researchers measure the construct in an indirect way instead of 
developing a scale. The fact that we empirically show that dynamic capabilities contribute 
to the survival of ventures in nascent markets, reinforces the underlying assumption that 
developing the conditions in a ventures which allow for change, prevails.  
Third, our paper also shows that boards have an impact which is contrary to the one we 
hypothesized. Despite the fact that the board literature shows that boards bring stability to 
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a venture due to their monitoring function, they do not amplify the impact of dynamic 
capabilities. This indicates that the role of boards might be more complicated than initially 
hypothesized in this paper. Despite the fact that boards facilitate structure and financial 
reporting procedures, they might also invoke rigidity in a company because of resource 
cognition (Danneels, 2010). Resource cognition refers to the cognitions which managers 
have about the firm’s resources. More specifically, resources cognition refers to the 
identification of resources and the understanding of their fungibility, which is crucial in 
understanding the impact of dynamic capabilities. Danneels (2010) shows that the further 
away executive decision makers are from the work floor the more difficult it will be for 
them to assess the real resources of the company. Hence, directors in a venture might rely 
on cognitions which are detached from the real environment in which the venture operates 
or which are different from the real resource base that can form a competitive environment. 
We can imagine that directors, who are only occasionally present at the venture and who 
serve on different venture boards, do not have the same focus of attention as founding team 
members. Still, due to the power of boards in ventures, they will codetermine strategic 
decisions and monitor the actions taken by the venture executives. Their deep involvement 
in the strategic decision making might be counterproductive, especially in nascent markets 
where usually no financial performance indicators are possible to use as benchmarks. This 
finding is particularly important to increase our understanding of the role which boards 
play in new ventures and extends the relatively new, emerging theories on board 
monitoring in new ventures (Garg, 2012). 
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APPENDIX D: Dynamic capabilities scale 
Different companies are good at different things. The following questions ask you to assess your 
company’s skills in various areas, relative to other start-ups. Relative to other start-ups and based 
on new information, my company is good at … 
 
 Strongly                                        Strongly  
Disagree                                          Agree 
1. Assessing the potential of new markets 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. Researching new competitors and new customers 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. Assessing the feasibility of new technologies 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. Identifying promising new technologies 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. Changing the marketing and communication plan  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. Altering the product roadmap 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. Making changes to the global delivery model / 
distribution channels 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. Revising the technology roadmap 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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5 Conclusions, implications and directions for further research  
This dissertation is a collection of three empirical papers on the capabilities of new 
technology-based firms. The first study examines the process by which firms develop 
dynamic capabilities to restructure their resources configuration and bundle resources into 
new substantive capabilities. In this study, I draw on the attention-based view, the cognitive 
dissonance theory and the literature on competing objectives to reveal possible barriers to 
the development of dynamic capabilities. The second paper focuses on the impact of early 
top managers (founders) and entrepreneurial teams on the development of capabilities. 
More specifically, I use the upper echelon theory and the micro-foundation perspective to 
investigate which managerial characteristics impact either the development of substantive 
or dynamic capabilities. In the third paper, I study the relationship between dynamic 
capabilities and firm survival. Here, I reveal the conditions under which dynamic 
capabilities can be beneficial for surviving the early stages. 
In this final chapter I summarize the main findings of these three studies. Next, I discuss the 
most important contributions for management science and provide an overview of the 
implications for management practice. Last, I give an overview of the limitations of my Ph.D 
which give rise to potential avenues for future research.  
5.1 Main findings 
The dynamic capabilities view has become dominant in explaining how firms can create a 
competitive advantage. Dynamic capabilities can be defined as the capacity of a firm to 
change their resource base, its substantive capabilities or its environment. Substantive 
capabilities are the firm’s capacity to perform a particular activity in a reliable and at least 
minimally satisfactory way (Helfat and Winter, 2011). While recent research provides 
empirical evidence that dynamic capabilities are crucial for the performance of both 
established (Drnevich and Kriauciunas, 2012) and new companies (see third study of this 
Ph.D), the existing capability literature remains largely silent when it comes to explaining 
how these capabilities emerge (Autio et al, 2011). To trace the emergence of capability 
formation, one needs to track the early stages of a firm, because it is during this phase that 
capabilities are developed. As Autio et al. (2011) highlighted, in a firm’s early stages no 
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routines have been accumulated over time, and more focus is needed on de novo capability 
development. In order to analyze which capabilities managers are likely to develop from 
scratch in firms, Teece (2007) already highlighted that the micro-foundation view on 
capabilities is an interesting avenue for research because most research on capability 
development is on a firm level. 
In paper 1, I performed a case study of a new technology based firm and focused on the 
micro-foundations of capability development. The capability literature in general has been 
criticized as lacking fundamental theoretic logics which explain the origins of capabilities 
and the micro-processes behind the development of capabilities. In line with this a few 
studies have argued that hierarchies matter in explaining dynamic capabilities. Building on 
the attention-based view, the cognitive dissonance theory and the literature on competing 
objectives, I analyzed how a dynamic capability is developed over time in a new venture 
which was initially one of the highest successes but eventually failed to address a significant 
change in the environment. Using the phases of perception, willingness and ability which 
typically are considered the building blocks of dynamic capabilities, we found several 
important barriers to the development of dynamic capabilities. First, we show that a 
firm should be able to manage attention which is distributed across different levels of 
the hierarchy as part of the awareness creation process. Understanding the 
management of distributed attention is key to advancing the theory of dynamic capabilities 
and more specifically to improve the “awareness/perception” part. Attention is distributed 
at different levels in the organization (Ocasio, 1997) and both the level and focus of 
attention differs at these various decision making levels. Hence, the level at which the 
environmental change is detected and where most likely the answer to that change will be 
formulated will have to communicate clearly to the other levels in the organization in order 
to facilitate that distribution of attention. We refer to the theory of issue selling to address 
these challenges.  
Secondly, firms should manage different levels of cognitive dissonance to create 
willingness. Although different layers in the organization were recognizing the change in 
the environment and were willing to develop an answer to address the environmental need, 
this did not mean that they were willing to change the business model at company level nor 
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to change the associated resources. In fact, we showed that those individual decision 
makers who had extensive experience in their job and who had thus developed heuristics 
which could help them to interpret the environment, were the least willing to change 
anything. Instead, they used their cognitive maps to fine-tune the current business model 
with which they felt comfortable. We theoretically explained this process by referring to the 
theory of cognitive dissonance. It explains why people resist against change and how they 
resist against change. Since dynamic capabilities have as an objective to introduce change in 
an organization, developing these capabilities means that cognitive dissonance will have to 
be managed. We argue that mechanisms of collective sense making are needed to overcome 
these individual  dissonances. 
Finally, realizing change implies that not only perception and willingness are created, but 
also that the individual decision makers must be able to implement the change deemed 
appropriate. We show that instead of moving from one configuration to another, the new 
business model and resource configuration are developed in parallel to the existing one, 
due to cognitive dissonance. Individuals will try to marginalize the dissonant cognition and 
leave the development of the new business model to individuals with less dissonant 
cognitions. However, this form of experimentation with a new business model implies that 
a significant number of the employees had to be able to pursue competing objectives due 
to limited resources. The degree to which they were able to do so also determined the 
ability with which the company was able to go through the final stage of the dynamic 
capability process, namely its implementation. 
Building on the upper echelons theory, which state that the firm reflects the preferences of 
its top management team (Hambrick and Mason, 1984),  I found in the second study of my 
Ph.D that micro-foundations, measured as personality traits, also explain why ventures 
either develop substantive or dynamic capabilities. We show that substantive and 
dynamic capabilities are different constructs, that find their roots in very different 
individual-level personalities. First, I show that conscientious founders and their teams 
foster the development of substantive capabilities. Conscientious founders are typically 
described as hard working, achievement oriented, forward planning and well structured 
(Gellatly, 1996; Ciaverella et al., 2004; Bell, 2007). This personality type impacts the way in 
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which the venture is structured and predicts the extent to which the founder emphasizes 
the development of procedures to increase the venture’s efficiency. However, to sense or 
shape new opportunities and to change existing substantive capabilities, new ventures need 
to develop dynamic capabilities. Our findings indicate that conscientious founders lack 
interest in developing these capabilities. Instead, I found that conscientious individuals 
need proactive team members to develop dynamic capabilities. Hence, if conscientious 
founders team up with proactive co-founders, their ventures do develop dynamic 
capabilities. Our results also show that proactive personalities have a strong positive 
impact on the development of dynamic capabilities, while they ignore the development 
of substantive capabilities. We further find that firms with proactive entrepreneurs without 
conscientious co-founders tend not to develop substantive capabilities. This means that 
proactive individuals will also benefit from working with conscientious co-founders. 
Because personality types and the behaviors which result from them are found to impact 
the development of capabilities in different ways, we provide a strong theoretical 
explanation for the micro foundations of capability development.  
In the third paper, we clarify the conditions under which dynamic capabilities play an 
important role in the early stages of a new venture. First, this article shows the often 
assumed but never tested positive impact of dynamic capabilities on the most important 
performance outcome of new ventures in nascent markets, namely firm survival. Secondly, 
this study extends the literature on dynamic capabilities by showing how stability in its 
form of formal structures within the organization and redundancy or human resource 
slack at the work floor do form fertile grounds. In line with Farjoun’s (2010) theoretical 
arguments on duality between change and stability and by combining arguments based 
upon organizational theory and dynamic capabilities, we find that dynamic capabilities 
work best when they are embedded in a stable and well-structured organization. Dynamic 
capabilities without stable underlying structures might lead to chaos and at least moderate 
the positive impact of these capabilities in nascent markets. Despite the fact that the board 
literature shows that boards also bring stability to a venture due to their monitoring 
function, we find that external boards, in comparison to role formalization of the founding 
team and redundancy on the work floor, do not amplify the impact of dynamic capabilities.  
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5.2 Implications 
5.2.1 Implications for management science 
This research makes several contributions to management science. First, this study 
investigate dynamic capabilities in the context of new ventures. So far, the dynamic 
capabilities literature has given scant attention to younger firms as reviews of the capability 
literature show that most research and theory building has focused on established 
companies (Zahra et al., 2006). Moreover, a growing body of scholars have called for more 
empirical research on how extant organizational theory applies to new ventures (Shane, 
2003; Sine et al., 2006). New ventures start with a business plan to create an outcome. 
However, environmental conditions, resource constraints and cognitive limitations almost 
always prevent founders from executing their plans as initially intended (Baker, Miner, & 
Eesley, 2003; Hmieleski & Corbett, 2008). This means that new ventures also need dynamic 
capabilities that  will help them to sense and seize opportunities so that the firm can change 
their existing resources configurations into new and more profitable directions (Teece, 
2007). This study defines dynamic capabilities in a new venture context, provides insights 
in how dynamic capabilities are formed and explains under which conditions dynamic 
capabilities can be beneficial for new venture survival. Consequently, this dissertation 
contributes to the fields of both strategic management and entrepreneurship. 
Second, this dissertation disentangles substantive from dynamic capabilities. From a 
theoretical perspective, we contribute by identifying resource bundles within a venture that 
could be associated with either increasing the efficiency of operations, i.e. substantive 
capabilities, or changing resource configuration, substantive capabilities or its environment, 
i.e. dynamic capabilities. Therefore, we used an in-depth case study using participant 
observation. From an empirical point of view, we developed the first measurement 
instrument to differentiate substantive and dynamic capabilities based on our 
participant observation and several rounds of scale refinement. Other available instruments 
(such as Danneels, 2008) only measure dynamic capabilities. 
Third, we contribute to the literature stream on the origins of organizational capabilities by 
taking a micro-foundations perspective. Felin and Foss (2011) call for a micro-foundation 
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perspective on capability formation, i.e. a focus at the individual level to understand the 
origins of capability formation (Felin and Foss, 2005). This call is further endorsed by 
several researchers including Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) and Helfat and Peteraf (2003) 
who argue that individual-level attributes are important in the early stages of capability 
development. More specifically, building upon the personality literature, we show that 
conscientious founders and their teams foster the development of substantive capabilities, 
while proactive founders speed up the development of dynamic capabilities. Because 
personality types and the behaviors which result from them are found to impact the 
development of capabilities in different ways, we provide a strong theoretical explanation 
for the foundations of capability development. 
Fourth, our study extends existing research on effects of upper-echelons team 
composition on team outcomes. Some studies on team composition focus mostly on 
diversity effects (e.g., Foo, Wong, and Ong, 2006) while other researchers include average 
team characteristics (e.g., Kearney, Gebert, and Voelpel, 2004). Our study shows that a 
configurational approach can also predict firm outcomes when team members’ 
characteristics complement each other. Relatedly, this study reinforces the key role of top 
managers in determining firm-level outcomes, including those of strategy, decisions, 
structure, and profits (c.f. Castanias and Helfat, 2001).  
Fifth, this dissertation provides a process view on the development of dynamic capabilities 
which allow firms to move from one resource configuration to another. Recently, Danneels 
(2010) calls for a process view to open the black box of dynamic capability theory which 
allows to examine the paths and sequences of dynamic capability development (Barney et 
al., 2011). We extend the dynamic capability perspective by describing the micro-
processes and micro foundations behind it and embedding them in the attention-based 
view, the theory on cognitive dissonance and literature on competing objectives. 
Finally, we contribute to the literature stream that investigates the relationship between 
capabilities and firm performance. While the capability literature has a long tradition in 
explaining the impact of capabilities on firm performance, only very recently studies have 
provided empirical evidence (Drnevich and Kriauciunas, 2012). However, these researchers 
 160 
 
provided evidence for established firms and use subjective measures to operationalize firm 
performance. In this dissertation, we clarify the conditions under which dynamic 
capabilities can be beneficial for the most important performance outcome of new ventures 
in nascent markets, namely firm survival. 
5.2.2 Implications for practice 
The findings and insights from this doctoral study are useful and relevant for 
entrepreneurs, managers, and investors and reveal some interesting implications for public 
investors and policy makers.  
First, this thesis shows that dynamic capabilities are important for new venture 
survival. Environmental conditions, resource constraints and cognitive limitations almost 
always prevent founders from executing their plans as initially intended (Baker, Miner, & 
Eesley, 2003; Hmieleski & Corbett, 2008). New technology-based ventures that developed 
dynamic capabilities, have the capacity to change their existing resource configurations. 
Founders, entrepreneurs and managers should be aware of building such mechanisms from 
the very beginning.  
Second, we clarified the conditions under which dynamic capabilities can be even 
more important for new ventures. In this dissertation, we tested the impact of three 
important factors of stability on the relationship between dynamic capabilities and new 
venture survival. First, we show that new ventures, especially in nascent markets, need 
some form of structure in which dynamic capabilities should be embedded. Dynamic 
capabilities assume that opportunities are identified and decisions are made about how to 
address new, emerging opportunities. If the roles in the founding team are clearly allocated, 
it is likely that these decisions will be taken easier since every member has a specific 
domain (e.g. technology, marketing, operations,…) for which he/she is responsible and 
trustworthy. A second important finding is that boards do not contribute to the positive 
impact of dynamic capabilities on firm survival. Founders, entrepreneurs and managers 
should be aware of the fact that the deep involvement of boards in strategic decision 
making can also be counterproductive, especially in nascent markets where usually no 
financial performance indicators are possible to use as benchmarks.  
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Third, this dissertation also has important implications for the composition of an 
entrepreneurial team. Firms reflect the preferences and decisions of the top team, 
especially in new ventures where there are few hierarchical layers. The literature has 
concluded that both substantive and dynamic capabilities are needed for firm success. Both 
types are influenced by learning and by the amount of previous experience. We show in this 
study that substantive capabilities and dynamic capabilities are different constructs that 
find their roots in very different individual-level personalities. In other words, the 
personalities in a team will determine which form of capabilities is emphasized. As business 
plans and experiences of the entrepreneurial team are seen as important criteria for 
entrepreneurial success, we show in this study that the personalities in a team, measured as 
the level of conscientiousness and proactiveness, influences and determine the 
development of either substantive or dynamic capabilities which are needed to ensure the 
firm performance. Consequently, investors should not ignore the dominant personalities in 
an entrepreneurial team when they make their investment decisions.    
Fourth, our case study shows an example of a new venture which was initially one of the 
highest successes but eventually failed to address a significant change in the environment. 
This study analyses how dynamic capabilities come into existence, reports important 
barriers to the development of dynamic capabilities and offers solutions to deal with 
these barriers. We used the phases of perception, willingness and ability as the building 
blocks of dynamic capabilities. The findings in this study could help entrepreneurs to 
manage these three important building blocks. We show that a firm should be able to 
manage attention, which is distributed across different levels of the hierarchy as part of the 
awareness creation process, by the process of issue selling. The “objectivisation” of data 
through the use of testimonials and external exports, the “change in modes of 
communication” by increasing direct involvement of the actors in different committees and 
the “communication persistency” by continuously putting important issues on the agenda,  
are concrete solutions proposed in our study. 
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New ventures should also be able to manage different levels of cognitive dissonance to 
create willingness to change. Managing cognitive dissonance implies that mechanisms of 
collective sense making are needed to overcome individual dissonances. Material artifacts 
are one such form of mechanism. Previous research has shown that the use of prototypes 
and other visual artifacts facilitates both sense giving from one individual to another and a 
generic collective form of sense making along which a group of individuals draws the same 
conclusions based upon a more collective form of discussion. In addition to material 
artifacts, the development of generic KPIs (key performance indicators) for the new 
business model can be seen as an additional way to stimulate collective sense making at the 
higher levels of the organization. Finally, the use of a benchmark company which had 
already developed a similar business idea did increase the willingness to further explore 
this avenue among the key decision makers. 
A third important building block that entrepreneurs, managers and other stakeholder of a 
new venture should take into account when change is needed, is the ability to implement 
changes. We argue that the management of competing objectives is an important element of 
this implementation process. Our paper proposes both contextual, system level and 
managerial practices to induce the simultaneous pursuit of such competing objectives. The 
company should attract individuals who are able to cope with individual ambidexterity and 
create a context to promote this form of individual level ambidexterity. However, this is not 
sufficient. The organizational system should also have built mechanisms to deal with 
stability and change. This can be realized by bringing redundancy and cognitive variety into 
the system. In addition, managerial practices such as flexibility inducing mechanisms and 
the use of simplifying heuristics can further increase the effectivity of managing efficiency 
and flexibility as a duality. 
Besides implications for founders, entrepreneurs, managers, board members and investors, 
this study also has a few important implications for public investors and policy makers. The 
study provides useful insights for policy makers who want to develop a policy towards 
new technology-based ventures. The economic crisis decreased activity dramatically in 
particular industries. The loss of economic activity will partially have to be compensated by 
the development of new industries, of which new technology-based ventures are important 
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drivers. Policy makers are aware of the importance of these types of companies and set up 
various financial and non-financial support mechanisms. However, the failures rates of 
these companies are still quite high. This study shows that new ventures are often not able 
to execute their business plans as initially agreed with investors. Public investors should be 
aware that new technology-based firms need to have the space to change their 
resource configurations in the direction of potentially more profitable opportunities. This 
means, for example, that public investors may not force new ventures, active in the early 
stages, to comply with initially agreed milestones. Instead, they should consider to refund 
them when they can present a new promising business model. Therefore, these public 
investors need to have experience in the field and perceive the necessary change.  
Finally, the findings in this study can also provide more input for entrepreneurship 
courses and training seminars offered by universities, government agencies or 
business schools. The lessons learned from the new venture failure in the qualitative case 
study and the quantitative survival analyses of 124 new technology based firms should 
provide more insights on how to survive the early stages and drive to new venture success. 
Business schools and universities can use these findings and teach nascent entrepreneurs 
to be more aware of the pit falls and best practices for entrepreneurial success, mentioned 
in this Ph.D. 
5.3 Limitations and directions for further research 
As every empirical study, this thesis is not without limitations, thereby providing avenues 
for future research. First, the dataset is comprised of young, technology-based firms 
located in Flanders. Although this has the benefit of reducing non-measured variance, it 
raises the question whether the results would hold in different environmental settings and 
for other types of firms. Future research may perform similar studies in different countries 
and industries (e.g. low versus high tech) to contribute to our understanding of the 
generalizability of these findings.   
Second, in this dissertation, we focused on the personalities that influence either the 
development of substantive or dynamic capabilities. While this study already reveals that 
conscientiousness and proactiveness are two personality types which are useful in the 
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beginning of a company’s life, future studies could analyze how additions or changes in the 
entrepreneurial team can speed up or slow down the development of certain 
capabilities. Future work could also explain why experience in setting up a structure and 
developing substantive capabilities can be transferred more easily to another start-up 
company as opposed to the experience in sensing or shaping new opportunities. 
Third, in this thesis we did not include team processes as potential independent variables 
for the development of either substantive or dynamic capabilities. Here, we looked at the 
personalities, experiences and cognition of individual entrepreneurs and entrepreneurial 
teams but we pay only limited attention to the interactions between personalities and 
people with different experiences. Future research could for example examine whether 
team conflict will have an influence on the development of dynamic capabilities (Jehn et al., 
1999). Management teams with high levels of task conflict will probably be more able to 
revise the badly performing substantive capabilities and generate more alternatives and 
opportunities. Management teams which are more behaviorally integrated (Simsek et al, 
2005), could be better in exploiting and structuring the existing ideas which helps firms to 
form strong substantive capabilities. Although we already considered the role of the board 
in our case study analyses, researchers could further investigate the specific impact of a 
board on the development of capabilities.  
Fourth, we reported the boundary conditions under which dynamic capabilities can 
have an important impact on firm survival by adjusting and changing substantive 
capabilities. However, future research could further unravel and describe the relationship 
between role formalization, external boards, human resource slack and dynamic 
capabilities. For instance, our study only includes the presence of an external board, while 
future research could also look at the characteristics and the composition of board 
members. More specifically, future research could investigate which characteristics of  
board members or which board compositions will have a positive influence on the survival 
chances of new ventures in nascent markets. Additionally, researchers could come up with 
more boundary conditions under which dynamic capabilities can be beneficial for new 
venture success in the early stages of a company’s life.  
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Fifth, future research could also look at the role of dynamic capabilities in the growth stage 
of the firm. Companies have much more stakeholders, different markets and 
products/services and will be bigger and even more resistant to change. What are barriers 
to develop dynamic capabilities in the growth stage (Cf. study 1)? What is the impact of top 
management teams on capability development in this stage (Cf. study 2)? What are the 
boundary conditions under which dynamic capabilities can be beneficial for firm 
performance in this stage of the company development (Cf. study 3)?  
Finally, we contribute to the micro-foundations literature stream and to the resource 
management framework of Sirmon et al. (2007). They argue that managers play an 
important role in structuring the resource portfolio, bundling the resources into 
capabilities and leveraging capabilities to exploit market opportunities. Study 1 shows 
the role of managers in the process of structuring and bundling resources. Moreover, we 
investigate how managers can restructure these processes when an environmental shock 
influences the company’s business activities. In study 2, we found out which managerial 
characteristics will influence the process of bundling resources into either substantive or 
dynamic capabilities. In the third study, we looked at the relationship between dynamic 
capabilities and new venture survival. We contribute to the literature on resource 
management by showing that role formalization in management teams reinforces the firm’s 
ability to leverage capabilities in the market. However, we did not investigate the impact of 
managerial or founder characteristics on the firm’s ability to leverage capabilities in order 
to exploit opportunities in the market. This remains an important future research avenue 
(Sirmon et al. 2007, 2011). 
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